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ABSTRACT
The problems associated with economic stability 
and rising income among the nations of the world are 
numerous and complex. These problems consist of short 
run and long run difficulties, and pertain to all countries 
regardless of the extent of economic development.
This paper presents the relationship between mone­
tary, fiscal, and external policies as they ?/ere employed 
in some of the Latin American countries during the five- 
year period, 1952-1956. These policies reveal, in large 
measure, changes in income, the price level, and external 
practices of these relatively underdeveloped countries.
For the purpose of determining to what extent 
monetary, fiscal, and external policies should be applied, 
the requirements necessary for a nation to realize a 
condition of international equilibrium are given. This 
concept explains that a stated national income may be 
maintained at a given exchange rate, provided that changes 
in saving and investment are offset by variations in 
imports and exports (the current account of the balance 
of payments). If there are differences betv/een the two 
accounts, then lending (the capital account of the balance 
of payments) would be required to create a balance.
It is suggested that an additional requirement is
viii
necessary before a condition of international equilibrium 
may be established. The requirement is that monetary, 
fiscal, and external policies must be so employed that 
they may fill the gap between saving and investment and 
imports and exports should capital movements fail to do 
so.
The concept of international equilibrium is applied 
to Mexico and Venezuela in order to determine if these two 
countries realized a state of international equilibrium. 
Monetary, fiscal, and external policies are then observed 
for the purpose of relating their contribution toward 
creating such a desirable objective.
It was found that those in charge of carrying out 
these policies in the nations considered were unable to 
obtain the objective of international equilibrium. It is 
suggested that the desire to develop the countries was 
considered to be of greater importance than was that of 
acquiring a condition of international equilibrium. The 
effect has been to relegate the aforementioned policies 
to some extent in order to stimulate economic development.
These findings suggested a need for various 
measures to be undertaken by underdeveloped nations which 
may provide for a greater degree of economic progress and 
stability. The measures suggested are (1) the relation­
ship between gold and international reserves and the money
ix
supply, (2) a comparison between the money supply, national 
product, and price level, and (3) changes in current 
account balances and long-term capital movements.
If utilized, these measures could contribute to a 
greater degree of monetary stability; express the rela­
tive effectiveness of the internal policies— monetary and 
fiscal policies— and, therefore, suggest variations in 
their employment; and provide a basis for estimating the 
need and effectiveness of capital movements.
These measures, as applied to six Latin American 
nations, appeared to justify their use in achieving a 
better balanced growth.
x
INTRODUCTION
A sizeable portion of the vast store of economic 
literature in recent years has been devoted to studies 
on an international level. Some of the writings have 
emphasized the adaptation of older ideas while others 
have presented the application of newer theories, some 
of which pertain directly to the underdeveloped countries,1
Although the larger portion of this literature is 
concerned with the responsibilities of the more highly 
industrialized nations and emphasizes the theme of full 
employment, steady but rising incomes, and relatively 
stable price levels, a growing body of economic writings 
is related to the problems of the lesser developed 
countries* A few of the major problems are discussed 
under such topics as the pent-up postwar demand for 
goods and services, the inadequate supply of many com­
modities* the mal-allocation of resource factors, economic 
development, a lack of saving and investment, disequilibrium
% o r  example, Bertil Ohlin, Interregional and Inter­
national Trade (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1935), 
especially pages 29-30, 42, 48-49, and 57-58$ Ragnar Nurske, 
"Domestic and International Equilibrium,” in The New 
Economics. edited by Seymour Harris, (New York: Alfred A. 
Knopf, 1948), pp. 264-292; and Joan Robinson, "Beggar - 
My - Neighbor Remedies for Unemployment,” in Readings in 
the Theory of International Trade, edited by Howard Ellis 
and Lloyd Metzler, (Philadelphia: The Blakiston Company, 
1949), pp. 393-407.
in the balance of payments, and so on. The subjects are 
of immense importance from both the standpoint of raising 
the apparent low plane of living in the underdeveloped 
areas and of explaining how these nations may fit into 
a pattern of expanding world trade and co-operation.
This paper is to deal with some of the economic 
problems of Latin America as a part of the general group 
of countries which are referred to as the underdeveloped 
areas of the world.^ Specifically, the contention of 
this paper is that the problems associated with fluctuat­
ing incomes, general high prices and inflation, and 
imbalances in the balance of payments could be ameliorated 
to a great extent if monetary, fiscal, and external 
policies were applied with greater effectiveness.3 The 
effectiveness allows for the application of these policies 
primarily through the present means now available in the 
countries. It further suggests a change in the manner
^The term underdeveloped area is construed to mean 
a nation or group of nations with a low per-capita income 
but having the basic prerequisites for material improve­
ment. For a more authoritative definition of under­
development refer to N. S. Buchanan, and H. S. Ellis, 
Approaches to Economic Development (New York: Twentieth 
Century Fund, 1955), p. 4; and E. M. Bernstein, and I. G. 
Patel, "Inflation In Relation To Economic Development," 
International Monetary Fund, Staff Papers. Vol. II, No.
3, November, 1952, p. 363.
^There are numerous articles treating these general 
problems. For an interesting account of the instability
of their employment only if the policies are inflexible, 
or have little or no effect on the functioning of the 
economy as they are used. In addition, it makes little 
sense if the policies are employed without proper co­
ordination.4
The approach to the solution of the above indicated 
problems begins with a logical hypothesis. It Is assumed 
that those in charge of directing the economic growth of 
the lesser developed nations hold a condition of Inter­
national equilibrium as their major objective. This 
objective may not be attained, or if it becomes a reality, 
the nations may not be able to maintain such a condition. 
From a more practical viewpoint, it is not so important 
as to whether or not a condition of international equi­
librium is maintained as long as It remains the chief
of domestic income and employment and the inevitable dis­
couragement of investment in the raw material industries 
caused by the oscillating of prices in the export industry 
see R. F. Mikesell, Foreign Exchange In The Postwar World 
(New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1954), p. 441. Mr.
Adler suggests less emphasis upon agricultural production 
to relieve the price problem while Mr. James W. Angell, 
et al., explains that in the next fifty years agricultural 
prices may become more steady than those of industrial 
products. Refer to John Adler, "The Fiscal and Monetary 
Implementations of Development Programs,11 American Economic 
Review. Papers and Proceedings. May, 1952, pp. 588-91; and 
James W. Angell, et al., Economic Policy, edited by William 
Grampp and Emanuel Weiler, (Homewood, Illinois: Richard D. 
Irwin, Inc., 1956), p. 319.
4Among several good articles on this subject refer
objective of these countries. Thus, it is realized that 
there are factors at work which constantly tend to dis­
turb an otherwise balanced pattern of growth. It is 
important, therefore, that these nations attempt to 
readjust to the altered conditions. Monetary, fiscal, 
and external policies have a definite role to play in 
helping to mitigate the adverse effects of these dis­
turbances.
The concept of international equilibrium explains 
that a nation could maintain a given national income at 
a stated exchange rate provided that realized saving 
equated realized investment and imports equated exports 
(a current account balance). Furthermore, that the above 
condition could be maintained If the balance between the 
internal accounts of saving and Investment are different 
from that of the external accounts of Imports and exports, 
provided that the movement of international capital is 
equal to the difference.^
to John Adler, "The Fiscal and Monetary Implementations 
of Development Programs,” American Economic Review. Papers 
and Proceedings, May, 1952, pp. 584-600; Seymour Harris 
fed.), Economic Problems of Latin America (New York; 
McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc., 1944)", pp. 96-112; and Simon G. 
Hanson, Economic Development In Latin America (Washington; 
The Inter-American Affairs Press, 1951), especially Chapter 
14, ”The Role of the Government: Public Finance, Banking 
and Economic Planning,” pp. 456-490.
®The writer drew heavily on the work of Professors
It is further suggested that capital, the balancing 
factor, may not be of sufficient magnitude— whether the 
balancing result requires an inflow or outflow of capital—  
to provide a balance between the internal and external 
accounts. If capital should be exactly sufficient to 
close the gap, it still must be directed into channels 
which would react on saving and investment and imports 
and exports in a balancing fashion, otherwise Income or 
the exchange rate, or both, would be subject to change.
On the other hand, the flow of capital is subject 
to decisions made by foreign residents, firms, and govern­
ments. Since these foreign groups must give sanction 
to capital movements, the lesser developed nations are 
not always in a position to influence the directional 
flow of capital.
From the reasons stated In the above paragraphs, 
it is likely that capital movements are normally unable 
to accomplish a condition of international equilibrium 
in the open economies of the underdeveloped countries.
Enke and Salera for the explanation of the concept of 
International equilibrium. See Stephen Enke and Virgil 
Salera, International Economics, second edition (Hew 
York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1952), pp. 232-241. This 
material is also presented in the third edition bearing 
the same title. Refer to Appendix A, pp. 555-565. All 
subsequent references pertaining to the above concept 
Is taken from the second edition.
A final contention of this paper is, then, that 
monetary, fiscal, and external policies must complement 
the movement of capital in order to close the gap between 
the internal and external accounts of these nations to 
achieve, if not maintain, a state of international equi­
librium, A more exhaustive treatment of the concept of 
international equilibrium and the role of monetary, 
fiscal, and external policies is reserved for the first 
part of Chapter I.
To get closer to the more practical implications 
in the employment of the three aforementioned policies, 
the last part of Chapter I is concerned with some of the 
numerous variable factors which influence the implemen­
tation of monetary, fiscal, and external policies. Some 
of the factors considered are foreign exchange reserves, 
depreciation of the currency, individual and business 
savings, the character of the banking systems, taxation, 
the role of governmental agencies, exchange systems, and 
so on.
No effort is made to separate the variable factors 
into a dependent or independent status. Income is con­
sidered to be the only independent variable factor. All 
other elements are dependent on one another and on income 
itself. Furthermore, each factor is introduced and 
analyzed individually. Also, little effort is expended
7in associating the influence of other factors upon a single 
factor under consideration. This method seems to he justi­
fiable since the purpose of our analysis at this stage 
is to probe into the nature of these factors as they would 
appear to be employed in the lesser developed economies.
To state the matter a little differently, one wants to 
know more about what to expect from the influences that 
these factors create in the underdeveloped countries.6 
Perhaps the variable factors introduced in this survey 
produce different effects than the same factors at work 
in the more highly developed nations. In addition, there 
may be some factors evident in the underdeveloped nations 
that are of minor significance in the more industrialized 
countries. Finally, some of the factors which exist in 
the lesser developed nations may not be evident at all 
in the advanced countries.'
After having examined the theory of international 
equilibrium and the anticipated influences exerted by 
the variable factors, subsequent chapters deal with the 
practical application of these forces. Chapter II is
6A1though important, such elements as cultural 
and political factors are not considered within the 
realm of this study.
^For instance, an increase in the tax rates appli­
cable to individual incomes may tend to stimulate pro­
duction in the developed nations, whereas a similar rise
8devoted to a study of Mexico, while Chapter III is con­
cerned with a study of Venezuela. In this manner, one 
is given an opportunity to apply the concepts developed 
in Chapter I.
These two nations are chosen on the basis of their 
dissimilar characteristics; that is, Mexico is primarily 
a domestic economy, and Venezuela is chiefly an export 
economy. Also, the external portion of their economies 
functions on a different basis. Mexico employs a flexible 
exchange rate system, and Venezuela utilizes a form of 
exchange control. Recent experience in these two under­
developed countries should present one with an opportunity 
to test the concept of international equilibrium; to 
observe the influences generated by the variable factors; 
and to examine the extent to which monetary, fiscal, and 
external policies contribute, or fail to contribute, 
toward a more balanced economic growth.
With the results produced after examining the two
in tax rates is likely to depress production in the lesser 
developed countries. A change in interest rates normally 
has the effect of determining the direction of Investment 
expenditures In the industrialized nations. Yet, a vari­
ation of interest rates in the underdeveloped countries 
may provide very little inducement in the employment of 
capital. Also, the latter countries may occasion an 
immediate capital flight in response to external pressures 
on their exchange rates. These pressures may be evident 
only after long intervals in the highly developed nations, 
and the probability of anticipated capital flight is likely 
to be remote.
above nations, the first part of the last chapter, Chapter 
IV, offers several measuring devices which should be use­
ful in describing the effectiveness of the above internal 
and external policies. The measuring devices include (l) 
the relationship between gold and international reserves 
and the money supply, (g) a comparison between the money 
supply, national product (income), and the price level, 
and (3) changes in current account balances and long-term 
capital movements.
These devices are applied to six Latin American 
countries, three of which represent domestic economies 
in opposition to export economies. They include Argentina, 
Brazil, and Mexico. The remaining three nations are prima­
rily export economies and consist of Chile, Peru, and 
Venezuela.
The six nations are taken as representative samples 
of the numerous countries referred to as the Latin American 
area. Of course, the list could be expanded. Yet, the 
number of countries chosen should be sufficient for these 
purposes, and may serve as a basis for judging whether or 
not the nations are directing their policies so as to 
achieve a condition of international equilibrium. In 
addition, the measuring devices may yield some information 
with respect to the requirement of foreign capital and 
the ability of the countries to absorb it. Finally, they
10
should suggest the need for a change in the use of one or 
more of the internal or external policies, or a shift in 
emphasis in applying the policies, to provide a more 
continuous pattern of growth.
The second part of Chapter IV is reserved for draw­
ing up the general conclusions.
The theoretical portion of this paper is largely 
confined to Chapter I Conceptual Relations Among Variable 
Factors. Chapter II Ihe Case of Mexico, Chapter III The 
Case of Venezuela, and the first part of Chapter IV Some 
Concluding Observations are primarily devoted to observ­
ing and describing events as they take place.
Chapters II and III follow a similar sequence of 
development. The earlier sections of these two chapters 
are concerned with the concept of international equi­
librium and, therefore, deal with the influences exerted 
on the national income and price level by the forces of 
saving, investment, imports, exports, and lending (capital) 
over a five-year period, 1952-1956. A discussion of the 
internal and external influences which give rise to 
changes In the above factors is presented on a year-to- 
year basis. This approach gives one an opportunity to 
check on the application and co-ordination of monetary, 
fiscal, and external policies, and to determine their 
effectiveness, or lack of effectiveness, in maintaining
11
the national income for the period.
In connection with Venezuela, an attempt is made 
to measure the approximate state of international equi­
librium by excluding, as far as possible, the impact of 
the petroleum industry, and then incorporating the con­
tribution of the oil firms into the analysis. By excluding 
this external element in the first instance, it should 
give one a chance to estimate the internal growth of the 
nation.
This paper is subject to perhaps many limitations.
A. few of the more important limiting factors pertain to
the number of countries included in this study and the 
time element. Besides being a monumental task, the 
inclusion of a larger number of Latin American countries 
would perhaps alter the findings to only a minor extent. 
Yet, because they are not included, the above statement 
is open to valid criticism. Nevertheless, some of the 
countries are in such an early stage of development that 
the type of analysis used in.this paper would yield inef­
fective results. Also, the kind of information which is 
required in a study of this nature wrould probably be 
1acking.
With respect to the time factor, the period under
study is of short duration. It includes only five recent
years, 1952-1956. At best, this short time span allows
one to only touch on the edges of the intermediate period. 
Nevertheless, whenever there are definite indications of 
the more pronounced long run forces exerting their weight, 
they will he brought to the reader’s attention.
CHAPTER I
CONCEPTUAL RELATIONS AMONG VARIABLE FACTORS
Certainly many of our present day economic problems 
dealing with nations hinge upon the outcome of the working 
of numerous variable forces. There is still room for more 
analytical treatment of these forces, especially as they 
apply to nations carrying on trade with one another. 
Furthermore, the underdeveloped areas have particular 
problems which may be alleviated somewhat through a 
better understanding of the interplay of variable factors.
This chapter is to deal with some of the variable 
factors as they affect the functioning of an economy. In 
other words, the question posed is: what effects can one 
expect from the working of these variable factors? Of 
utmost importance are the possible effects to be realized 
in the functioning of an open economy, and particularly 
as the factors are applied in underdeveloped nations.
To get underway, it would seem prudent to establish 
the conditions which provide for an equilibrium situation 
of a nation engaged in trade. After such a setting is 
accomplished, variable factors will be introduced and 
analyzed. The variable factors will be treated under 
two general headings: (1) monetary and fiscal variables 
and (2) external variables. There will be an overlapping
15
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between these two categories; nonetheless, a general 
categorizing is attempted for clarity.
Emphasis is to be placed upon the monetary effects 
of the variables rather than their effects upon the flow 
of goods. This distinction is of more importance when 
the external factors are treated.
The subject matter in this chapter will pertain 
mostly to general short-term problems rather than long 
run adjustments, and, therefore, should be considered as 
supplemental to the more fundamental long run processes.
I . THE SETTING
The income approach will be utilized to establish 
the necessary requirements for international equilibrium 
of a nation engaged in trade. At the outset, the various 
symbols must be defined.-*- NI is to refer to a given 
national income; E is to represent intended exports; M is 
to indicate intended imports; S is to represent intended 
saving; A is to explain intended investment, that is, the
%ost of the terminology is taken from Professors 
Enke and Salera. See Stephen Enke and Virgil Salera, 
International Economics (New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 
1951)7 PP« 233-241. For other references of interest see 
Charles Kindleberger, International Economics (Homewood, 
Illinois: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1955), especially Chapter 
22, "Cyclical Disturbance to Equilibrium," pp. 414-435; 
and Harry Brainard, International Economics and Public 
Policy (New York: Henry Holt and Co.7 1954)7 pp. 157-172.
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net accumulation of real capital by residents; L is to 
represent the rate of lending; MB is to refer to monetary 
and banking policies; and F is to relate to fiscal policy.
E and A tend to increase income while M and S tend 
to reduce income, other things remaining the same. There 
is no assurance, however, that E -f- A equals M ■+* S since 
either or both factors on one side of the equation may 
rise or fall to an extent greater or less than one or both 
of the factors on the opposite side of the equation at 
any given point in time. For example, a rise in intended 
exports is not likely to be associated with an exact rise 
in intended imports. And it is further unlikely that the 
difference between these two amounts will be exactly offset 
by a rise in intended saving and a fall in intended invest­
ment to accomplish an equality between the two sides of the 
equation.^ The same reasoning may be applied to any other 
situation in respect to these factors. In other words, 
in order to establish national equilibrium two balancing 
factors must come into play. They are (1) the intended 
rate of lending (L) and (g) monetary and fiscal policies
2 As observables, saving and investment are equal. 
However, at any given point in time, either factor may 
be larger or smaller than the other. In this connection 
see Alvin Hansen, Monetary Theory and Fiscal Policy (New 
York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1949), Appendix B, pp. 219- 
225.
16
(MB and F).5
The center of attention will first be directed 
upon lending. The following conditional requirement for 
the establishment of national equilibrium is stated in 
the following equation.4
E - M  = L = A -  S
Lending plays the important role of creating a 
balance between the two sides of the equation (E - M and 
A - S).5 In doing so it connects the national economy, 
at a given income level and exchange rate, through the 
intended saving and intended investment account, and the 
international economy through the external accounts of 
intended exports and intended imports.
The result is that the excess of intended saving 
over intended investment may be offset by positive lend­
ing. If the' opposite situation existed, negative lend­
ing (borrowing) would be instigated in order to balance 
the account.
Similar reasoning may be applied to the external 
account witnessing an excess of intended exports over
®These two forces are briefly discussed by Professor 
Kindleberger. Refer to Kindleberger, op. cit., pp. 438 
and 448-450.
4Enke and Salera, op. cit.. p. 233.
^Lending here includes the usual capital account
items.
17
imports or vice versa. The former would provide a 
balance by positive lending, and the latter through 
negative lending. The outcome is explained in a some­
what different light by Professors Enke and Salera in 
the following statement: ”. . .  When equilibrium has 
been attained, intended exports minus intended imports 
will equal intended saving minus intended investment 
because both differences will be equal to lending.”®
The above discussion may be augmented by pointing 
out individual conditions emphasizing the direction of 
lending.
If:
E>M, L should be positive, (-) effect 
in the balance of payments, or lending, 
takes place.
M>E, L should be negative, (+) effect 
in the balance of payments, or negative 
lending (borrowing), takes place.
S> A, L should be positive, (-) effect 
in the balance of payments, or lending, 
takes place.
A> S, L should be negative, (♦) effect 
in the balance of payments, or negative 
lending (borrowing), takes place.
Lending in its balancing role may be either a 
cause or effect factor.^ From a causal viewpoint, lending
®Enke and Salera, o&. cit.. p. 234. 
^Enke and Salera, o]D. cit., p. 233.
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would involve contracts for the movement of funds based 
upon decisions of individuals, government, and private 
or quasi-public institutions.
Lending as a resultant concept may occur when 
exporters decide to place their earnings in a bank of 
the importing country. There is a transfer of purchas­
ing power as would be occasioned by a movement of short­
term funds.
Since lending and borrowing involve two nations, 
which means that the flow of funds must be sanctioned by 
both sides, except for similar transactions as mentioned 
at the end of the above paragraph, lending may fail to 
close the necessary gap between the equation factors.
For instance, intended lending may fail to close the gap 
registered by an excess of intended exports over intended 
imports; or, a surplus of intended investment over intended 
saving may not be reduced by the necessary amount required 
through intended (negative) lending.
In such a case as given, there would be a tendency 
for the national income to change, or the exchange rate 
would have to be modified.
The possible failure of lending as a balancing 
factor to provide a given national income and rate of 
exchange may be compensated for through the interaction 
of the second balancing factor (s)— monetary policy (MB)
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and fiscal policy (F). A second equation may be conceived 
and expressed as follows:
E - M = MB and F = A - S 
In this equation monetary and fiscal policy replace 
lending in the former equation.8 This attempts to explain 
that if lending— involving other nations— doe;: ■ t achieve 
the necessary balance between the accounts, the money and 
banking system and the government could provide enough 
flexibility to achieve the desired balance.
Monetary and fiscal policy could play an Important 
part in achieving equilibrium. Some of the measures 
available are applied to individual situations below.
If:
E>M, MB should provide for an Increase 
In the international exchange reserve 
fund to act as a "buffer."
F should allow for an increase of 
export taxes or a reduction in subsidies, 
if granted.
M> E, MB should utilize the "buffer" of 
international exchange reserves.
F should include a rise in import 
taxes or a reduction of import subsidies, 
if granted.
®The term replacement is employed here only as 
an explanation of the new balancing factor(s) (MB and F). 
Actually, the factor(s) supplement rather than replace 
lending.
go
s> A, MB should grant a selective downward 
revision of quantitative and qualitative 
controls; a reduction of commercial bank 
interest rates.
F should produce a decrease in 
taxation; an increase of transfer payments; 
a rise in government lending to the public.
A} S, MB should incorporate a selective 
upward revision of quantitative and 
qualitative controls; a rise of commercial 
bank interest rates.
F should sanction an increase in 
taxation; a reduction of transfer payments; 
stepped-up government borrowing from the 
public.
The types of measures and the extent of their use 
would depend a great deal upon the experience of the nation 
involved. The maintenance of a supply of exchange reserves 
as a result of an international sales increase is an 
accepted means today of providing for future declines in 
export sales or for changes in relative imports. Inter­
national reserves may be used as a first line of defense 
to close the gap if negative lending fails to do so.^ 
Variations in tax levies may not register the 
desired effects within a reasonable period of time. On 
the other hand, a highly efficient tax system could 
provide the necessary directional change in saving, 
exports, and imports, especially if commodity taxes and
^Venezuela has accumulated approximately $350 
million of gold and foreign exchange between the years 
195S and 1956. See the International Monetary Fund, 
International Financial Statistics. any recent issue.
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similar excise taxes constitute an important segment of 
income. Export and import tax levies may be changed in 
short-order if the Executive branch of the government 
has been granted authority to vary these imposts.^
Governmental borrowing from the domestic sector 
could be carried out in connection with tax policy and 
other fiscal measures to insure the filling of the gap 
not closed through lending. The decision to use this 
measure would hinge upon the desirability of creating a 
temporary debt and the extent of prior debt outstanding.
The smaller the gap to be closed between the two sides of 
the equation, including lending, the more likely would be 
the possibility of employing government borrowing from 
the public.
Borrowing from the banking system creates additional 
reserves for commercial banks and makes possible larger
^Decree number 2602 allowed the Acting President 
of Columbia to establish import duties for all commodities 
in the Tariff Schedule. Refer to United States Department 
of Commerce, Business Information Service. World Trade 
Series, number 177, February, 1952; laws 1502 and 53 of 
1935 and 1939, respectively, gave the President of Paraguay 
the power to increase import duties in an amount equal to 
revenue losses from changes in the official rate of exchange. 
See United States Department of Commerce, Investment in 
Paraguay. December, 1954, p. 90; and Presidential decree 
number 11 issued on October 18, 1955 exempted certain 
industries from paying Nicaraguan import duties on various 
products- Refer to United States Department of Commerce, 
Foreign Commerce Weekly. December 19, 1955, p. 8.
H-James Maxwell, Fiscal Policy (New York: Henry
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loans. However, this action by itself may reduce saving 
only slightly. This depends primarily upon psychological 
stimulation and anticipation of future economic conditions 
by the public in general.
A change in the flow of transfer payments could 
be so altered as to contribute somewhat toward closing 
the gap between the equation factors. Perhaps the most 
serious obstacle connected with this measure is the time 
element. Generally, a change in the directional flow of 
transfer payments takes too long to accomplish desirable 
results.
Probably the most flexible measure would be the 
altering of quantitative and qualitative controls of the 
banking system. Timing is of immense importance. In 
the case in which intended saving is in excess of 
intended accumulation and positive intended lending 
does not close the gap, a lowering of the general and 
selective monetary controls should reduce the evident 
high liquidity. Lowering bank interest rates would also 
contribute something toward the accomplishment of the 
same objective, because it would tend to entice idle 
funds into investment channels. A reverse application
Holt and Co., 1955), pp. 115-117. This is a good although 
brief discussion of the merits and demerits of spending 
and taxation.
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of these monetary measures would serve to close the gap 
if intended accumulation were grea-ter than intended saving 
and intended lending fell short of absorbing the differ­
ence*
In the above discussion monetary and banking 
measures were causal factors directly instigated to 
create a balance between the equation factors. One may 
inquire as to whether these measures could be effectual 
factors, i. e., applied for some other given purpose yet 
indirectly aiding in closing the gap. This appears 
entirely possible. Quantitative and qualitative controls 
are tightened when the authorities feel that there is 
too much money and credit in circulation or when prices 
begin to rise. This is normally a period when intended 
accumulation is in excess of intended saving. A general 
loosening of controls would take place when there is too 
little money and credit in circulation or when prices 
start to fall. This is usually the time when intended 
saving is in excess of intended accumulation.
The varying of monetary controls in an attempt to 
deal effectively with the supply of money and credit in 
circulation would tend to produce changes in the direction 
required to help offset the excess of intended saving 
over intended investment and vice versa.
At present monetary and fiscal policies are
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probably more in the realm of effect factors than they 
are cause factors so far as they pertain to the balanc­
ing of the equation. In other words, these policies are 
applied mainly to the domestic problems of money, credit, 
and prices rather than as measures instigated to fill a 
gap in order to achieve a given national income.
So far it has been shown that a nation could 
realize a national equilibrium condition through the 
alteration of the rate of lending and monetary and fiscal 
policies. International equilibrium could not be achieved, 
however, without taking into account the rate of exchange. 
There would be only one exchange rate and national income 
level that would provide an equilibrium, given the rate 
of lending and the sum of the monetary and fiscal 
Influencing devices.
The national Income level may rise or fall, but 
there is only one exchange rate at each income level that 
would provide equilibrium, given the rate of lending and 
the influence of monetary and fiscal factors. Conversely, 
there may be different exchange rates, but there is only 
one income level at each exchange rate that would assure 
equilibrium, given the rate of lending and the Influence
-*-^ The recent experience of Brazil and Chile 
indicates that monetary and fiscal policies were quite 
unsuccessful in relieving the above domestic problems.
Refer to Table III, page 309, and 3.10 of this paper.
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of monetary and fiscal measures.
If there is a tendency for the rate of lending to 
he positive, recording a (-) in the balance of payments, 
when intended exports exceed intended imports and (S> A), 
there will be pressure exerted to raise the exchange rate 
unless this tendency is offset by monetary and fiscal 
policies. The opposite reaction would be expected if 
there is a tendency for the rate of lending to be negative, 
causing a (+) in the balance of payments, when intended 
imports exceed intended exports and (A>S). There will 
be pressure exerted to lower.the exchange rate unless 
this tendency is offset by monetary and fiscal policies.
The influence of intended saving and intended 
investment will affect the exchange rate mainly in an 
indirect manner. The extent of the influence may be 
very slight, depending upon the importance of trade in 
relation to national income.
If monetary policy is chiefly relied upon to 
close the gap when intended accumulation is excessive, 
the dampening effect via discouraging loans in order to 
accomplish a higher liquidity may actually create a 
desire on the part of individuals to spend abroad. The 
transferring of purchasing power has the effect of
l^Enke and Salera, oja. cit.. p. 254.
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turning saving into spending and relieving the downward 
pressure upon the exchange rate.-*-4 The reverse effects 
would he expected should intended saving be larger than 
intended investment.-*-5
This discussion should point out the extreme 
difficulty that a nation would encounter in order to 
achieve an international equilibrium relying primarily 
upon the tedious task of balancing the several factors.
In addition, this short run balance does not include many 
factors that actually bear great weight. The general 
level of prices, for example, may change with income, 
move in the opposite direction, or remain constant 
depending upon the relative elasticities of those two 
factors. It is possible that the income elasticity of 
demand may be greater than the price elasticity of demand. 
This would mean that a greater than proportionate increase
^ The result of this action depends in great 
measure upon the initial group that carried out the 
negative lending. If this group were the government, 
the above result is possible. If individuals were the 
recipients of borrowing, monetary policy may or may not 
accomplish this result.
45This analysis assumes that the multiplier effect 
is neutralized; e. g., autonomous exports would bring 
forth autonomous imports with the accompanying results 
of induced exports and induced imports. In line with the 
above reasoning either the exports and imports achieve 
exact proportions— which is highly unlikely— or their 
effects are offset through the operation of the two 
balancing factors. Professor Brainard discusses the
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in income would be spent upon certain classes of goods. 
These products, however, may be occasioned with a rela­
tively inelastic demand with respect to price. Further 
purchases may not be forthcoming unless the price falls.
In other words, the incentive to buy which is created by 
additional income may be offset by high, rigid prices.
In another case, the price elasticity of demand may be 
quite high along with income elasticity of demand. This 
condition may bring about a lower price level since a 
given increase in income in certain lines of goods could 
stimulate purchases to such an extent that total revenue 
accruing to businessmen would be greater at the lower 
price, and, hence, cause pressure toward a lower general 
price level. Of course, in both instances above, the 
movements would depend upon whether the goods involved 
loom heavy in the public’s budget. The state of employ­
ment would also have an Impact on these two forces.
There is a good deal of emphasis placed upon such 
a precarious balancing of these factors t o d a y . T h e
operation of the multiplier according to four sources 
of income: new gold, use of foreign bank deposits, 
foreign loans, and government grants. See Brainard, 
op. cit., pp. 164-166.
■^The income approach would require the utili­
zation of the two balancing factors in order to main­
tain equilibrium at a given national income.
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camps are divided on this score* Advocates on the one 
side argue that international equilibrium is the primary 
responsibility of the individual n a t i o n . E a c h  country 
must keep in step or be ostracized by the others. The 
opposing forces feel that international equilibrium is 
basically an international co-operative responsibility 
rather than an essentially domestic one.^-® This interest­
ing problem is, however, outside the scope of this study.
The remainder, of this chapter is to be concerned 
with some of the monetary, fiscal, and exchange variables. 
Disequilibrium and imbalance are terms often referred to 
in discourse concerning the economic problems of nations. 
Special significance is attached to these terms when 
discussion is directed toward the underdeveloped areas.
Before discussing the variable factors and dis­
equilibrium, the concept of equilibrium should be defined. 
According to Professor Kindleberger, international
•^National and International Measures for Full 
Employment. Report by a Group of Experts appointed by 
the Secretary-General (Lake Success, New York: United 
Nations Publications, 1949), pp. 49-50.
l®Delbert Snider, Introduction to International 
Economics (Homewood, Illinois: Richard Irwin, Inc.,
1954), pp. 384-385. Also refer to Brainard, op. cit., 
pp. 189-191; and Jacob Viner, "The Prospects for Foreign 
Trade in the Postwar World,” in Readings In The Theory 
Of International Trade, edited by Howard Ellis and 
Lloyd Metzler, ("Philadelphia: The Blakiston Co., 1949), 
p. 526.
equilibrium means: ”. . .  that state of the balance of 
payments over the relevant time period which makes it 
possible to sustain an open economy without severe unem­
ployment on a continuing basis. , . ."19 Equilibrium, 
from the rate-of-exchange approach, is explained by 
Professor Nurske ". . . as one that maintains a country1s 
external accounts in equilibrium without the need for 
wholesale unemployment at home. . . ."29 ^ synthesis of
these two definitions yields several points as conditions 
for international equilibrium. They are: (1) an equality 
in the balance of payments, (2) a relatively high state 
of employment at home, and (S) a rate of exchange suit­
able to maintain (1) and (2) over a period of time.
II. SOME VARIABLE FACTORSSl
The above problems of international equilibrium 
have not been solved. No doubt part of the difficulty
. -^Kindleberger, oja. cit.. p. 597.
^Ragnar Nurske, "Conditions of International 
Monetary Equilibrium," in Readings In The Theory Of Inter­
national Trade (Philadelphia: The Blakiston Co., 1949),
pp. 11-12.
^-The variable factors as referred to here mean 
those factors which in the short run and intermediate 
period would cause a disruption to the otherwise smooth 
flow of economic activity unless offset, or at least 
mitigated, through monetary, fiscal, or exchange practices.
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lies in the realm of the reaction of variable factors.
Many economists would agree that not enough is known 
about these various influences, one way or another, upon 
internal and external complexities.
It is hoped that some benefit may be realized from 
probing into the nature of their working. This invest­
igation will be undertaken from a conceptual viewpoint. 
Subsequently, in later chapters, a pragmatic analysis 
will be made of their application and effects in selected 
countries.
A. Monetary and Fiscal Factors
In the discussion of monetary and fiscal policies 
it will be anticipated that central banks are more or less 
free to carry out monetary policies which appear feasible 
to offset the probable adverse results of variable factors. 
From a realistic standpoint this is not always the case.^~ 
To the extent that this condition is not true, monetary
^SA good account of the relationship between 
central banks and governments is presented by Miroslav 
Kriz, "Central Banks and the State Today," American 
Economic Review. September, 1948, pp. 565-580; also see 
Roland I. Robinson, "Central Banks and the State: A 
Comment," American Economic Review. March, 1949, pp. 
494-496; and Robert Triffin, "Central Banking and 
Monetary Management," in Economic Problems of Latin 
America, edited by Seymour Harris, (New York: McGraw- 
Hill Book Co., Inc., 1944), pp. 96-116.
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policy would succumb to the dictates of the federal 
government, or the dominance of fiscal policy over mone­
tary policy would prevent proper co-ordination between 
the two areas of policy determination.2®
1. Income Changes
The plane of living in a nation is dependent in 
part upon the ability of that nation to cope with income 
changes primarily through the facility of monetary and 
fiscal policy. Particularly is this true in countries 
which are subject to great resiliency in the income 
pattern. The inability of the above policy to deal 
adequately with such problems as changes in export income 
or the presence of too little saving, prolongs the period 
of adjustment for a nation grasping for greater develop­
ment.
The remainder of this section will consider some 
of the variable factors which tend to give rise to 
changes in income and, therefore, produce serious problems 
for monetary and fiscal control. These factors will 
consist of export income, personal savings, taxation, 
and government borrowing.
2®A study of Venezuela yields evidence of this 
result. See Chapter III of this paper, pp. 260-262.
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a. Export Income
The preferred position of monetary policy with 
respect to changes in export income is usually considered 
as passive; that is, banks serve importers by making 
exchange available, while they serve exporters by convert­
ing foreign exchange earnings into local currency.
As foreign sales rise and exporters receive more 
income, their earnings would have a natural, beneficial 
effect on the country as a whole. A portion of the 
increased income earned would spur domestic production 
and income; a part of the income would be used to import 
more goods; and the remainder would be held for near-future 
Investment. If foreign income should fall, these situ­
ations would be reversed. Monetary policy, even in this 
instance, would be passive, at least to a certain extent, 
with changes In production and the distribution of income 
providing the necessary adjustment.
This passive attitude concerning monetary policy 
has blended into a more active one in many nations. The 
main reasons for this change are the desire by many 
countries to increase post-war production, the emphasis 
upon greater industrialization, and the over-all concept 
that each nation is to maintain a high rate of employ­
ment and income within the nation regardless of so-called
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temporary external maladjustments.®4
The answer to the question of how important is 
export income in relation to total income seems to depend 
much upon the relative degree of industrialization in 
most nations. The lower the degree of industrial develop­
ment, the greater is the importance of export income to 
total income, and vice v e r s  a .25
This source of income constitutes an exceptional 
problem for monetary authorities in underdeveloped areas. 
Exports are subject to sudden change and, from a monetary 
standpoint, banks are subject to rapid deposits and with­
drawals.®6 To bring in the other side of the picture,
® Professor Hansen questions this approach in terms 
of long run cost or price-level disparities, but supports 
it when it is made to refer to a short run cyclical dis­
turbance. See Hansen, Monetary Theory and Fiscal Policy, 
pp. 210-211. According to Professor Nurske, adjustment 
should occur through varying the exchange rate. See Bagnar 
Nurske, The New Economics, edited by Seymour Harris, (New 
York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1948), p. 273. Professors Despres 
and Kindleberger state that a guiding principle in post­
war equilibrium policy is one which explains that the pur­
suit of domestic policies of full employment should not be 
hindered through balance of payments difficulties. See 
Emile Despres and Charles Kindleberger, "The Mechanism for 
Adjustment in International Payments— Lessons of Post-war 
Experience," American Economic Review. Papers and Proceed­
ings , May, 1952, p. 332.
®^There are exceptions to the above statement. For 
example, Venezuela is further advanced Industrially than 
the majority of Latin American countries, yet export income 
amounted to approximately 37.9 per cent of national product 
(income) between 1952 and 1956. See the International Mone­
tary Fund, International Financial Statistics. January, 1957*
2®The Central Banks of Columbia, Ecuador, Mexico,
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there is also a tendency for nations which depend upon 
exports for a relatively large share of total income to 
possess a relatively large thirst for imports. Once again 
this explains the situation of underdeveloped nations with 
respect to their anxiety to industrialize.^ Because of 
this situation, it is likely that commercial banks will 
tend to hold larger liquid reserves than would otherwise 
be the case. The outcome may be fewer loans and less 
investment on the part of banks, or at least a tendency 
to channel funds into more selective areas.
The more cautious attitude of bankers resulting
from the dominance of exports and imports could serve 
to some extent as a means of braking the inflation.
However, a deleterious effect may be encountered in the
form of loans and investment directed predominantly 
toward old well-established firms rather than toward 
the growth industries.
Total bank deposits may fail to register a decline 
even when imports rise sharply. The reduction of deposits
Salvador, Uruguay, and Venezuela utilize foreign exchange 
reserves as part of the minimum reserve against note issues 
or deposit liabilities, or both. One of the reasons given 
to explain the employment of international reserves in this 
way is that they tend to create confidence in the currency 
no longer backed by gold. See M. H. DeKock, Central Bank­
ing (London: Staples Press, Ltd., 1954), pp. 88-89.
S. Buchanan and H. S. Ellis, Approaches To 
Economic Development (New York: The Twentieth Century Fund,
1955), pp. 383-385.
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by importers may be matched by an increase of deposits on
pQ
the part of foreign exporters. Of course, the small 
local banks are not likely to handle sizeable deposits 
from foreign exporters; nonetheless, the larger com­
mercial banks and the central banks may often be in this 
position. There is a strong possibility that the money 
supply will not be reduced as importers withdraw funds 
according to orthodox banking, and inflation might there­
fore be prolonged.
The rise in export income provides additional 
income in both the private and public sectors. In the 
private sector of the nation’s economy, expenditures on 
consumption and investment would normally be greater. 
Spending might rise at a faster rate than the increase 
in export income, since bank credit would tend to be 
easier to obtain. The probable result would be a rise 
in prices and a fall in real income.
As for the public sector, government revenues 
would rise as a result of a prior increase in exports.
This would create an incentive for additional con­
sumption and investment expenditures in this area. The 
difficulty here lies in the fact that a temporary
^8F. W. Paish, ’’Banking Policy and the Balance of 
International Payments,” in Readings In The Theory Of 
International Trade, edited by Howard Ellis and Lloyd 
Metzler, (Philadelphia: The Blakiston Co., 1949), p. 48.
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increase in income because of a rise in exports may be
comprehended as a permanent improvement in economic
activity.^ The error in judgment would be realized when
export income suddenly declines; but the government may
find that the only way to relieve the situation will be
to increase federal expenditures. Sooner or later this
'zn
may call for deficit financing.
Since imports are one of the most flexible factors, 
it has been proposed that the authorities stabilize 
them.^ This kind of policy would pertain only to nations 
depending upon exports and imports to a relatively large. 
extent. By holding imports quite steady, erratic move­
ments in export income would be expected to produce less
2^Hefer to Bruno Brovedani, ’’Latin American Medium- 
Term Import Stabilization Policies and the Adequacy of 
Reserves,” International Monetary Fund, Staff Papers. 
Washington, D. C., Vol. IV, No. 2, February, 1955, p. 267.
®°The banking system of Uruguay attempts to 
mitigate internal disturbances created by the gain or 
loss of export income. When exchange reserves accumulate 
the banking system reduces its lending. It does this by 
refusing to issue new currency against its larger reserve 
balance. A comparison is made between the annual 
expansion in bank loans and the changes in bank reserves 
of gold and foreign exchange with the money supply. If 
the percentage rise in bank loans is much greater than 
the Increase in reserves in terms of the money supply, 
the banking system reduces credit expansion. Ibid.. 
pp. 272-273.
51Ibid.. pp. 258-287. The author would consider 
this as a proposal for, medium-term policy.
adverse results for monetary policy. It would be Imown 
that a certain amount of export income would be required 
to pay for a given amount of imports. At a time when 
export income is larger than that required to pay for the 
imports, the excess amount could be set aside for periods 
when export income would fail to equate the necessary 
payment for imports. Even if the surplus export earn­
ings were not held for future depressing periods, there 
would be less disturbance to the present money supply 
since only a portion of the total export income would 
be channeled into the monetary system. On the import 
side, the stabilization of imports would require that 
the greater portion of the limited amount of imports 
would consist of necessities. In other words, import 
stabilization would tend to prevent wasteful spending 
upon semi-luxury and luxury items which the nation could 
not afford.
Serious disadvantages might result from a policy 
aimed at stabilizing imports. The over-all program 
would place in the hands of the authorities the decision 
as to what would and would not be imported into the 
country. Furthermore, a policy geared to limit imports 
would fail to register the changing needs for goods 
coming into the nation. In establishing the basic com­
modity import unit, the authorities would have to
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consider the contribution of export income. Since there 
is little internal control over exports, this would be 
difficult to do. The longer the time period considered, 
the more likely is the probability of error of judgment
'Zp
from the standpoint of both exports and imports.
The rise or fall of export income not accompanied 
by a proportionate change in the same direction of imports 
and not offset through opposite changes in investment or 
similar changes in saving would cause pressure upon the 
price level unless the banking system were able to 
provide enough flexibility to counter the price movement, 
or unless fiscal policy could provide larger revenue 
through taxation, or both. °
Since in many nations structural changes and the 
mobility of factors are not free to adjust to the new 
situation in a hurry, a resort to deficit financing at 
home and abroad serves as a temporary avenue of escape.
It would appear that this latter action only prolongs a 
much needed adjustment.
How would other forms of income affect monetary
*2 p
A cursory view of the balance of payments of 
the Latin American nations yields little evidence to 
support the contention of import stabilization between 
1950-1955. Refer to the International Monetary Fund, 
Balance of Payments Yearbook. Summary Statements, Vol.
7, March, 1957.
3SThe multiplier would be expected to accentuate 
the directional pressure on the price level.
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and fiscal policy in a nation, especially one that is 
considered to be underdeveloped? The answer would depend 
in great measure upon the alternative means used to 
accumulate capital. These methods would include personal 
savings, taxation, government borrowing from banks, the 
public, and foreign countries.3^
b. Personal Savings
Personal savings would normally constitute the 
major source of capital funds. However, in some nations 
the supply of personal savings either does not exist or 
the amount is too small to be effective.33 In this 
connection, consumption expenditures constitute nearly 
all the national income. To the extent that such is 
the case, part of the blame must rest upon the monetary 
and banking system. Individuals who accumulate small 
amounts of saving may either hoard the funds or spend a 
little more than they otherwise would, in part, because 
of the failure of the monetary system to provide people 
with saving institutions.3®
*z a
°^This general classification was taken from Professor 
Kindleberger. Refer to Kindleberger, op. cit.. pp. 384-387.
33An opposing comment to this popular contention is 
offered by Professor Rozenthal. See Alek Rozenthal,
American Economic Review. Book Reviews Section, March,
1956, pp. 183-184.
3®Some of the countries In Latin America have
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The voluntary aspects of the problem of saving may 
be partially explained by the tendency of those who have 
relatively large amounts of funds available to place 
their money in land or imported luxury items rather than 
in productive enterprises. Again, the failure of bank 
development would account for the lack of systematic 
personal savings.38
The development of several types of banking insti­
tutions within a given area probably contributes to the 
disparagement of banking services from the standpoint of 
individual savers. For example, it is pointed out that 
the development of banking systems in Latin America 
follows no consistent pattern.3® Foreign branch banking 
is common in some of the nations, commercial (unit) bank­
ing characterizes other countries, and central banking
alleviated this problem to some extent. For instance, 
Mexico had two savings institutions in 1931. By 1951 
there were 739 savings institutions including banks and 
branches, credit unions and other financial institutions. 
Refer to Senate Committee on Banking and Currency, Interim 
Report, Study of Latin American Countries (Washington: 
United States Printing Office), 1954, p. 354.
^John Adler, "The Fiscal and Monetary Imple­
mentations of Development Programs,1' American Economic 
Review. Papers and Proceedings. May, 1952, p. 595.
380ther factors are important in this connection, 
such as: the moulding of the saving habit and faith in 
the government.
3®Triffin, op. cit.. pp. 96-103.
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is important in still others.Furthermore, the kinds 
of controls and their effectiveness may vary a good deal. 
Foreign branch banking, for instance, is likely to extend 
its services predominantly to traders, or it may encourage 
the investment of funds in other countries rather than 
for domestic utilization. Of course, any one type of 
banking system may serve a nation better than other forms.
A nation should be free to choose the kind which serves 
its purpose best.
In the more industrialized countries an active 
stock market serves as an important outlet for money not 
spent on consumption. Failure in the development of 
security exchange markets appears to be a characteristic 
feature of the lesser developed nations.
The instability of the governments and the lack 
of Industrial development in many nations have been lead­
ing factors explaining the failure In the development of 
security exchange markets. In addition, the problem of 
the technical development of capital markets has prevented 
the accumulation of saving for investment.4 -^
4(-*The desire for more government control over bank­
ing functions may be a partial explanation of the recent 
trend in central banking development, especially in Latin 
America. Refer to Buchanan and Ellis, op. pit., p. 538.
4^A good discussion of this problem may be found in 
Professor HansonTs book. Refer to Simon G. Hanson, Economic
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It would probably be prudent to first establish a 
very narrow market in securities and gradually expand it 
as It comes to meet with general acceptance. In this 
connection, the government could be of valuable assistance 
in propagandizing the program. It could also develop a 
market for the distribution of its own bonds.
As for the encouragement of personal savings of 
the small income earners who are unfamiliar with security 
exchange markets, the development of small local indus­
tries on a community basis may be utilized for this 
4 9purpose.
Instead of concentrating upon alternative ways to 
encourage personal saving, some countries attempt to 
acquire funds through forced savings; that is, through 
printing additional quantities of paper. As more money 
is printed and spent, inflation arises and this tends to 
reduce the real income of wage earners since their wages 
fail to keep pace with rising prices.
The selective control over imports has some
Development in Latin America (Washington: The Inter- 
American Affairs Press, 1951), pp. 469-471; also see 
Triffin, pp. cit., pp. 107-111.
4^Buchanan and Ellis, op. cit.. pp. 304-305.
4SSee R. F. Mikesell, Foreign Exchange In Post-war 
World (New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1954), p. 445; 
and Walter Krause, The International Economy (New York: 
Houghton Mifflin Co., 1955), pp. 290-291.
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influence on the saving function. Certainly the small 
savers would be forced to purchase less. Those with 
larger incomes are likely to spend more of their higher 
incomes in buying other domestic products or to increase 
their saving accounts abroad. However, it is difficult 
to conceive of a nation deliberately reducing its imports 
for the prime purpose of encouraging personal savings.
Deposit insurance in those nations which have no 
comparable service would be of special importance to the 
people. Countries with a good record of political sta­
bility could provide this service through the government 
if no private concern were willing to do so. Banking 
legislation could be modified to provide more flexi­
bility with respect to capital requirements for banks 
desiring to serve the rural areas. The government and 
private businesses could do something toward familiar­
izing the public with the banking institutions by pay­
ing workers with checks and encouraging payments by 
checks.4*^
c. Taxation
A good deal of concerted agreement is expressed
^Domestic Financing of Economic Development.
Report by the Department of Economic Affairs (Lake Suecess, 
New York: United Nations Publications, 1950), pp. 13-15.
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by writers who feel that much may be accomplished in the 
area of taxation as a part of fiscal reform.^
Taxes imposed upon commodities would normally be 
quite regressive for the majority of the people in nations 
with relatively low income and saving. It may be well to 
reduce, as far as possible, this type of taxation, at 
least for an interim period. Selectivity may be exer­
cised in such a way as to reduce or exclude taxes imposed 
upon necessities. A dual advantage may be realized from 
such action; more funds would be made available for 
investment, and the banking system would be used more 
intensely.^®
Because exports and imports play a substantial 
role in various nations, customs duties are of considerable 
importance.^ If carried too far, import levies might 
deter domestic purchases to a serious extent. While there 
is some justification for preventing the importation of
4®This is one of the most promising spheres of 
independent policy action, according to Professor Hanson. 
Refer to Hanson, op. cit., pp. 472-473; a similar view­
point is expressed by Professor Triffin. See Robert 
Triffin, "Exchange Control and Equilibrium," Foreign 
Economic Policy for the United States. edited by Seymour 
Harris, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1948), p. 414.
It should be recognized that the saving made 
possible by the reduced tax rate may not be shared in its 
entirety with consumers.
4^Wendell Gordon, The Economy of Latin America 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1950), p. 368.
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luxury goods, these duties, at the same time, tend to 
reduce the effect of comparative advantage in trade. 
Importers may maintain their usual mark-ups, or even
A O
increase them, rather than share in the increased duty.
Imposts applied to exporters may force factors 
and suppliers to assume a larger share of the tax. Yet, 
a graduated custom levy on imports starting with items 
of necessity and ascending with semi-luxury and luxury 
products could have a beneficial effect. The higher 
income groups would be encouraged to invest more of their 
idle income at home. At the same time, the larger number 
of lower income earners would be able to purchase a 
greater volume of imported goods should home production 
fail to satisfy domestic demand.
A tax on exports may produce a sizable share of 
total tax revenue. So long as the tax is not greater 
than the cost-price differential, it would not interfere 
with sales or hinder international specialization.^
AO
Customs duties constitute a major portion of 
total government receipts in nearly all the Central American 
countries including Mexico. No doubt these duties are an 
important source of revenue in nearly all of the Latin 
American nations. See the United States Department of 
Commerce, Investment in Central America (Washington: United 
States Printing Office, 1956),p. 30; and Bank of Mexico, 
Annual Reports. 1955 and 1956.
^Buchanan and Ellis, op. cit., p. 328.
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This type of tax is easy to administer, and it may con­
tribute to stability by raising and lowering the duties 
during prosperity and depression.
Government monopolies which are quite common in 
some countries may also be made a source of tax income.
The imposition of a tax on such monopolies may create a 
desire for efficiency. Their ability to withstand a tax 
may be used as one measure for comparing their efficiency 
with that of private producers. Sometimes they plead 
non-tax payments on the basis that they offer commodities 
and services at exceedingly low prices. If this defense 
is valid, their tax contributions should be lowered 
proportionately. No doubt there are numerous examples 
to show that such is not the case.^° Though there may 
be some justification for their temporary existence, it 
would appear to be advantageous not to include govern­
ment monopolies in a country’s long run planning.
The progressive income tax so popular in some
nations has not been successful as a major source of
51income in many of the lesser developed countries.
50One recent case Is that of Argentina’s monopoly 
agency called the I. A. P. I. which purchased farm com­
modities at low prices and sold them at the higher world 
market price. See Gordon, op. cit., pp. 253-254.
^Individual income taxes provided only 13.9 per 
cent of total government revenues of Costa Rica in 1955. 
Similarly, taxes on income yielded 7.7 per cent of the
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The chief explanation for this is that the higher income 
groups hold a good deal of political p o w e r . T a x  
administrators often wink at the flagrant abuses of the 
income tax of this group. And as for the much larger 
group, perhaps one of the chief reasons explaining the 
lack of popularity with respect to the progressive income 
tax has been the inability of the larger masses to earn 
enough taxable income, and the expense involved in col­
lection.
A tax levied upon real property has been suggested 
as a means to be used for recouping revenue lost through 
individual income l e v i e s . T h i s  may be a commendable 
measure if applied to unused property, but it is doubt­
ful that it should be used as a substitute for a sound 
progressive income tax. The trend toward a more even
total Salvadoran government revenues in 1955. Honduran 
income taxes amounted to 16.9 per cent of total govern­
ment revenues in the fiscal years 1954-1955. Refer to 
the United States Department of Commerce, Investment in 
Central America. 1956, pp. 78, 181, and 806.
^Gordon, op. cit., pp. 808-810 and 813; for an 
explanation of comparative burdens of high income tax­
payers refer to Hanson, op. cit.. pp. 466-467; Professors 
Buchanan and Ellis point out some of the difficulties of 
income tax levies; such as, illiteracy and inadequate 
record keeping. See Buchanan and Ellis, op. cit.« p. 384.
53Gordon, pp. cit.. p. 813. Mr. Adler defends 
this type of tax, since the distribution of property is 
more uneven in some countries than is the distribution 
of income. Refer to Adler, op. cit.. p. 594.
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distribution of land may reduce the incentive toward 
developing costly real property tax programs.
A good tax system, particularly in the under­
developed nations, should be highly flexible; that is, 
as the structure of production changes, new tax sources 
may be tapped while others may become of lesser importance. 
For example, in a few Latin American countries the sever­
ance tax has begun to yield more revenue.^ Perhaps the 
sales tax and other types of taxes will take a more 
important place as a source of revenue as more productive 
facilities are created or existing ones are expanded.
d. Government Borrowing
The remaining portion of this section is concerned 
with government expenditures made possible by borrowing.
The types of borrowing to be considered are borrowing 
from banks, the public, and foreign countries. In 
addition, an attempt is made to integrate monetary and 
fiscal policies to show how they may contribute toward 
a more effective borrowing program.
The well-known Keynesian concept of closing the 
investment gap through government spending is probably
^Principally Venezuela and Columbia. See Wendell 
Gordon, The Economy of Latin America (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1950), Table 18 National Government 
Revenue, p. 368.
49
emphasized more in the monetary and fiscal policies of 
underdeveloped nations than elsewhere. It is supported 
on the basis of full employment and economic development.^
The full employment concept is supported on a 
somewhat different basis than it is in the more industri­
alized nations* It is generally agreed that nearly full 
employment already exists in most underdeveloped countries. 
Of course, inefficiencies may be evident because of the 
poor factor distribution. Yet, this may establish a 
foundation for the justification of the more effective 
use of monetary and fiscal policy. If this reasoning 
can be inculcated, then there is a firm basis established 
for more public control in order to bring about a stronger 
economy.
Development, or the desire to industrialize, 
further supports the more extensive employment of mone­
tary and fiscal measures. Development may proceed at a 
slow or rapid rate. Because of the desire to compete 
more successfully with other nations and to raise the 
domestic plane of living, the latter is more likely to
5^Full employment is usually considered as an 
objective, while economic development is a means-to-end 
concept. For a discussion of the meaning of economic 
development in this connection see Harold F. Williamson, 
Economic Development, edited by H. F. Williamson and John
A. Buttrick, (New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1954), p. 6.
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56occur with consistency.
Monetary and fiscal controls should be much easier 
to employ in countries in which the people are accustomed 
to a good deal of government activity. The underdeveloped 
nations are, as a rule, in this general situation; there­
fore, it is likely that monetary and fiscal measures may 
be utilized on a larger scale than would be possible in 
the more developed nations.
Personal savings as the major source of capital 
accumulation may not provide sufficient funds for growth. 
Even a change in the tax rates or in the structure of the 
tax system may fail to yield a high state of employment 
or to support a desirable developmental policy. The 
final area of domestic policy lies within the sphere of 
governmental expenditures.
The type and amount of borrowing on the part of 
the government may be determined by several factors.
The amount of borrowing may be quite small if the govern­
ment were to attempt to balance the budget at the end 
57of each year. On the other hand, a cyclical balancing
^®Gunnar Myrdal, An International Economy (New 
York: Harper and Brothers Publishers, 1956), p. 206.
57The yearly budget appears to be giving way in 
favor of some type of cyclical budget balancing. Refer 
to Charles Prather, Money and Banking. 5th edition, 
(Homewood, Illinois: Richard D. Irwin, inc., 1954),
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of revenues and expenditures would allow more time for 
balancing to become a reality according to predetermined 
plans.58
It is known that if aggregate expenditure exceeds 
the national output at full employment, inflation will 
arise; and if national output is larger than aggregate 
expenditure, unemployment will come about. The responsi­
bility of the government tends to lie within the limits 
of the above concept, the prevention of inflation and 
the prevention of serious unemployment. The current 
problem of the underdeveloped nations, however, is 
explained primarily in terms of inflation rather than 
unemployment as such.59
The experience of the depression of the 1930Ts 
has shown that monetary policy is less effective in the 
downswing than in prosperity.89 However, even in the
p. 434; also "The Problem of Economic Instability,"
American Economic Review. September, 1950, pp. 521-522.
A committee report under the chairmanship of Donald H. 
Wallace.
58Cyclical budget balancing is at least suggested 
in the various development programs in Latin America.
For example, Argentina and Guatemala have adopted five- 
year programs. For a survey of the economic development 
plan for Guatemala, refer to the Government of Guatemala, 
Desarrollo Economico de Guatemala 1955-1960. (Economic 
Development of Guatemala), Guatemala, C. A., 1956.
59This is not to say that unemployment (underemploy­
ment) is a basic factor partially responsible for inflation.
89George Halm, Economics of Money and Banking
52
latter instance, the success of monetary policy was none 
too bright because of poor timing, psychological moti­
vations, and so on. Is it possible then that government 
borrowing may be successful if monetary policy stands 
ready to cope with any adversity affecting the economic 
system? The answer seems to be problematical.
The effect of government borrowing upon the 
economy depends upon the way in which it is created. 
Borrowing from the banking system allows for the expansion 
of commercial bank reserves. If newly created money is 
spent by the government, private expenditures need not 
decline since banks are in a position to provide more 
funds, and total spending may become favorable to further 
output and income. Yet, the newly created reserves 
provide for the likelihood of too much spending and 
constitute a threat to the price level.®1
The responsibility of the banking system requires 
that it is so organized that it has sufficient funds 
available to loan, and it has proper machinery at its 
disposal to loosen or tighten the money supply as it sees 
fit. It is entirely possible that this is not the case
(Homewood, Illinois: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1956, p. 398.
Ibid.. p. 399. For a brief but good account of 
the effect upon the money supply through debt retirement 
see Burns, Neal, and Watson, Modern Economics. 2nd edition, 
(New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., Inc., 1953), pp. 633-634.
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in an underdeveloped nation. The banking system may not
be so highly organized, or the government may dominate
fi2monetary policy. If this is true, monetary policy 
would be quite ineffective as a weapon to ward off 
inflation or to prevent deflation.
Government borrowing may come from public saving. 
Although this form of borrowing would be expected to be 
quite small, it has an effect similar to an increase in 
taxation and represents a transfer of existing funds from 
the public to the government. The income effect of such 
borrowing depends upon the way in which the government 
would utilize the funds obtained.
The operation of government enterprises may take 
an active part of a negative monetary policy. Government 
owned firms serve as an important source of revenue in 
some nations as well as an item of expenditure. The 
government may borrow from its enterprises at most any 
time, and at increasing amounts as the firms become more 
vast and numerous. Moreover, repayment is not such an 
important problem. At the same time, this borrowing 
action would restrain or prevent any outward action by
®^Even in an industrialized nation such as the 
United States, banking and government policy sometimes 
conflict. Evidence of this is found in the Federal 
Reserve-Treasury rift.
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the monetary authorities.  ^ This clandestine operation 
might well be an alternative to the printing or borrowing 
of money, since the latter is frowned upon by the 
authorities and other (creditor) nations too.
The expenditure of borrowed funds may have different 
results depending upon the action taken by the monetary 
authorities. Even in the case in which expenditure of 
the funds is carried out by the government, monetary 
policy could help assure the most useful application of 
those funds by establishing the terms on loans. Loans 
from government funds could be channeled into the most 
deserving sectors by the adoption of different loan terms 
for each sector.®^ A large portion of the funds would go 
where they would be the most productive. Of course, that 
part of the funds which was borrowed and spent directly 
by the government would circumvent this action to some
Of course, the functioning of an economy may be 
hindered through such action.
fi4.D In this connection, the policy of the Central 
Bank of Mexico accomplishes a similar result. Instead 
of channeling funds on the basis of loan terms, the 
Central Bank does this by deposit reserves. It requires 
the commercial banks to maintain a 100 per cent cash 
reserve behind their demand liabilities, but it reduces 
the reserve percentage If the commercial banks make 
loans in definite sectors on a stipulated long-, inter­
mediate-, and short-term basis. See B. H. Beckhart, 
editor, Banking Systems (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1954), pp. 585-586.
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extent.
The government has one other borrowing alternative 
remaining. Besides borrowing from the public or banks, 
it may have access to foreign capital.
A nation plagued with fundamental problems such 
as are usually connected with mal-distribution of 
resources, with being a primary producer, or a nation 
which is over-emphasizing industrial production may be 
faced with a persistent deficit in its current account.
Generally, it is explained that short-term funds 
will move out of the country primarily for safe-keeping. 
Yet, it is likely that some short-term funds will be 
moving into the nation. This is natural since foreign 
importers will place deposits in banks for present or 
future purchases from the country in question, and because 
there is always the possibility of making a high return 
on capital invested for short periods of time. One may 
inquire if it is possible for the nation to receive an
®^I. G. Patel, "Selective Credit Controls in Under­
developed Economies," International Monetary Fund, Staff 
Papers. Washington, D. C., September, 1954, p. 87; Mr. 
Adler points out the importance of diversified investment. 
See Adler, op. cit., pp. 588-591; Professor Kindleberger 
suggests that price distortion may channel government 
funds into areas that cannot be supported after inflation, 
i. e., hotels, etc. This is likely unless monetary 
measures act quickly enough to dispel the threat. Refer 
to Charles Kindleberger, International Economics. p. 386.
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income benefit from short-term funds when the account may 
show a net outward movement of such capital. That possi­
bility depends much upon the monetary policy of the 
country. If banks are operating with a fractional reserve 
policy, the additional external deposits placed in the 
domestic banks would allow for a multiple expansion of 
loans and investment, provided these funds are not 
sterilized in the name of the foreign owner.
The funds moving out or 11 in flight” may be composed 
mainly of accumulated saving rather than the withdrawal of 
deposits.. The net effect in the nation concerned would be 
an expansion of money and credit through the banking system 
to an amount greater than the net outward movement of funds 
as indicated in the balance of payments. In other words, 
as long as there is a rather consistent amount of short­
term capital in the banks of the country, it could experi­
ence a net income gain even though short-term capital is 
moving out at a rate faster than it moves toward the 
nation.
It would not be common practice, however, to expect 
the short-term movement of funds to be employed for the 
purpose of attempting to deal successfully with a per­
sistent import surplus. Gold exports, grants or gifts 
directed into the country, or capital investment moving 
in constitute the major means of solving the current
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account deficit. The most important of these items would 
be the capital movement. Gold cannot be drained away 
over long periods of time, and a nation cannot count upon 
other countries* grants or gifts.®®
Both monetary policy and fiscal policy could play 
an Important role in connection with capital inflow. The 
monetary role would affect the employment of the funds.
As mentioned earlier (see page 54), the monetary authori­
ties could channel the funds into their most productive 
uses through the terms on capital. This would help to 
assure repayment by stimulating exports and, at the same 
time, providing for the growth of basic industries.
Fiscal policy would be responsible for determining 
the necessary amount of capital needed. This would 
involve the co-ordination between the balance of payments 
deficit or surplus and the internal need for funds, 
including judgment with respect to the probable debt or 
surplus encountered.
B. External Factors
Only a few nations today, if any, can afford to 
neglect the impact of external trade upon their national 
income, output, and employment. Even in the case of the
®®Snider, oj). cit. . pp. 134-136
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United States in which exports contribute but a small pro­
portion to total national income, it is becoming increas­
ingly evident that changes in exports and imports along 
with other items making up the balance of payments have 
profound international results.®^ A small change in our 
decisions to export and import may have tremendous effects 
in other nations, primarily in those of the more under­
developed areas.
Earlier in this chapter it was stated that lending 
(L) could be employed in order to create a balance between 
imports (M) and exports (E). At the same time monetary 
and fiscal policy (MB) and (F) could be so applied that 
they may bring an equality between saving (S) and invest­
ment (A). By reason of their complementary nature, these 
two forces would normally spill over into each other’s 
area. As an example, monetary and fiscal policy might 
be concerned to a certain extent with income derived 
externally for the purpose of maintaining a given national 
income. On the other hand, lending would tend to affect 
saving and investment decisions within the nation.
The working of the above forces as indicated
®^It is explained that though export income repre­
sents a small contribution of total income in America, 
this may mean the difference between profits and marginal 
returns. Refer to Paul V. Horn, International Trade 
Principles and Practices (New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 
1951), p." 29.
assumed the existence of a stable exchange rate at a 
given national income. But from a more practical view­
point, there will be pressures exerted which will tend 
to influence the rate of exchange. These pressures may 
be caused by internal or external factors. Now our 
problem hinges upon the question of what effect an 
exchange rate has upon national income. This calls for 
our immediate attention.
1. The Bate of Exchange
The rate of exchange refers to the price of one 
currency in terms of another. This broad definition 
infers that the exchange rate, the national price level, 
and national income tend to influence one another.
A monetary disequilibrium could occur because of 
an unequal degree of variation in national price levels, 
that is, because of changes in the price levels of two 
nations, with the exchange rate remaining the samej®® 
or whenever a variation in the exchange rate occurs, 
national price levels remaining constant or moving less
flQ
proportionately.
68A shift in foreign demand may raise the price of 
one export product and lower that of another leaving the 
national income unchanged. Refer to Enke and Salera, op. 
cit.. p. 193.
®®Snider, o£. cit.. p. 167.
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The movement of the exchange rate could lead to a 
monetary disequilibrium since it would influence the 
national income. A rise in the exchange rate would 
normally increase the national income, that is, a greater 
increase in exports relative to imports.^ Conversely, 
a drop in the exchange rate would produce a fall in the
71national income, for imports would then exceed exports.
A fluctuation in national income accompanied by 
a given exchange rate could create a monetary disequilibrium 
which might call for an adjustment of the exchange rate.
This would be the probable outcome if lending and mone­
tary and fiscal policy should fail to be effective. On 
the other hand, the exchange rate might not need to be 
tampered with if the national price level should fail to 
move along with the national income variation.
The national income and national price level may 
not move with the same degree of variation and in the same 
direction. For example, the national price level may move 
slowly or not at all until a state of nearly full
70f Mexico realized an increase in exports in 1955 
and 1956 caused, in part, by a rise in the domestic rate 
of exchange in 1954. Refer to the Bank of Mexico, Annual 
Reports, 1954-1956.
71The final result depends upon the regulators of 
demand and supply. For an analysis of these complex 
forces see P. T. Ellsworth, The International Economy 
(New fork: The Macmillan Co., 1950), pp. 555-572.
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employment is realized. Also, such factors as wage 
rigidity and monopoly may slow down or prevent price 
movements from occurring as national income changes.
It is further conceivable that a change in the 
national price level, the exchange rate remaining station­
ary, could cause a monetary disequilibrium, in as much 
as the national income may not respond to the same degree 
of change as the price level. This is most likely to 
occur after full employment has been reached, and it 
depends to a great extent upon the distribution of income.
So far as adjustment to equilibrium is concerned, 
both price and income changes are involved.^ Price 
variations are probably least applicable when a good deal 
of unemployment Is present and when prices and costs are 
inflexible since a change in the money supply and bank
72The export sector may .suffer less than the 
domestic sector because of more favorable terms on loans, 
subsidies, an Inelastic demand for major export products, 
etc., especially if this sector normally contributes a 
large share to total income.
^The income approach tends to relegate price 
changes to a secondary position. This is emphasized by 
Professor Nurske as follows: ,r. . . in the adjustment 
process, price changes work generally In the right 
direction for the restoration of equilibrium. But, 
insofar as they occur at all they are essentially a by­
product of the changes in the volume of employment and 
productive activity. These latter changes are there­
fore to be regarded as the primary equilibrating factors." 
Ragnar Nurske, "Domestic and International Equilibrium," 
in The New Economics. edited by S. E. Harris, p. 269.
62
reserves affect the general level of prices only to a 
small degree. However, rising production during a business 
slump will tend to raise prices or, at least, keep them 
from falling.74
Income variations affect production through changes 
in employment. As production and employment rise, the 
increased income tends to maintain a larger supply of 
money. This has the effect of keeping interest rates 
down as the demand for money strengthens with a rising
7c
output.'^
2. Exchange Control
Income analysis as applied to an open economy 
generally requires that cyclical and monetary adjustments 
(short-term) should come about through internal changes 
rather than by exchange rate variations. In the long run 
period, however, the structural pressures would require 
an adjustment in the exchange rate.7®
74Snider, op. cit., p. 234.
75Ibid.
7%r. Bloomfield points out that Keynes, Harrod, 
and other followers expressed this attitude. Refer to 
Arthur I. Bloomfield, "Foreign Exchange Rate Theory and 
Policy," The Hew Economics, edited by S. E. Harris, pp. 
300-301, including footnotes on page 300; also see Ragnar 
Hurske, "Conditions of International Monetary Equilibrium," 
in Readings In The Theory Of International Trade, p. 34.
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Many of the present problems of the underdeveloped
nations depend upon the application of monetary and fiscal
policies for their solution. A few of these problems
pertain to investment, development, social security and
union activities, inflation, and price controls. In
order to solve these types of problems the responsible
authorities may desire to prevent external pressures
77from upsetting their domestic goals. ' Exchange controls 
are often employed in such cases.
The ultimate effect of exchange control is to 
allow monetary and fiscal factors to make their full 
contribution toward establishing and maintaining full 
employment at a high income level while the balance of
rt Q
payments may be held in equilibrium.'0 It Is assumed 
that after these adjustments have been made exchange 
control would no longer be necessary, and a free or 
flexible exchange system would take its place. The time 
required to solve these basic problems may, however,
^Professor Mikesell criticized the United Nations 
reports for overemphasizing planning, controls, etc. which 
tend to divert attention away from the relative price 
structure, comparative advantage, and so on. Refer to 
Raymond F. Mikesell, "Economic Doctrines Implied In 
United Nations Reports," .American Economic Review. Papers 
and Proceedings. May, 1954, pp. 570-582.
^Professors Buchanan and Ellis stated that the 
danger in the use of exchange controls is that they put 
no correctives to work. It Is essential, therefore, that
64
extend over many years.
Exchange control may not contribute to the mainte­
nance of a high national income, since it would tend to 
reduce both imports and exports over a period of time.
The underdeveloped nations would generally be 
pressed with inflation since capital facilities cannot 
expand as rapidly as the money supply in the first 
instance, and the national income would fall because of 
later retaliation on the part of the outside world.
A higher domestic price level would tend to stimu­
late imports and reduce exports, provided that the price 
levels in other trading nations do not rise at the same 
time. If the higher price level were extended to the 
open economy, it would tend to lower the nation's exchange 
rate. Imports would tend to rise, for importers would 
be willing to give up more units of currency for imported 
goods than before. But the authorities would not allow 
the increased imports to upset the balance of payments.
The result is that the imposition of exchange control 
will prevent the rate from falling.
Exports would decline if the exchange rate were 
lowered, because foreign buyers would have to give up 
more units of their currency for their imports. Since
monetary and fiscal policies are successful. See Buchanan 
and Ellis, Approaches to Economic Development, p. 402.
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exchange control prevents the lowering of the exchange 
rate, exports would not he expected to show much decline*
The actual effect of exchange control upon the ' 
balance of payments also depends upon the relative volume 
of imports and exports.
Should the inflation not he overcome within a 
reasonably short period of time, the nation might stand 
to lose much more than it could gain. The blocking of 
external forces also prevents the utilization of com­
parative advantage. It does this by forcing the nation 
to use high priced domestic resources and commodities 
which could be imported cheaper, and by preventing it 
from exporting resources and goods produced cheaper at 
home.1^
The final outcome would depend upon the severity 
of the general inflation, the adaptability of monetary 
and fiscal policies to this situation, the relative price 
inflation in the various domestic sectors which may cause 
price control, and the probability of appreciating the
79The rather extensive use of multiple exchange 
rates is an outward manifestation of this reasoning.
Rates other than the official rate are employed to attract 
certain imports and to assure the sale of selected exports. 
At least six countries in Latin America employed multiple 
exchange rates in 1952. They were Columbia, Costa Rica, 
Ecuador, Nicaragua, Peru, and Venezuela. See R. F. 
Mikesell, Foreign Exchange In The Post-war World, p. 315.
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exchange rate in order to bring the nation’s price level
fininto line with those of other trading nations. u
After about twenty-five years, exchange control 
continues to be used for the purpose of rationing imports. 
It is usually explained that this is necessary in order 
to prevent a decline in the national Income. Nevertheless, 
the reduction in imports would normally lead to a future 
decline in exports.
The immediate effect of this phase of exchange 
control activity would be a rise in income following the 
lowering of imports. Gold and foreign exchange would 
flow into the nation. But if the period were prolonged, 
the gold and foreign exchange reserves of foreign countries 
would become seriously reduced or even exhausted.
Under the circumstances Just described, it is 
possible that short-term loans could be made to foreign 
nations. The consequent outflow of its capital might be 
expected to provide for an equilibrium in the balance of 
payments of the import-restricting country. Yet, for 
several reasons, such is not likely to be the result.
88The domestic alternative adjustment would be 
deflation. This could lead to unemployment if prices, 
wages, etc. are inflexible. The economic and social cost 
may be too high. Refer to Snider, ojq. cit.. p. 257.
81This would depend upon the volume of import 
reduction and the type of demand for the country’s exports.
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The exchange control authorities would probably prevent 
the outward movement of capital. Again, capital may be 
more profitably employed within the country not neces­
sarily because of a higher return but because greater 
opportunities now exist. Furthermore, the restrictions 
upon imports may indicate that the general price level 
of the nation restricting imports is relatively higher 
than those of other trading nations.
The close of the interim period is realized when 
exports decline to the extent of the lower import level. 
The national income cannot be maintained with a lower 
scale of imports and exports unless monetary and fiscal 
policy are successfully adapted to that purpose. The 
role of these two policies is next to be traced.
On the basis of the experience of many nations 
the following chain of efforts and results would probably 
follow under a newly launched system of exchange control. 
Since the control is likely to be imposed to reduce 
imports, exports would become excessive. Saving would 
then be required to exceed domestic accumulation by an 
amount equal to the excess of exports over imports.
This could be realized in part by raising quantitative 
and qualitative controls and increasing commercial bank 
interest rates. Additional remedies would include 
higher taxes, more emphasis upon government bond sales,
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and smaller transfer payments.
The monetary and fiscal factors at work to main­
tain an excess of saving over investment would probably 
be moderated, since exports would be constantly reduced 
until finally exports equated the lower import level to 
create equilibrium, ^his does not appear to be the 
correct solution to the problem, however, since now both 
exports and imports have d e c l i n e d . I n  order to main­
tain the original national income at a level which existed 
before controls were imposed to reduce imports, both 
saving and investment would have to rise to the same 
extent at which imports and exports have fallen.®3
DO
This does not take account of the fact that 
the domestic price level may be influenced and that 
Imports not controlled could amount to a sizable pro­
portion of total imports.
83Symbolically the explanation would be as follows:
If:
E - M = A - s, or
E * A = M t s, then
M > E, and
A > s, exchange controls are imposed to 
restrict imports, then
E > M, monetary and fiscal policies are 
applied to increase saving, then
CD V A, exports are reduced to equate the 
lower import level, then
E sr M, monetary and fiscal policies are 
employed to reduce saving, then
S s A, but, M and E are at a new low level
which indicates that monetary and 
fiscal policies should have allowed 
for a rise in both S and A in order 
to maintain the original income level.
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Theorizing can be carried to a point which often 
has a humorous side. On the other hand, one’s sober but 
practical application to current problems, without due 
regard to sound theory, can be so over-controlled as to 
require hourly or "minutely11 decisions looking toward 
the solution of the problems. In this connection, too, 
the administration involved in such minute control may 
become too costly in terms of accomplishments. The 
chain of developments described above serve to indicate 
briefly the vast complexities which would confront the 
authorities responsible for carrying out monetary and 
fiscal policy in the presence of an exchange control 
system.
3. Flexible Exchange Rates
The flexible exchange rate system represents a 
middle-of-the-road condition with respect to external 
p o l i c y . T h e  rate of exchange is allowed to fluctuate 
according to the dictates of demand and supply, except 
that extreme fluctuations are prevented through the 
operation of a stabilization fund or some other similar 
government a g e n c y . D u r i n g  the post-war era, the
^4Snider, o£. cit., p. 159.
®%exico is a good example of a Latin American 
country which utilizes a flexible exchange rate system.
The United States supports, in part, the Mexican stabi­
lization fund.
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International Monetary Fund has been attempting to modify 
extreme exchange rate movements on an international basis.
Since the exchange rate can vary, part of the 
shock may be absorbed through this external means rather 
than placing full reliance upon domestic changes alone 
as would be necessary under exchange control.
The fluctuating rate places great reliance upon 
the demand and supply forces at work within nations and 
among the trading countries. The market rate as 
determined through trading is responsible for establish­
ing an official rate of exchange.
The official rate of exchange is destined to 
express an equilibrium condition in the balance of pay­
ments of a nation with other trading countries. This 
rate, expressed in terms of prices, tends to link the 
average price levels of the periphery.
As the market prices change in accordance with 
the forces of the market, the official rate would be 
"flexible1' too. Speculation would be of lesser importance 
than under a freely fluctuating system largely because 
variations in the official rate are usually carried out 
only periodically and in secret. This result could be 
expected as long as the change in market prices are of 
moderate intensity.
86Halm, on. cit. , p. 478
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Foreign exchange reserves would flow out if the 
average market prices of a nation’s goods rose temporarily 
above those of its trading partners. The official rate 
would not need to be altered if the situation corrected 
itself within a reasonable period of time. On the other 
hand, the balance of payments could be maintained at 
equilibrium should the reverse occur as the nation 
accumulates foreign exchange.
If market prices fluctuate to great extremes, the 
stabilization fund would be required to buy or sell 
foreign exchange until the market straightened itself 
out. The problem is that this may take a long time, and 
the Fund may be exhausted. The other alternatives would 
be the inflow of funds or capital, monetary and fiscal 
measures, or a change in the official exchange rate.
The most likely to occur is a mixture of all three.
Yet, an important problem would still wait for 
solution. How could internal measures (monetary and 
fiscal policy) be combined with external measures 
(exchange policy) in order to maintain a price and income 
level consistent with such a level in other trading 
nations? Probably no general answer can be given here 
since the emphasis in each country would depend upon its 
own situation.
It would seem worthwhile to discuss the alternatives
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in terms of the more common problems evident today in the 
underdeveloped areas. These are inflation and disequi­
librium in the balance of payments.8^
Since inflation is often so glaringly evident in 
the underdeveloped areas, deflation appears to be the 
method necessary to solve the internal monetary problem 
and, thereby, reduce the pressure exerted upon the 
exchange rate.
If there is a redundancy of money and credit which 
brought on the inflation in the private sector, either 
because of a desire on the part of authorities to induce 
the people to consume and invest more or because pro­
duction fails to rise proportionately with the larger 
supply of funds, a tightening of monetary and fiscal 
policy would contribute to the reduction of the excess 
of mones^ and credit.
Qfjf
In Latin America eight of the twenty nations 
are virtually free of exchange controls. These are:
Cuba, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, 
Honduras, Mexico, and Panama. These countries finance 
their trade with the rest of the world almost exclusively 
in dollars and maintain a high percentage of gold and 
dollar reserves behind their currencies. However, for 
our purposes the eight-country classification is not 
sufficiently exact, for some of the countries exercise 
varying degrees of control by means of payments agree­
ments and other devices. Refer to R. F. Mikesell,
Foreign Exchange In The Postwar World, pp. 305-306.
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The amount of deflation necessary to stabilize the 
economy is of great importance. As deflation takes hold 
and costs and prices begin to fall, prices usually fall 
faster than costs. This tends to lead to unemployment.
But unemployment is directly opposed to the objective of 
full employment. Also, the rigidity of prices and wages 
and the possibility of widescale monopoly would not allow 
deflation to do its job.
Increased borrowing on the part of the government 
to finance various projects may lead to inflation.
Deflation as a means of correction may be turned down 
because it would be thought of as an impediment to develop­
ment. In other words, the social cost may be considered 
less if inflation prevails primarily for the purpose of 
increasing developmental projects. Whether such action 
is justifiable or not, the pendulum may swing in favor 
of a short-term expediency (inflation) for a long-term 
anticipated gain (a diversified industry and larger pro­
duction) . Furthermore, deflation as an element of policy 
in many underdeveloped areas Is likely to be opposed 
because of its tendency to reduce imports which may other­
wise be too great a cost in terms of development.
8®Underemployment is a more likely situation in 
the underdeveloped areas. People usually are not thrown 
out of work, but they move to less productive employment. 
See Seymour Harris, Chapter I, "Some Major Issues," in 
Economic Problems of Latin America, pp. 8-9.
Foreign exchange earnings derived from exports may 
not aid a deflationary policy if such earnings ^re allowed 
to infiltrate into the monetary system. This form of 
income is subject to wide and unpredictable movements 
which could upset a broad deflationary policy.
Prestige may even enter into the explanation of 
the failure of deflation. Underdeveloped nations like to 
imitate the more industrialized countries. This is a 
defensive type of situation in which the feeling among 
the lesser developed countries is that they must match 
the rising income of the industrial countries or at least 
to see to it that their income moves in the same direction 
that is being taken by that of the more fully developed, 
industrial countries, even at the cost of inflation.
Loan funds may be moving toward the underdeveloped 
areas, and this movement may explain, in part, the original 
equilibrium exchange rate. Nevertheless, the domestic 
economy may feel the inflationary effect of such loans 
as they are spent in unproductive endeavors.8^
Inflation may present a problem even when the funds 
are being utilized productively. For example, the govern­
ment may use the funds to import capital goods which are
8% o  doubt the above is a partial explanation as 
to why the World Bank restricts its loans to governments. 
Generally, the government or agencies of the governments 
in Latin America take a large share of the responsibility 
for channeling funds into the more productive sectors.
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sold to domestic firms. The firms would probably pay for 
these goods with savings or borrowed funds. Income would 
rise to the extent of the loan plus the Income velocity 
which it generates. The result would be a greater supply 
of money. Individual purchasers would have to refrain 
from spending for other customary non-capital items until 
the new savings are equal to the foreign loan. Since 
this deferral of expenditure is unlikely, inflation would 
prevail.®^ A deflationary policy, on the other hand, may 
reduce the Incentive to expand.
The desire for development which loan funds could 
help support, accompanied by the determination to main­
tain an equilibrium in the balance of payments, may be 
stronger a force than that of deflation. In such event, 
the price level would remain quite high, with Income 
varying in accordance with the more dominating factors.9-L
Depreciation of the exchange rate is an alterna­
tive means available for coping with inflation. Its
^Buchanan and Ellis, op. cit., p. 388.
^Export income may rise or fall in comparison 
with domestic income, including that derived from Imports; 
at one time or another its rise or fall will be affected 
by such factors as the distribution of income through 
monetary and fiscal policy which could cause income to 
rise or fall; the extent and results of price control, if 
applied; the stimulative effect of the multiplier which 
would also influence the actual income; the psychological 
determination on the part of the public via co-operation 
in order to alleviate an undesirable condition.
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effect upon the price level and national income may have 
mixed results.
If the general market prices of a nation’s com­
modities rise, the authorities may he willing to raise 
the official rate of exchange to conform with them. This 
will have the effect of reducing imports, in view of the 
probability that domestic traders will need to surrender 
more of their home currency for a given amount of imports 
than they did previously. An increase in the domestic 
rate would also tend to increase the exports of the nation, 
for traders of other nations would now give up less units 
of their currency for purchases from the depreciating 
country.
The average price level in the nation depreciating 
its exchange rate would tend to fall or, if rising, to 
ascend at a slower rate than those of its trading partner.9^ 
This being the case, a nation could maintain its price 
level and income would rise. Many perplexities could 
arise, however, and lead to a different solution.
If at the outset a deficit balance accrues in the
^After the 1954 depreciation of the Mexican peso, 
the wholesale price index (1953 = 100) rose to 125 at the 
end of 1955. Yet, between January and October of 1956 
the price index revealed a three point rise to 128. Using 
the same base year, the wholesale index of the United 
States showed a five point increase between January and 
October of 1956. Refer to International Monetary Fund, 
International Financial Statistics, January, 1957.
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balance of payments, depreciation could remedy the situ­
ation within a short period of time.®^5 Thereafter, 
retaliation in kind by other nations is likely to prevent 
a continuation of the earlier benefits attaching to 
depreciation.
Furthermore, exchange depreciation may actually 
foster inflation through its effectiveness in preventing 
imports from entering the nation. The larger supply of 
money would probably result in the bidding of prices at 
home. At the same time, rising export income would create 
additional funds for domestic expenditures. This may, in 
turn, lead to a policy of further depreciation which could 
make the problem nearly unbearable.®4 Speculation and
This assumes that the elasticities of demand and 
supply are high enough to bring about greater than pro­
portionate changes in imports and exports. For a good 
discussion of these effects, refer to Jacob Viner, Inter­
national Trade and Economic Development. p. 91-93; also 
see James Meade, The Theory of International Economic 
Policy (London: Oxford University Press, 195lJ, I, 309-310.
According to Mr. Bloomfield depreciation may not 
work rapidly enough in a short period of time, especially 
if the country is a primary producer faced with a rela­
tively inelastic demand for its exports. Refer to Arthur 
Bloomfield, ’’Foreign Exchange Rate Theory and Policy,"
The Hew Economics. p. 309.
q a
° Chile presents a good example of this process.
The wholesale price index rose in the following manner: 
1953-100, 1954-157, 1955-277, and August, 1956-485. On 
the other hand, the exchange rate changes were as follows 
(pesos per dollar): 1953-110.0, 1954-200.0, 1955-300.0, 
and August, 1956-497. See the International Monetary 
Fund, International Financial Statistics. January, 1957.
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capital outflow would probably occur, and this would again 
assert itself upon the balance of payments in the form of 
a deficit.
Internally, inflation may.raise the domestic price 
level to an extent greater than that in the periphery.
In this case, too, exchange depreciation would fail, since 
the price rise may encourage imports.®5
Consideration should also be given to the point 
that if inflation is greater in one sector than another, 
e. g., the export sector, exports may remain stable or 
possibly decline.
Under such circumstances, monetary and fiscal 
policy would have a definite place in helping to bring 
about a tolerable situation. Tightening of monetary 
controls would be essential as would also the raising of 
taxes in the fiscal area. Intended saving (S) would 
become a key factor, for both investment (A) and exports 
(E) would have risen while imports (M) would have declined, 
except in the case of hyperinflation as was Indicated in 
the last two paragraphs a b o v e . ^ 6  National income would 
probably fall, at least in some sectors, as a result of 
the operation of these measures.
®5Snider, op. cit., pp. 257-858.
9®Professor Viner recognized similar measures. See 
Viner, loc. cit.
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Professor Snider suggests an intermediate proposal 
of disinflation plus exchange depreciation.^ Inflation 
would be reduced through the appropriate monetary and 
fiscal measures but would stop short of an actual down­
turn of prices. After prices are stabilized, presumably 
under conditions of full employment and high national 
income, then exchange depreciation may be instigated in 
order to bring costs and prices at home into equilibrium 
with those prevailing in the trading nations. This 
appears to be an excellent policy proposal, but the 
exactitudes required would be extremely difficult to 
ascertain and implement.
SUMMARY
In this chapter an attempt has been made to bring 
together some of the internal and external factors whose 
functioning with respect-to a nation’s economy may con­
tribute to serious fluctuations in income and the general 
price level, and may threaten the exchange rate. Mone­
tary and fiscal policy and exchange policy are the 
measures suggested to offset their otherwise adverse 
effects.
Primary emphasis is placed upon these factors as
^Snider, oj3. cit., pp. S58-S59.
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they relate to the lesser developed countries. These 
nations are quite generally characterized today by inflation 
and by disequilibrium in their balance of payments. At 
least a partial explanation of their present-day problems 
lies in the realm of factor influences and the inability 
of these nations to cope with the reverberations which 
originate so largely in those influences.
The approach is primarily in terms of income 
analysis, and from a theoretical standpoint. The temporal 
sequence of developments is kept within the realm of short­
term problems. Accordingly, a very considerable emphasis 
is given to the monetary aspect of changes and to the 
methods employed to deal with such changes as opposed to 
the physical or output analysis.
Monetary and fiscal measures are regarded as 
desirable and necessary forces for establishing an equi­
librium situation. The addition of these measures to the 
general balancing factor of lending is considered 
appropriate, because lending, operating alone, may fail 
to close the gap in the balance of payments, especially 
within the short run period of time. Monetary and fiscal 
policy has an important role to play in helping to reduce 
the impact of variable factors, external as well as 
domestic.
It appears that much may be accomplished by a
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nation confronted with short-term shocks which tend to 
affect its national income or price level and its balance 
of payments through a better co-ordination between 
external and internal policy. Here again, monetary and 
fiscal measures have an important part to play.
It was found that changes in the external sector, 
such as variations in income, depreciation, etc., have 
an impact upon the domestic sector which tends to alter 
the national income or price level. The decision with 
respect to the type of external policy which seems most 
desirable to produce an equilibrium in the balance of 
payments requires a varying degree of monetary and fiscal 
implementation. As an example, the use of exchange 
controls, with periodic changes in the exchange rate, 
seems to create an unusually important role for monetary 
and fiscal policy while, on the other hand, these measures 
are of lesser importance if a nation is pursuing a flexi­
ble exchange rate policy. In the latter case, the 
external forces are taken into account through the vari­
ability of the exchange rate rather than by monetary and 
fiscal policy. Of course, if extreme fluctuations occur 
in the external sector, then monetary and fiscal policy 
may play a stellar role in moderating the problem. 
Deflation or exchange depreciation rely to a very con­
siderable extent upon the latter policy.
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As a step toward the more effective co-ordination 
between internal and external policy, it was suggested 
that -perhaps disinflation along with some exchange 
depreciation may be employed to help prevent too great 
a burden in either area. Yet, such sychronization of 
policy as may be required might create more problems 
than it could solve.
Since there are many varying factors which bring 
about change, both monetary and fiscal policy and external 
policy should be of a flexible nature in order to suc­
cessfully deal with the problems which that change pre­
cipitates .
Subsequent chapters will present individual 
country analyses in order to find out how some of the 
more representative nations are coping with these concepts 
through practical application. An effort will be made 
to determine the extent to which that practical appli­
cation supports, and is supported by, certain theoretical 
expectations and conclusions in this area of inter­
national trade study.
CHAPTER II
THE CASE OF MEXICO
Mexico w^s selected for this study because it repre­
sents one of the more economically advanced countries of 
Latin America. Its specific position would be subject to 
change relative to the other nations In this area depend­
ing upon the classification one chooses to employ. Using 
the dual criteria of domestic economic progress and freedom 
from external control, Mexico should be classified as one 
of the more favorably situated nations of Latin America.
Domestically, the gross national product and 
national income have continued to rise in a consistent 
manner in recent years.-*- Wo doubt part of Mexico's ability 
to cope creditably with domestic problems is because the 
people have an opportunity to observe and to employ many 
policies successfully used in the United.States. On the 
other hand, Mexico is an underdeveloped country faced with
•^The gross national product has risen from 58,300 
millions of pesos in 1952 to 92,400 millions of pesos in 
1956. The devaluation of the peso by about 30.8 per cent 
in 1954 is responsible, in part, for the rise in the gross 
national product figures from 1954 to 1956. See the Banco 
de Mexico, S. A., Trigesimatercera Asamblea General 
Ordinaria de Accionistas CThirty-third Annual Report of 
the Bank of Mexico), 1955, p. 149j also the International 
Monetary Fund, International Financial News Survey. 
November 16, 1956, p. 162.
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inflation and numerous other domestic problems found in a 
typical developing nation. ^
It is contended that Mexico has no balance of pay­
ments problem as such.® ^hls explains why the country 
does not practice exchange control. Nevertheless, there 
is a tendency for Mexico to import more than it exports.
The purpose of this chapter is to analyze some of 
the theoretical concepts developed in Chapter I from a 
more practical viewpoint. The topics to be presented for 
observation will be the international equilibrium of 
Mexico and the internal and external policies of the 
country during the last five years, 1952-1956. Variable 
factors which present numerous problems will be treated 
as they Influence monetary,■fiscal, and external policies* 
As mentioned earlier, attention Is to center around recent 
experiences of the nation and, therefore, covers a rela­
tively short period of time.
^A recent report of the National Bank of Mexico 
states that Mexico1s economic position is comparable to 
that of the United States in the last quarter of the 
nineteenth century. Refer to Banco Nacional de Mexico,
S. A., Review of the Economic Situation of Mexico. July, 
1955, pp. 5-4.
3R. F. Mikesell, Foreign Exchange In The Postwar 
World (New York: Twentieth Century Fund), 1954, p. 506.
I. INTERNATIONAL EQUILIBRIUM: SOME FACTS
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The concept of international equilibrium assumes 
that the necessary factors of saving, investment, imports, 
exports, and lending are so adjusted that equality among 
these factors is a probability, and that they will main­
tain such a relationship over a more or less prolonged 
period of time. From a more practical viewpoint, it is 
unlikely that such a situation would occur in an under­
developed nation, or if it did exist, it would not last 
for an extended period of time.
The latter explanation seems reasonable because 
international equilibrium is subject to human discretion. 
For example, an international equilibrium balance could 
be disturbed whenever groups of importers decide to alter 
the quantity of goods imported, while the decisions on 
the part of savers, investors, exporters, or lenders do 
not change accordingly to offset the prior dictates of 
the importers.
Furthermore, a nation which would realize a state 
of international equilibrium would be constantly on the 
defense to maintain its favorable position because many 
of its trading partners probably would have not achieved 
such a desirable goal.
A majority of the lesser developed nations are
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subject to the economic diversities of foreign industrial 
countries with which they trade. Such may be the case 
even if their foreign trade represents a minor portion of 
total income. The reason for this is that they must 
import certain basic foodstuffs not available within the 
country or not produced in sufficient quantities, and 
their urgent need to acquire capital goods produced by 
other nations. The import of foodstuffs is essential to 
maintain their plane of living while the inflow of capital 
goods provides for future growth.
Mexico is no exception to this kind of reliance 
upon other countries. The major part of its foreign trade 
is with the United States.^ Although its foreign trade 
accounts for about 15 per cent of its total trade, the 
types of goods imported are crucially important for the 
maintenance of the nation1s plane of living and for 
economic growth.
On the other hand, the extensive participation on 
the part of the government may serve to check large devi­
ations away from an equilibrium position. Again, Mexico
% n  1954, 83.6 per cent of MexicoTs import trade 
and 79.7 per cent of its export trade was carried on with 
North America, principally the United States. The import 
and export trade was 83.1 per cent and 80.2 per cent, 
respectively, for the year 1955. See the Banco Nacional 
de Comercio Exterior, S. A., Comercio Exterior de Mexico 
1955 (The National Bank of Foreign Commerce, Foreign 
Commerce of Mexico 1955). March, 1956, p. 217.
87
is an example of an underdeveloped nation in which the 
government takes an active role in economic development.
The following section on saving and investment 
emphasizes the relative contribution of the private and 
government sectors to the total product of the nation. 
Unless specifically stated, the terms national product 
and national income will be used interchangeably. The 
national product figures are to be used in describing 
relationships. This seems to be the best way of making 
comparisons since both the private and public sectors are 
being considered. Furthermore, the national product is 
equal to national income if it is recognized that the 
former takes account of depreciation, indirect business 
taxes, and subsidies. Unfortunately, existing infor­
mation with respect to these factors is lacking in the 
case of Mexico. The national product data are given, 
therefore, in gross figures.
A. Saving and Investment
Table I, page 88, presents the saving and invest­
ment picture of Mexico from 1952 to 1956. The national 
product for the years 1953 and 1955 show exceptional 
directional changes.5 in addition, the 1953 national
National product figures for the years 1952-1954 
were taken from the Bank of Mexico, Annual Report, 1955,
TABLE I
SAVING AND INVESTMENT OF MEXICO 
(in millions of pesos)
National
Producta
(1)
As a 
% of 
Total
S aving 
(2)
As a 
% of
(1)
Private 
S aving
(3)
As a 
% of
(2)
Public
Saving^
(4)
As a 
% of
(2)
Invest­
ment3
(&)
As a 
% of
(1)
Private
Invest­
ment
(6)
As a 
% of
(5) '
Public
Invest­
ment^
(7)
As a 
% of
(5)
1952
58,300 100.0 5,222c 9.0 3,394 65.0 l,828d 35.0 8,166 14.0 4,732 57.9 3,434 42.1
1953
56,300 100.0 6,573 11.7 4,000 61.0 2,573 39.0 7,540 13.4 4,600 61.0 2,940 39.0
1954
66,478 100.0 8,056 12.1 4,815 59.8 3,241 40.2 9,428 14.2 5,400 57.3 4,028 42.7
1955
84,000 100.0 10,742 12.8 6,505 60.6 4,237 39.4 11,611 13.8 7,600 65.5 4,011 34.5
1956e
92,400 100.0 11,817 12.8 7,156 60.6 4,661 39.4 12,774 13.8 8,360 65.4 4,414 34.6
Source: Bank of Mexico, S. A., Annual Report, 1955; Nacional Financlera, S. A.,
Informe Anual (Annual Report), 1956; and United States Department of Commerce, Investment 
In Mexico, 1955.
®Gross figures.
^Public sector includes decentralized government organizations, state owned 
businesses, government of the Federal District, and states and municipalities.
cPartially estimated.
j 00
Estimated at 35% of total saving. 00
eAll figures are estimated on the basis of a ten per cent increase.
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income fell by 1,800 millions of pesos from the preceding 
year, while the national income in 1955 rose by 15,420 
millions of pesos over 1954.6
The decline in the gross national product for 1953 
was 3.4- per cent. Several reasons can be offered to 
explain, in part, this decline in the national product. 
Inflation had been a problem for several years, and the 
Korean War further aggravated the situation. Credit 
expanded by nearly 20 per cent between 1952 and 1953.?
On the other hand, prices actually declined in 1953.®
The fall of less than three percentage points was not 
unusual when compared to the prior yearts price rise.
In 1952 the price level rose by about 35 per cent; 
furthermore, in the following year, 1954, the price level 
ascended by approximately 37 percentage points.
p. 149. The figure for 1955 was obtained from the Nacional 
Financiera, S. A., Annual Report. 1956, p. 37, and the 
figure for 1956 was acquired from the International Mone­
tary Fund, International Financial News Survey. November 
16, 1956, p. 162.
^National income figures for the years under study 
were as follows: 1952, 52,000 millions of pesos; 1953, 
50,200; 1954, 59,180; 1955, 74,600; and 1956, 82,060.
The sources of national income data are the same as those 
used for the national product figures (see footnote 5, 
p. 87), except for 1956. National income for 1956 was 
estimated at ten per cent greater than 1955.
7
Bank of Mexico, Annual Report. 1954, p. 58. This 
figure excludes inter-bank accounts.
Q
Ibid., p. 123. The wholesale price index was
392.5 at the end of 1953 (base 1939 - 100).
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Positive action, primarily by the governmental 
sector, halted the rise in output and income for the year. 
Realized public investment fell by 494 millions of pesos 
(14.4 per cent) -while private investment expenditures 
dropped by 132 millions of pesos (3.0 per cent). Over-all 
total realized investment expenditures declined by 7.7 
per cent at the end of 1953. In contrast, the national
product dropped 3.4 per cent.
Table I further reveals that total saving rose 
25.9 per cent during the year. Realized private saving 
increased 17.1 per cent; thus it accounted for approxi­
mately 45 per cent of the total rise.
To sum up the internal factors, the decline in 
government investment expenditures and the rise of public 
savings played a vital role in explaining the economic 
situation at the year's end. Saving rose by a much 
greater extent than investment fell; however, the effect 
upon the fall in the national product was not very pro­
nounced. Two major reasons explain this condition. They 
are the abundance of credit and the time element. The 
extent of available credit has already been stated, but 
some attention should be given to the latter factor.
During the first half of 1953 the government carried out 
various conservative measures to deal effectively with 
the inflation. The conservative attitude, expressed mainly
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through a brisk reduction of investment spending, spread 
to the general public. The result was larger saving.
The government was forced to change its policy in the 
middle of 1953 because national income was expected to 
fall rapidly. Government investment spending then rose; 
nevertheless, the desired expansion on the part of the 
general public failed to mature. The final end-of-the- 
year result was an actual decline in the national product 
and income*
These events were expressed by an authoritative
report:
. . . Two distinct phases were apparent during
1953. In the first half of the year, official 
policy was aimed at balancing the fiscal budget 
and containing the threat of inflation, which also 
coincided with a deterioration in the balance of 
payments. The measures for financial austerity 
mainly led to a slackening of public investment.
. . , Nevertheless, the private sector enjoyed 
credit which was more readily available and more 
abundant, loaned with the objective of encouraging 
private investment and of thus reconciling the 
need for financial and monetary equilibrium with 
the desire to avoid restricting economic develop­
ment.
The consequent tendency towards depression led 
during the second half of the year to a change in 
fiscal policy, while public investment was raised.
But the influence of the initial contraction, 
which was partly psychological, could not be 
neutralized. . . .9
%nited Nations, department of Economic and Social 
Affairs, Economic Survey of Latin America 1954 (New York: 
United Nations Publications, 1955), p. 174.
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The high liquidity on the part of the general 
public had become too firm to be pried loose. The general 
price level followed pretty much the course of events.
The wholesale price level in December, 1952 was 392.7.
By February, 1953 it had declined to 383.9 while it stood 
at 387.4 at the end of April. Finally, the year ended 
with the December, 1953 price index at 395.6.-^
On the international scene, the normal trend of 
import surpluses was realized again in 1953.^  This fact 
plus the fear of the public’s inclination to save for 
later spending upon imports brought about the decision by 
the government to devaluate the currency in 1954.
Foreign exchange reserves declined from 2,163 
millions of pesos in 1952 to 1,886 millions of pesos at 
the close of 1953. From the commodity viewpoint, the 
reason for the smaller exchange balance was not because 
of a rise in imports, the latter actually declined, but 
because of the pronounced fall in exports earnings as is 
demonstrated by the balance of payments schedule.
Mexico’s short-term obligations with American
^National Bank of Mexico, S. A«, Review of the 
Economic Situation of Mexico. See the following issues: 
February, April, and June, 1954.
-^See the Balance of Payments of Mexico, Appendix 
A, p. 174.
-^Devaluation took place in April, 1954.
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banks, principally loans and acceptances and draft 
indebtedness, rose by 34.6 millions of pesos (4 millions 
of dollars) while American Banks’ obligations to Mexico, 
mainly deposits and United States Government bonds matur­
ing within one year, fell by 380.6 millions of pesos (44 
million dollars)*^®
The second of the two years of exceptional 
directional change in the national product was 1955. The 
sharp rise in the national product was brought about in 
several different ways. Perhaps the most significant 
event was the devaluation of the peso in mid-1954.
Export income swelled by about 1,937 millions of pesos 
(154.9 millions of dollars).^4
Total investment for 1955 was 23.1 per cent larger 
than in 1954. Government investment did not increase, 
but actually fell. This result came about after a large 
injection of government investment in 1954. The official 
attitude was to place the burden of rising investment on 
the shoulders of the private sector. The result was a 
fortunate turn of events; private investment was greater 
by approximately 41 per cent over 1954, as Table I
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 
Federal Reserve Bulletin. December, 1956, pp. 1374 and 1376.
^Calculated at the new rate of exchange of 12.51 
pesos to the dollar.
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Indicates.
Another factor of utmost importance was the official 
concern of higher costs and prices attributed in part to 
the 1954 devaluation. This problem led once again to a 
more conservative policy with respect to government spend­
ing.
The policy of the Bank of Mexico was to encourage 
private investment. Although this policy will be dis­
cussed under the internal and external policy heading, it 
should be pointed out that commercial banks were enticed 
into channeling loans to those various sectors of the 
economy in which economic development would yield the 
greatest returns.
Private saving expansion during 1955 represented 
a 56 per cent increase over the preceding 12 months. The 
share of private saving to total saving maintained a rate 
of approximately 60 per cent; the remainder consisted of 
public saving.
The physical output was larger by some 26 per cent 
at the end of 1955; that is, a rise from 66,478 millions 
of pesos in 1954 to 84,000 millions of pesos in 1955, 
calculated In terms of gross figures.
Table I shows that the figures for 1956 were esti­
mated. The national product and income represented a 10
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15per cent increase over 1955. The figures for investment 
and saving have also been increased by 10 per cent. No 
doubt these are conservative estimates, but they seem to 
be indicative of the general conservative viewpoint 
expressed during the first part of the year.
On the basis of information made available during 
the first half of the year, it would seem reasonable to 
expect the balance of payments of Mexico to continue its 
favorable condition. Nevertheless, it is difficult to 
predict just how and to what extent the devaluation will 
affect Mexico*s international relations.
It is quite clear that the volume of saving has 
failed to maintain a volume of investment capable of 
supporting a high level of production and employment.
Table I indicates, however, that the saving gap has 
narrowed over the past five years.
Table II, page 96, takes account of the monetary 
influences by attaching prices to a base year. The general 
commodity index of 210 commodities was employed as a guide 
for measurement. The index based upon 1939 was rebased 
for 1950 in order to obtain a more current trend in price 
changes.^6
1 R
International Monetary Fund, International 
Financial News Survey. November 16, 1956, p. 162.
^-%ee the Index of Wholesale Prices in Mexico City, 
Appendix B, p. 176.
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TABLE II
REAL SAVING AND INVESTMENT OF MEXICO 
(in millions of pesos)
Year National Saving Investment Pricesa
Product (1950 = 100)
1958 46,014 4,122 6,445 126.7
1953 44,647 5,213 5,979 126.1
1954 48,207 5,842 6,837 137.9
1955 58,239 6,618 7,221 160.8
1956 55,797 7,135 7,714 165.6b
Source: Table I, p. 88.
aPrices are computed from data issued by the Bank 
of Mexico, S. A., Annual Reports. and the National Bank of 
Foreign Commerce, Foreign Commerce of Mexico. December, 1956.
^The price index for 1956 consists of the average 
price of consumer and producer goods for the first ten 
months of the year.
Table II shows that inflation has been something 
more than of passing importance. The national product 
rose In terms of 1950 prices by 81.3 per cent, or it aver­
aged a little more than 5 per cent per year. In contrast, 
investment expenditures increased by 19.7 per cent or 
approximately 3.95 per cent for each of the five years.
The data also shows that investment expenditures for the 
period as a whole failed to maintain the given level of 
national income. Nevertheless, the last two years, 1955 
and 1956, indicated that investment expenditures rose by 
6.6 per cent per year while the national product increased 
by 7.6 per cent per year. In other words, investment has
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Improved its position with respect to the national income.
Saving has risen at a rapid rate, although It still 
falls short of investment expenditures. The rate of 
increase in 1955 and 1956 was about 11 per cent for each 
year based upon 1950 prices. The rise in saving paints 
a somewhat optimistic picture; nevertheless, there are 
several reasons that help to explain why saving con­
sistently falls short of investment. It is said that 
only a small proportion of the population have funds avail­
able out of their income for saving. Although statistical 
proof is lacking, Mr. Antonio Flores, Director of the 
National Financiera (National Industrial Financing 
Corporation) states that:
. . .  the distribution of income results in a 
situation which has a marked influence on the 
structure of the capital market. There is on the 
one hand a small population group whose high income 
gives it a wide margin of saving, and on the other 
millions who can hardly satisfy their most pressing 
needs.
It Is recognized too that hoarding is a continuous 
problem in Mexico; however, there is no way to determine 
to what extent hoarding could contribute to greater invest­
ment. There is good indication that hoarding is not so
United Nations, Department of Economic Affairs, 
Domestic Financing of Economic Development (New York: 
United Nations Publications, 1950), p. 160. A report by 
a committee of experts.
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serious a problem today as it was in the past. Banking
institutions have spread to nearly all parts of the
country. In 1951 there were 759 depositories of cash
including banks and branches, credit unions, and other
financial organizations. This figure is in contrast to
18the two savings institutions which existed in 1951. The 
growth In the number of all types of financial institutions 
follows the phenomenal rate of the savings banks.
The rise in the national product and income during 
recent years has surely contributed to a larger number of 
people realizing some savings. On the other hand, the 
rise in income is not nearly so impressive when expressed 
in real terms as shown in Table II. Nevertheless, invest­
ment expenditures have made it possible for more people to 
save a portion of their income.
The degree of government Influence into the working 
of the economic system Is of particular interest. Table I, 
page 88, shows that government investment varied between
54.5 to 42.7 per cent of total investment for the years 
under study while public saving ranged within similar 
percentage points. In other words, government partici­
pation accounts for a large portion of total income and
18
Senate Committee on Banking and Currency, Interim 
Report, Study of Latin American Countries (Washington: 
United States Printing Office), 1954, p. 554. A report 
of the Capehart Commission In Latin America.
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employment* Also, it accounts for a sizable portion of 
total saving. Public works and public enterprises are 
evidently the foundation for economic development. The 
basic industries and external economies are primarily a 
governmental responsibility.
The saving public does have access to two stock 
exchanges in Mexico. Although individual participation 
on these exchanges is greater at present than ever before, 
there is still a good deal of apathy on the part of the 
general public.
Inflation has been a leading factor in holding
back further utilization of the exchanges. Inflation is,
nevertheless, a partial explanation for the recent upsurge
in stock exchange activity. Private holders of bonds
have suffered through their investment in this type of
fixed return paper; therefore, many people have changed
1 Qtheir portfolios to the purchase of stocks.
The public is being further stimulated in putting 
its saving to work through the efforts of the invest­
ment bankers. In addition, the National Financiera sells 
securities to individuals. Evidently the general public 
is becoming more accustomed to the purchases of the latter 
institutions securities since it is now offering its
19National Bank of Mexico, S. A., Review of the 
Economic Situation of Mexico. December, 1955, pp. 3-4.
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paper without the usual repurchase guarantee. This 
guarantee has been used in the past in order to encourage 
individuals to buy more, securities. Nevertheless, a 
recent issue was offered by the National Financiera with­
out this additional prop. In other words, the officials 
of financial institutions must feel that the general 
public is so conditioned with respect to the purchase of 
securities that it will take them off the market without 
an additional incentive.^0
Table I reveals the rapid rise in saving during the 
five-year period. Total realized saving increased approxi­
mately 126 per cent, but public saving over-shadowed 
private saving. The percentage figures were 155 per cent 
for the former and 111 per cent for the latter.
No doubt part of the public saving consisted of 
forced saving of the private sector. On the other hand, 
another unverified portion of public saving represented 
the inflationary influence. Nonetheless, aggregate saving 
has risen at a rapid rate even though it did fall short 
of investment expenditures.
The question may be posed: why is it that investment 
spending was larger than saving? A partial explanation is 
that the creation of money allowed for greater investment
pQ
& International Monetary Fund, International 
Financial News Survey. January 27, 1956, p. 236.
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expansion. The expansion was of a dual nature. Credit 
itself made it possible for private investment to rise.
The second feature is that the government provided vast 
investment expenditures. Furthermore, rising export 
income and the tightening of import restrictions both 
stimulated domestic investment. In reference to Table I, 
total actual investment increased 56.4 per cent during 
the five years under consideration. Private Investment 
expenditures rose 76.7 per cent while the public sector 
accounted for a S8.5 per cent increase. Perhaps of 
greater significance is the fact that public Investment 
has averaged 38.6 per cent of total investment for the 
period. Both private and public investment expenditures 
have advanced rapidly in the last few years; however, the 
inflationary impact must be kept in mind. Certainly It 
should modify such optimistic overtones.
Traditionally, a low propensity to save creates a
PTlarge multiplier effect. The result should stimulate 
consumption and, in turn, induce further investment. In 
Mexico part of the multiplying effect is reduced because 
the Improvement In consumption is confined to a very 
narrow base; that is, only a small portion of the
^Table I indicates that the maximum autonomous 
multiplier effect, notwithstanding import leakages, would 
average about 7.
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population share in the returns from investment via higher 
incomes sufficient to accumulate savings for investment* 
Some part of the funds that would he available for further 
investment are directed into conspicuous consumption, the 
acquisition of more land, increased imports, or it goes 
abroad as flight capital.
Reference to Table I again shows that saving, as 
one leakage factor, would reduce the multiplier somewhat. 
The marginal propensity to save in Mexico is approximately 
0.14. However, the inclusion of the marginal propensity 
to import estimated at about 0.20 reduces the multiplier 
to a great extent.22 At the minimum, the two leakage 
factors amount to 0.34. This means that 34 centavos (100 
centavos per peso) out of every additional peso of income 
would be saved and spent for imports.
Only a rough estimate is possible in determining 
the influence of capital outflow. The balance of payments 
indicates that capital outflows were especially prominent 
in 1952, 1954, and 1955.25
Import restrictions have been tightened in each of
CO
The estimate of the import leakage is taken from 
Mr. Flores. Refer to United Nations, Department of Economic 
Affairs, Domestic Financing of Economic Development, pp. 
175-176.
23See the Balance of Payments of Mexico, Appendix
A ,  p .  1 7 4 .
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several recent years. In 1954 the government took action 
to reduce the inflow of luxury and non-essential goods.2^ 
An effort was made in 1956 to regulate import licenses of 
some commodities in accordance with the value of the
oc
surpluses of major export products. A new Mexican 
import tariff schedule went into effect in the latter 
year.2® The new schedule involves a complete revision of 
the tariff classification for imported goods.
A further treatment of saving and investment will 
be presented under the subsequent heading of monetary, 
fiscal and external policies. At this stage it is quite 
clear that realized saving and Investment decisions have 
not provided for an equality between these two factors in 
any of the years under studyj investment expenditure has 
been larger than saving in every year. Table III below 
gives the amounts of excess investment over saving.
TABLE III
THE EXCESS OF REALIZED INVESTMENT OVER SAVING 
(in millions of pesos)
1952 2,944
1953 967
^United Nations, Economic Survey of Latin America
1954. p. 176.
25International Monetary Fund, International 
Financial News Survey. September 21, 1956, p. 95.
pg
United States Department of Commerce, Foreign 
Commerce Weekly, February 20, 1956, p. 6.
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TABLE III (continued)
1954 1,372
1955 869
1956 957
Source: Table I, p. 88.
B. Imports, Exports, and Lending2*'’
Chapter I explained that if an international equi­
librium condition were to be obtained whenever Investment 
expenditures exceeded saving, as is the case in Mexico, 
imports should be larger than exports by an amount equal 
to the investment surplus. If this balance were not 
realized, then lending would be the factor responsible 
for creating the balance.^9 This section will inquire 
Into Mexico1s import and export relations to find out 
whether or not an International equilibrium exists, and 
if it does not, to see if lending fills the gap.
The current account section of the balance of pay­
ments explains whether a nation is balancing its current 
transactions (receipts and expenditures) in its trade 
with other nations. If an imbalance is present, the 
difference must be reconciled through the capital account,
27Imports include all the current account minus 
Items while exports represent the sum of all the current 
account plus items. Lending constitutes the (net) 
capital account balance.
28
Refer to Chapter I, pp. 15-17.
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unilateral account, or the gold account.
Some interesting relationships may be drawn from 
Table IV. Mexico has realized an import surplus in its 
commodity trade for every year included in this survey. 
Nevertheless, the import surplus has declined in every 
year with the exception of 1953. Among the more important 
factors which have contributed to the narrowing of the 
import gap were the success of import controls as mentioned 
on pages 102 and 103, the devaluation in 1954, the stimu­
lation of exports, and good harvest years.
TABLE IV
IMPORTS AND EXPORTS OF MEXICO* 
(in millions of dollars)
Item 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956a
Exports, f.o.b. 619.6 589.2 655.3 810.2 454.9
Imports, c.i.f. -830.9 -807.6 -788.7 -883.7 -518.3
Nonmonetary gold 2.0 14,0 11.7 14.2 2.4
Foreign travel 275.1 302.3 336.8 364.8 223.6
Foreign travel -113.3 -140.1 -173.2 -164.6 -104.1
Investment income -123.5 - 93.6 - 85.7 - 93.3 - 57.9
Other (net) 28.7 28.6 23.3 20.8 9.1
Balance -142.3 -107.2 - 20.5 68.4 9.7
Source: Balance of Payments of Mexico, Appendix 
A ,  p .  1 7 4 .
*Minus items denote debits or a reduction In 
purchasing power.
aIncludes the first six months of 1956 only.
The receipts of foreign travel expenditures are 
of particular importance to Mexico's current account
106
balance. The major components of this item consist of 
dollar earnings brought into Mexico by seasonal workers 
(braeeros) in the United States and foreign tourist 
expenditures in the country. Table IV reveals that the 
foreign travel Item amounted to between one-third and 
one-half the value of exports.
The investment income account was characteristic 
of a nation in a debtor stage of economic progress; that 
Is, Income earned abroad consistently falls short of 
income earned in Mexico by foreign individuals, firms, 
and governments.
Mexico had an over-all debit balance on current 
account In the first three years of the five-year period. 
Yet, the amount of the debit balance was lowered in each 
of the successive years. The decline in 1955 was about 
35 millions of dollars. Although total commodity trade 
fell, imports declined to a greater extent than exports 
and nonmonetary gold tak:en together. No doubt the con­
servative measures carried out by the government in the 
first half of the year contributed to the fall in Imports 
(see pages 90 and 91). The "wait-and-see" attitude of the 
general public, the possibility of devaluation, and the 
general business decline in the United States were sig­
nificant factors accounting for the reduction in exports.
The foreign travel Items offset one another between
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1952 and 1955 while the miscellaneous account declined by 
only 100,000 dollars. The principal factor explaining the 
reduced deficit balance in 1953 was the investment income 
item, which although still unfavorable, fell by some 29.9 
millions of dollars.
The deficit on current account in 1954 was 20.5 
millions of dollars. The devaluation of the peso in 
April, 1954 was perhaps the chief reason for the small 
unfavorable balance. Table IY shows the effects of 
devaluation with a large spurt in export sales and a 
reduction in imports.
In 1955 the current account turned favorable. 
Exports rose by 154.9 millions of dollars. This large 
increase of exports is indicative of the results to be 
expected during the first full year after devaluation.
On the other hand, imports surged upward by the amount of 
95 millions of dollars. Perhaps the main reasons for the 
rise in imports were the accumulation of foreign exchange 
reserves and the rapid rise of the domestic price level 
(see Table II, page 96). Both were Influenced in the 
first instance by the devaluation of the previous year.
Another important factor which helped to produce 
a favorable current account balance in 1955 was the large 
increase of foreign travel receipts in Mexico accompanied 
by a decline of Mexican foreign travel expenditures.
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Since the data for 1956 included only the first six 
months, it is difficult to predict the changes which may 
have occurred in the last half of the year. Nevertheless, 
it is normal for exports to rise markedly in the last part 
of the year when a large portion of the crops are harvested 
for shipment.
By way of summation, the current account has shown 
a deficit balance for the years 1952, 1953, and 1954.
The only complete year which yielded a favorable current 
account balance was 1955, while the information for 1956 
presents an incomplete picture,
A survey of the capital account should throw some 
light upon the directional flow of lending (positive or 
negative). Table V shows the capital account items and
TABLE V
CAPITAL ACCOUNT OF MEXICO 
(in millions of dollars)
Item 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956a
Long term 64.3 21.7 115.9 179.0 84.5
Private 42.S 21.3 98.0 139.5 69.8
Official 21.5 .4 17.9 39.5 14.7
Short term -51.2 65.5 - 95.6 -121.9 48.2
Private - 2.4 20.1 - 20.2 29.0 13.5
Official -48.8 45.4 - 68.4 -150.9 34.7
Balance 13.1 87.2 20.3 57.1 132.7
Source: 
A, p. 174.
Balance of Payments of Mexico, Appendix
aIncludes the first half of 1956 only.
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their directional movements. It is inferred that all the 
positive items represent inward movements of capital or 
negative lending (borrowing), or returns on loans made 
and, consequently, the minus items indicate outward flows 
of capital or positive lending, or the repayment of 
previous borrowings.
Long-term movements of capital into Mexico showed 
a constant rise except for the year 1953. The reasons 
for the fall of capital imports were two-fold. First of 
all, the government of Mexico was deeply concerned with 
the presence of inflation. As mentioned earlier, measures 
were taken in that year to prevent further loss of 
purchasing power. Furthermore, the adverse psychology as 
expressed by the private sector contributed to the smaller 
amount of long-term capital inflow.
The 400,000 dollars of official capital import were 
evidence that foreign governments and other official 
bodies were inclined to reserve their decisions to make 
funds available to Mexico.
Private long-term capital inflow accounted for the 
greater portion of Mexico*s total long-term foreign capital 
resources; nevertheless, some caution should be read into 
these figures. A large portion of the private direct 
investments consisted of the reinvestment of the profits 
of foreign owned firms in Mexico rather than new investments
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by a larger number of foreign residents.
The amount of official capital flows represents 
capital actually consumed, not authorized. In addition, 
the figures include repayments made each year. The 
constancy of repayments along with the favorable balance 
of payments in the past few years has provided Mexico
OQ
with a high international credit rating.
Total short-term capital movements have been quite 
erratic during the period covered by this survey. Table V 
indicates a debit balance existed for three out of the 
five years. On the whole, official short-term capital 
movements have been larger in amount than the private 
short-term capital movements. The private short-term 
capital account consists of the changes in national and 
private banks* assets which include gold holdings of these 
banks, but it excludes the foreign assets of the Central 
Bank.30
The short-term account totals represent net balance 
31figures. A minus means that either non-residents
2%ational Bank of Mexico, S. A., Review of the 
Economic Situation of Mexico. February, 1956, pp. 3-5.
30The Bank of Mexico's foreign assets are included 
with "other foreign assets" of the "official short-term" 
capital account item. Private transactions also fall 
within the classification of the latter account item.
See the Balance of Payments of Mexico, Appendix A, p. 174.
31The lone exception is the "use or repayment of 
International Monetary Fund resources" item.
Ill
have— on balance— drawn down their bank deposits in 
Mexican banks; or the banks have acquired stocks, bonds, 
or other assets of foreign countries, including foreign 
currency, bank deposits, and brokerage balances; or the 
banks have received gold on balance.
The minus balance of the short-term capital account
in 1952 seems logical because internally the economy was
characterized by inflation. Externally the situation gave
rise to foreign skepticism which resulted in a decline of
American banks * short-term claims on Mexico and a rise in
United States banks1 short-term liabilities to Mexico.
In other words, American short-term balances were being
withdrawn while Mexican nationals were increasing their
deposits in American banks and purchasing United States 
32securities. The favorable capital account balance was 
possible in 1952 because of the inflow of long-term 
capital.
At the end of 1953 the short-term capital balance 
turned positive. This suggests that a high state of 
liquidity was desired on the part of both the private 
and official sectors.
ssUnited States short-term claims fell by two 
millions of dollars while United States short-term 
liabilities increased by 73 millions of dollars. See 
the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 
Federal Reserve Bulletin. March, 1955, pp. 334 and 336.
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The debit balance on short-term capital account was 
re-established in 1954 and continued through 1955. 
Devaluation played a star role in bringing about the minus 
balance.
A more thorough investigation of the balance of 
payments accounts will be undertaken in the subsequent 
section dealing with monetary, fiscal, and external 
policies.
It is now possible to bring together the internal 
factors of saving and investment and the external factors 
of imports, exports, and lending in order to arrive at an 
approximate international equilibrium of Mexico.
Table VI combines the above factors to show their
TABLE VI
THE INTERNATIONAL EQUILIBRIUM OF MEXICO 
(in millions of pesos)*
Year National Saving(S)- Lending Import(M)-
Product Investment (A) Balance Export(E)
Balance (4-inflow) Balance
1952 58,300 A> S 2,944 4- 113 M> E 1,231
1953 56,300 A> S 967 4-  754 M> E 927
1954 66,478 A >  S 1,372 254 M> E 257
1955 84,000 A>  S 869 714 E > M 856
1956 92,400 A >  S 957 4r- l,660a E > M  121a
Source: Table I, page 88; Table III, pages 103-104;
Table IV, page 105; Table V, page 108; and the Balance of 
Payments of Mexico, Appendix A, p. 174.
^Monetary conversions were made at the following 
rates of exchange: 8.65 pesos per dollar, 1952-1955; 12*51 
pesos per dollar, 1954-1956.
aIncludes data for the first half of 1956 only.
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balancing relationships. An over-all appraisal of the 
table yields some important facts. Investment was in 
excess of saving for each year. In the first instance, 
this relationship presents a gratifying situation. Never­
theless, it is possible that productivity has not risen 
so much as the figures indicate. An increase in the 
supply of money and credit could constitute a part of this 
seemingly tremendous increase in investment and output.
According to theory, an excess of investment over 
saving should be offset through negative lending if inter­
national equilibrium is to be realized, i. e., there 
should be an inflow of capital in an amount equal to the 
investment surplus. Table VI reveals the above condition. 
Lending was negative on balance; an inflow of capital took 
place in every year. This fact Indicates that some portion 
of the rise in investment and national product was caused 
by inflation. The year 1953 would seem to bear this out, 
because income and output fell while investment was still 
much greater than saving.
Table VI further indicates that external policy 
was of prime importance since the lending balance was
i
moving in the desired direction for the first three of 
the five years surveyed. In other words, lending should 
be negative whenever imports exceed exports. In addition, 
a major correction was made through external policy via
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devaluation in 1954*
Within the general framework of events, each year 
presents its own unique set of factor relationships. The 
remainder of this section will be devoted to observing 
the influences exerted by the various factors during the 
five-year period under consideration.
I
In 1958 investment (A) exceeded saving (S) by some 
2,944 millions of pesos. This would indicate that lend­
ing (the capital account of the balance of payments) 
should show an inflow of capital by this amount. Accord­
ingly, negative lending took place to the extent of 113 
millions of pesos. Therefore, the lending function 
contributed to a decline in the imbalance in a theoreti­
cal sense, which when deducted from investment totaled
2,831 millions of pesos.
Since investment was in excess of saving, the 
surplus must have been generated through an increase of 
money and credit and government spending. The supply of 
money in circulation and demand deposits increased by 278 
millions of pesos while credit extended by the banking 
institutions was greater by some 770 millions of pesos
^ S e e  Table VI, column 4, p. 112*
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during 1952. Money and credit accounted for 1,048
millions of pesos out of the total investment balance of
2,831 millions of pesos, including the lending factor.
Although data were not available, the remainder must have
been financed through the government by use of various
direct and indirect methods.
Negative lending failed to close the gap between
imports and exports. The year 1952 ended with an import
balance on current account to the extent of 1,231 millions
of pesos. Although negative lending took place, there
35remained a gap of 1,118 millions of pesos. This gap
was covered through the unilateral, gold, and errors and
omissions accounts of the balance of payments and the
change in international reserves. To sum up: Mexico
received donations amounting to 27 millions of pesos,
lost gold to the extent of 551 millions of pesos, increased
its foreign exchange reserves by 519 millions of pesos,
and assigned 21 millions of pesos as a credit to the errors
and omissions item. These figures total 1,118 millions of
pesos, and this sum is equal to the original gap between
3 6the import surplus and the capital or lending balance.
34Refer to Money and Credit of Mexico, Appendix C,
p .  1 7 7 .
Refer to Table VI, columns 4 and 5, p. 112.
36The figures for the donations and gold items—  
converted into pesos— are taken from the Balance of
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The national product realized an increase of 6,500 
millions of pesos at current prices. This amounted to a 
12.5 per cent rise in national product (income). How­
ever, in constant pesos the rise was only 1,127 millions 
of pesos, or 2.5 per cent. In either case the rise in 
output appeared satisfactory. It would seem logical that 
productivity could rise hy a larger amount since the 
establishment of a new firm, for example, would convert 
the operators of, say, shoe-shining booths into steel 
handlers or auto assembly workers. In other words, the 
'immediate effect of even a small capital investment in a 
country in which productivity is exceptionally low would 
make possible a large percentage rise in production.
On the other hand, the constant creation of money 
and credit may be too great even though a rise in national 
product is evident. This year seemed to be the end of a 
culmination period; that is, inflation was getting too far 
out of hand. Since 1950 the total money supply has risen 
18*2 per cent or from 5,989 to 7,078 millions of pesos. 
Furthermore, at the end of 1952 the banking system had
<zrf
extended 7,639 millions of pesos worth of credit. These 
figures reveal the fact that the national product probably
Payments, Appendix A, p. 1?4. The foreign exchange figure 
was obtained from the International Monetary Fund, Inter­
national Financial Statistics. January, 1957, p. 156, line 12.
S^Money and Credit of Mexico, Appendix C, p. 177.
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could not have been maintained at its existing level with­
out even more extreme penalties imposed on the economic 
system.
Externally, the top-heavy import balance consist­
ing mainly of capital goods failed to reap immediate bene­
fits while the gold-foreign exchange balance indicated a 
reverse directional movement, that is, a net loss of gold 
amounting to 32 millions of pesos.
II
The next year, 1953, ended with an actual decline 
in national product (income). This was the only year in 
this survey in which the national product fell. Yet, 
in referring back to Table VI, page 112, one finds a 
pattern in the trend of saving and investment, lending, 
and imports and exports similar to that of the preceding 
year, except that the figures were smaller in amount.
Investment exceeded saving by 967 millions of 
pesos in 1953. This figure would indicate that lending 
should have been negative by the amount of the investment 
balance in order to establish an equilibrium at the new, 
lower national product figure. Thus, borrowing took place 
as lending revealed an inward flow to the extent of 754 
millions of pesos. Internally, then, there was an invest­
ment accumulation of 123 millions of pesos after consider­
ing the effect of the lending inflow.
Even though saving rose by an amount greater than
investment fell, investment was still in excess of saving.
Money and credit in circulation increased in 1955 by a
large amount. Money in circulation was 575 millions of
pesos greater than at the end of 1952. In addition, the
banking system allowed credit to rise by 1,514 millions
of pesos.38 This total of 2,089 millions of pesos was
much larger than the investment excess. Accordingly, this
fact would seem, at first, to indicate a large rise in the
price level. However, the price level did not rise, but
fell slightly. The events explaining these results were
given earlier; however, it would seem expedient to mention
39them once again. The government decided to reduce the 
apparent inflation at the beginning of the year. Invest­
ment spending was curtailed and credit controls were made 
more stringent. By mid-year it was observed that the 
national income was headed toward a sharp decline; there­
fore, governmental policy was reversed. Government spend­
ing began to rise while money and credit were made more 
plentiful. Yet, the private sector failed to be stimu­
lated through governmental and banking policy. The result 
was that the price level fell during the first four or
38Ibid.
39
Refer to pp. 91-92
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five months of the year under the government’s "austerity"
policy, but as credit rose during the last half of the
year, the price level increased too, and finally settled
on a plane nearly equal to that at the beginning of the 
40year. u
On the international scene, imports were larger 
than exports by 927 millions of pesos. Negative lending 
once again was in the right direction to close the import 
gap. Nevertheless, the amount of capital inflow was 175 
millions of pesos short of covering the import excess. 
Other balance of payments accounts provided the desired 
flows to create a balance. Gold inflow totaled 119 
millions of pesos while donations amounted to 37 millions 
of pesos. Foreign exchange reserves declined, however, 
by 389 millions of pesos. Finally, the errors and 
omissions absorbed the remaining 644 millions of pesos 
in the form of a credit balance.
Economic development suffered a blow in the year 
1953 as output declined 3 per cent in real terms. It 
appears that the authorities were rudely awakened to the 
fact that saving and investment were not strong enough to 
support the previous high level of income and output. 
Furthermore, the abundance of money and credit could not
40
See Table II, column 5, p. 96.
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be relied upon to sufficiently stimulate the private 
sector.
Evidently the authorities gave serious consider­
ation to the probability of an inappropriate exchange 
rate, which is the predominate factor influencing the 
national product (income) in the external sector. Upon 
reviewing the gold and foreign exchange items for the 
first two years of this study, it is evident that a net 
loss occurred. In 1952 there was a net gold loss of 32 
millions of pesos while at the end of 1953 foreign 
exchange drained away to the extent of 270 millions of 
pesos. Taking both years into consideration, the total 
net loss of these two items was approximately 302 
millions of pesos.
Ill
The problem to be faced squarely at the beginning 
of 1954 seemed to be one with two alternative solutions. 
The first was to moderate economic development primarily 
through stringent monetary and fiscal measures; the 
second, to maintain an abundance of money and credit 
internally and to take drastic measures in the external 
portion of the economy. The decision to be rendered at 
this time was further influenced, no doubt, by the possi­
ble reaction of the private sector to either proposal. 
Although the decision was not as clear-cut as the two
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above alternative solutions indicate, the second of the 
two choices dominated.
What was the result? Investment rose to about 
1,372 millions of pesos over saving, and the lending 
balance resulted in an inflow of capital, which failed 
to close the saving-investment gap. Investment less the 
lending balance totaled 1,118 millions of pesos.41 It 
is of special interest to note that although private sav­
ing and investment figures were larger in 1954, they rose 
by nearly the same amount— 800 millions of pesos. Govern­
ment investment spending increased by 1,088 millions of 
pesos while saving rose less in 1954 than it did in 1953.42 
The result was that the excess of investment over saving 
was attributed to larger government spending.
The abundance of money and credit appeared to make 
it rather easy for the governmental sector to increase 
investment expenditures. The money supply was made larger 
during the year by some 1,071 millions of pesos, and bank 
credit increased In an amount of 3,670 millions of pesos 
according to assembled data.455
Lending almost fulfilled its theoretical purpose
41Refer to Table VI, columns 3 and 4, p. 112.
42See Table II, p. 96.
43Refer to Money and Credit of Mexico, Appendix C,
p. 177.
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in the international sector, i. e., the inward movement 
of capital nearly equaled the import surplus. As shown 
in Table VI, page 112, the import surplus was 257 millions 
of pesos while (negative) lending amounted to 254 millions 
of pesos. The difference of 5 millions of pesos was 
accounted for in the following manner: foreign exchange 
reserve-holdings rose 976 millions of pesos and (net) 
donations flowed inward to the extent of 71 millions of 
pesos. The outward movement of gold totaled 1,206 
millions of pesos. The summation of these figures (2,253 
millions of pesos) was offset by a debit balance in the 
errors and omissions account amounting to 2,250 millions 
of pesos. The difference of 3 millions of pesos was 
equal to the imbalance between the import-lending items.
The result of these forces made possible, in part,
a rise in national product amounting to 10,176 millions 
44of pesos. At current prices, this figure represented 
an 18.1 per cent increase over 1953. However, at 1950 
prices the percentage rise amounted to 8.0 per cent.
The rise in money and credit during 1952, and the 
last half of 1953, and for a portion of 1954 brought about 
the creation and modification of several monetary, fiscal, 
and exchange measures during this and the following year.
See Table I, column 2, p. 88
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Some of these factors included a new tariff, a new income 
tax law, and restrictions upon the granting of credit. A 
discussion of these measures will be forthcoming in the 
subsequent section dealing with monetary, fiscal, and 
external policy.
The outstanding change during 1954 was the devalu­
ation in April. The peso rate was lowered from 8.65 to 
the dollar to 12.51 to the dollar, a decline of 45 per 
cent in terms of dollars. The devaluation surely con­
tributed to the higher price level. One source of infor­
mation states that: ’’The monetary devaluation provoked a 
rapid upturn in prices, the level of wholesale prices 
rising by 15 per cent during the period March to December 
1954. . . .h -® Another result of devaluation was the 
rise of exports and the fall of imports. Nevertheless, 
because the new, lower exchange rate was in effect for 
only about seven months in 1954, the real impact of 
devaluation was more clearly recognized in 1955.
One other factor should not be overlooked, as 
observed from the experience during the year. This factor 
was government Investment. It was earlier stated that the 
investment-saving excess was financed almost entirely by
^United Nations, Department of Economic and Social 
Affairs, Economic Survey of Latin America 1954, p. 178.
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the government. The productivity of government investment 
in general is indirect and quite slow in realizing a 
greater output. This type of capital addition may make 
possible a larger future output, but the immediate effect 
would be quite moderate. In evidence of this result, the 
real national product was only about 2 millions of pesos 
larger than that of 1952.^®
IV
Two main events took place in 1955. The first was 
that government investment declined, and the second 
related to the influence on the external sector brought 
about by the devaluation of 1954. On the domestic scene, 
investment exceeded saving for the fourth year in a row. 
This year's excess was 869 millions of pesos. The lend­
ing factor could have contributed to an equilibrium situ­
ation if capital would have moved inward to the extent 
of the investment surplus. However, this inflow was not 
sufficient to equate saving and investment. As Table 
VI, page 112, shows, capital flowed inward on balance to 
the extent of 714 millions of pesos. Furthermore, money 
and credit in circulation rose by approximately 2,975 
millions of pesos. Yet, it was not the government sector 
which increased its investment spending. Investment
46
See Table II, p. 96.
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expenditures in this sector actually declined by 17 
millions of pesos. It was, therefore, the private sector's 
additional spending which led to an investment surplus.
Even though total investment was larger than total saving, 
the latter increased by more than the former.
It would seem that from this experience an opti­
mistic trend was developing via increased private and 
decreased government spending while saving in both areas 
continued to rise. Nevertheless, the distribution of 
Income was probably on a very narrow basis. It was the 
export sector that seemed to gain the most. Importers
were in a favorable situation, too, since the domestic
47price level shot upward again this year.
The International sector contributed a good deal 
to the rise in national product amounting to 17,522 
millions of pesos at current prices. This is the first 
year of the survey In which exports were larger than 
Imports. Devaluation did its job from this standpoint. 
However, this is not to say that devaluation produced 
only favorable results. The export excess called for the 
outward movement of capital to the extent of this surplus 
If equilibrium were to be accomplished in the external 
sector. But as stated above the capital flow was inward
47
Refer to Table II, p. 96.
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instead. The result was a gap amounting to 1,570 millions 
of pesos, if the export surplus and the lending balance 
are taken into account. The gap was closed by the inflow 
of 1,000 millions of pesos of gold, a (net) outward move­
ment in the donations account of 55 millions of pesos, 
and a rise of foreign exchange reserves amounting to 1,652 
millions of pesos. The remaining balance was absorbed 
by a debit of some 2,167 millions of pesos in the errors 
and omissions account.
Gold and foreign exchange reserves produced a net 
gain for the first time in the last four years. The 
receipt of these two factors totaled 2,652 millions of 
pesos; hence, there is a strong indication of the large 
increase of money in circulation. Referring to Appendix 
C, Money and Credit of Mexico, page 177, it is observed 
that of the total additions to money and credit in 1955, 
money in circulation accounted for 2,049 millions of 
pesos of the total 2,975 millions of pesos created by 
both money and credit.
The financing of the excess Investment of 869 
millions of pesos, the surplus of exports amounting to 
856 millions of pesos, and the accumulation of gold and 
foreign exchange reserves noted above, all of which con­
tributed to an increase of the national product of some 
17,522 millions of pesos, would seem to have exerted some
127
influence upon the general level of prices. Table II on 
page 96 supports the above statement by showing that the 
price level rose 22.9 points at the close of 1955. The 
result was that the national product rose 8.4 per cent 
at 1950 prices. This rise is considered highly favorable 
if compared to the experience of industrialized nations, 
but it was much lower than the current figures indicated.
V
The estimated rise of 10 per cent in saving and 
investment for the year 1956 provided an investment sur­
plus of 957 millions of pesos. According to mid-year 
figures, capital inflow amounted to 1,660 millions of 
pesos. Information during the year gave no indication 
that one could expect a reverse flow of capital at the 
yearTs end; nevertheless, it would be expected that the 
mid-year figure was much larger than that anticipated at 
the close of the period. Taking the first half-year 
figure as representative for the period, capital inflow 
more than provided for the excess of investment over saving.
On the other hand, total money and credit in circu­
lation declined for the first time in the last five years. 
Credit was reduced by 1,265 millions of pesos and money 
in circulation fell some 514 millions of pesos. This 
result was brought about by new banking requirements which 
included higher reserves behind demand and savings deposits
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and the refusal on the part of the Bank of Mexico to grant
48rediscounts as freely as in the past.
Exports exceeded imports by 121 millions of pesos* 
The export surplus added to the inflow of capital, which 
amounted to 1,660 millions of pesos, indicated that the 
export-import gap would not be closed through lending.
At mid-year the gold-foreign exchange items together 
showed a net gain of about 126 millions of pesos. ^
Should there be no adversities during the remainder of 
the year, the balance of payments will be favorable once 
ag ain.
Perhaps the outstanding event of this year was the 
determination on the part of the authorities to maintain 
a tight money and credit policy. The real national product 
rose by approximately 7 per cent. Although estimates were 
employed in determining saving and investment for this 
year, a recent report stateb that at the end of July the 
real national product rose 10 per cent above that of the 
previous year.^ Furthermore, the conservative monetary
48International Monetary Fund, International 
Financial Hews Survey. May 11, 1956, p. 355*
^Foreign exchange figures w'ere obtained from 
the International Monetary Fund, International Financial 
Statistics. January, 1957, p. 157.
50International Monetary Fund, International 
Financial News Survey. September 21, 1956, p. 94.
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policy was applied with a good deal of success as compared 
with prior years. The general price level rise was held 
to less than five points.
Before passing on to the final sections of this 
chapter, a few general statements seem to be in order.
The national product (income) rose during four out of the 
five years included in this survey. Nevertheless, the 
rise in prices was greater than that of the national 
product. This rise indicates that the majority of people 
with low incomes must have suffered to a great extent.
Lending as a balancing factor did not serve its 
purpose of closing the gaps between saving and invest­
ment and imports and exports. For this reason, it would 
be natural to expect variations in the national income. 
Mexico realized an inflow of capital in every year under 
consideration. Since realized investment was larger than 
realized saving throughout the period, it was stated that 
capital should have moved inward in order to provide a 
balance between the factors. The effect of a capital 
inflow would be to raise saving. Saving did rise accord­
ing to the experience of Mexico. It is true, nevertheless, 
that investment was two or three steps ahead of saving, 
but the principle was at work. In other words, with a 
more vigorous application of monetary and fiscal measures, 
the gaps between saving and investment probably could have 
been closed.
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The relationship between lending and the external 
sector produced a rather consistent pattern at least for 
the first three of the five years under investigation.
The inward capital flows, though insufficient, contributed 
toward the closing of the import surplus gap. It appears 
that external policy— particularly that of a fiscal nature—  
was not applied with enough force. During the last two 
years of this survey, Mexico encountered export surpluses. 
Devaluation made this possible, but, at the same time, 
the lower exchange rate which helped to produce a larger 
national product also raised prices and influenced the 
distribution of income. It would seem that the necessary 
corrections would have been possible through the combined 
efforts of monetary, fiscal, and exchange policies. The 
review of the year 1956 revealed that some measures were 
Instigated in order to reduce the two-pronged effects of 
the investment and export balances.
The foregoing analysis has shown that many changes 
have occurred in Mexico even though a relatively short 
period of time was considered. Although some attention 
has been given to various measures adopted to cope with 
these changes, a more systematic treatment of these devices 
will be undertaken in order to visualize more clearly how 
this nation handled such problems. The following dis­
cussion will center around internal and external policies.
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II. SOME OBSERVATIONS ON MONETARY, FISCAL,
AND EXTERNAL POLICIES
Banking operations in Mexico are carried out
through a central hanking system. The Bank of Mexico is
the central bank which is endowed with all the traditional
51functions of a central bank. Although the methods
employed to control the supply of money and credit in
circulation are described as being similar to that of our
Federal Reserve System, the association between the Bank
of Mexico and the government is much different than that
of the Federal Reserve System and the United States
government. The Mexican government owns 51 per cent of
the stock of the Bank of Mexico, and it enjoys the right
52to appoint five of the Bankts nine directors.
The types of controls consist of open market oper­
ations, rediscounting, and reserve requirements. The 
first two kinds of controls have not been very effective. 
With reference to open market operations Professor Myers 
states that:
51The Bank of Mexico was organized in 1925, but 
it was not given the sole right of note issue until 1958. 
Refer to Margaret G. Myers, ”16x100,” in Banking Systems, 
edited by Benjamin H. Beckhart, (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1954), p. 580.
5gIbid.
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Open-market operations, which are often used 
in order to force banks to rediscount and thus 
make the rate effective, are of little avail in 
a country like Mexico where the securities market 
is rudimentary. . .
The rediscounting process has likewise been quite 
ineffective in most recent years. It seems that many 
banks have access to sources of funds other than the 
Central Bank. The favorable balance of payments occasioned 
in the last few years Indicates that deposits received 
from external trade are.one of the most important sources 
of funds.
Reserve requirements include both demand and savings
deposits. These requirements differ according to the three
types of banking institutions. For example, the flexible
reserve requirements in 1949 consisted of a 50 per cent
reserve against deposits for banks located in Mexico City;
a 45 per cent reserve for all branch banks; and a 40 per
cent reserve against deposits for all non-branch city
banks. Modifications wrere made at various times as to
the use of government securities and private reserves.
The latter were not used until 1948, when the banks in
the Federal District were given permission to include
government-approved securities and private issues up to
54
limited amounts of their total reserves. The idea was
55Ibid.. p. 581. 
54Ibid.. pp. 584-585.
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to increase the amount of loans to productive enterprises.
Finally, in September, 1949, a more drastic action 
was taken because of the threat of continued inflation.
The Bank of Mexico subjected all increases in demand lia­
bilities of the deposit banks to a 100 per cent reserve. 
However, an exception allowed deficits in reserves up to 
70 per cent without penalty, provided that the deficit 
sums were invested in equipment loans of a short-term 
character, securities of two years’ maturity, or capital 
loans up to five years’ duration. In addition, the total 
long-term loans for any bank were limited to an amount 
equal to 20 per cent of its demand liabilities. The 
effect of the latter was to limit the banks’ ability to 
take advantage of the escape clause in the new reserve 
requirement and to make banks invest up to 20 per cent of 
their deposits in long-term loans, with the remaining 
increases in deposits placed with the Bank of Mexico.^ 
Bankers were critical of the elaborate reserve 
program; so a revision was made in 1950. The 20 per cent 
of total deposits in long loans was maintained, but 
increases in deposits had to be offset in the following 
manner:
55
Ibid.. p. 585.
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30 per cent by an Increase in deposits at the 
Bank of Mexico;
20 per cent by investment in productive activities, 
at medium-term and long-term;
20 per cent by investment in securities, private 
or government;
30 per cent (the remainder) unrestricted. b
The above requirements were established for the 
banks in Mexico City; however, similar requirements were 
imposed on branch and non-branch banks. The former were 
allowred 35 per cent of the increase in cash deposits as 
unrestricted while the non-branch banks were given the 
right to employ 40 per cent of their increases in deposits 
as they wished.
The concluding requirement of this complex reserve 
procedure took effect in 1951. Because the expansion of 
bank credit became so large, all banks whose deposits 
exceeded an amount equal to 10 times their capital and 
reserves were required to deposit the total amount of 
such new cash deposits with the Bank of Mexico.^
Other restrictions were placed upon special bank­
ing institutions including the agricultural and invest­
ment banks.
There is a distinction between national and private 
banks. However, from a practical standpoint, their
56Ibid., p. 586. 
57Ibid.
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operations and regulations are similar. For example, all 
private commercial banks are associated with the Bank of 
Mexico. They must subscribe to the stock of the Central 
Bank, and their reserve requirements are almost identical 
with those of the national banks, as stated above.
This short review of the complex banking operations 
reveals the sincere effort of the monetary authorities to 
reduce money and credit in circulation on the one hand, 
and to stimulate economic development on the other. None­
theless, the latter effort seemed to predominate over the 
former because, even with the imposition of the stringent 
monetary measures as applied in 1951, total money and 
credit rose from 13,669 millions of pesos at the end of 
1951 to 14,717 millions of pesos at the close of 1952.
In addition, the Central Bank held 1,614 millions of 
pesos worth of government securities.5® This figure 
represents a large portion of the Federal Government1s 
debt. The significant point to be stressed is that the 
Bank of Mexico was being forced to help finance the program 
of industrialization carried out by the government.
The following discussion relating to monetary, 
fiscal, and external policies will be presented on a 
year-to-year basis in a manner similar to that employed
58
Refer to the Balance Sheet of the Bank of Mexico, 
Appendix D, p.
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in the preceding portion of this chapter.
I
Total government expenditures were greater than
total income in 1952.^® The deficit of 231.6 millions of
pesos included public debt retirement, which accounted
for 16.9 per cent of total expenditures. Although the
data are incomplete as given by function, the difference
between the sum of the items shown (3,381.0 millions of
pesos) and the total expenditures of 5,657.7 millions of
pesos consisted of transfer expenditures. A Department of
Commerce report which listed expenditures by type under the
heading of current, capital, and transfer expenditures for
the year presented a breakdown of these expenditures in
60the following manner, all in millions of pesos.
Price and other subsidies 688.7
To public institutions 678.7
To private institutions 10.0
Social security payments 123.9
Acquisition of real property 6.4
Acquisition of securities
including investments 1,500.0
Other transfers 50.6
Total transfers 2,349.6
The total transfers figure less social security
payments accounted for 2,225.7 millions of pesos. This
59See the Federal Government Accounts of Mexico, 
Appendix E, p. 180.
uJnited States Department of Commerce, Bureau of 
Foreign Commerce, Investment in Mexico (Washington: United 
States Government Printing Office, 1955), p. 88.
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figure added to the actual expenditures computed by 
function totaled 5,606.7 millions of pesos. Thus, if 
transfer expenditures are taken into consideration, it is 
possible to account for nearly all of the expenditures 
for 195S, even though the use of different sources and the 
ever-present possibility of overlapping are taken into 
account.
The transfer expenditure item yielded some important 
information with respect to the governments participation 
in economic activity. Subsidy payments were as large as 
expenditures for public education and culture, and greater 
than expenditures encountered for agricultural develop­
ment. Furthermore, nearly all of the subsidies granted 
were directed into publicly owned facilities.
Government purchases of securities had a substantial 
effect upon the amount of money in circulation and the 
extension of government ownership. The portion of corpo­
rate and public enterprise securities purchased by the 
government expanded its ownership and control over the 
economy, and perhaps the larger portion of the purchase 
of securities resulted in a greater supply of money in the 
possession of business firms and other holders.
Total government income consisted in large measure
61of direct taxes levied upon income or profit.
61National income taxes are divided into five
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Approximately 43.3 per cent of total federal revenue was
fiPobtained by means of direct taxation. The usual criti­
cism of the underdeveloped nations1 failure to employ 
direct tax levies does not apply in the case of Mexico. 
However, this statement is not meant to be construed as 
indicating the attainment of maximum satisfaction in 
connection with taxation procedures.
There is probably some doubt as to the rather small 
deficit encountered by the Federal Government. Yet, one 
must keep in mind the fact that the public sector includes 
much more than just the Federal Government. Unfortunately, 
income and expenditure figures realized by these other 
groups were unavailable. A United States Department of 
Commerce report makes the following statement in referring 
to the public sector: . . The principal deficits in
schedules as shown below. See the Senate Committee on 
Banking and Currency, Interim Report, Study of Latin 
American Countries, p. 394.
Schedule I includes individuals or corporations 
engaged in commerce, industry, or agriculture for a 
profit.
. Schedule II applies to income received from 
interest, dividends, leases, patents, royalties, and 
so on, from foreign enterprises.
Schedule III represents income from subsoil 
operations or government concessions.
Schedule IV includes salary, wages, bonuses, 
pensions, and annuities.
Schedule V covers professions, arts, and sports.
62
Direct taxes specifically included those levied 
upon income, excess profits, exports, and mineral pro­
duction.
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recent years have been incurred by the autonomous public 
agencies."6^ At any rate, one may conclude at this stage 
that both the banking system and the government failed to 
prevent inflation during 1952.
The next area of interest is that of the external 
sector. In this connection, an important question may be 
asked: were there any factors in this area which influ­
enced the national product and contributed to the apparent 
inflation? One article reviewing the money supply of 
Mexico contains a statement which reads: ”. . .  During 
periods when our imports predominate, for instance, there 
is a contractionist tendency in the offer of money whereas 
the opposite phenomenon manifests itself when the country's 
exports exceed imports."64 Construed literally, this 
statement means that banks will witness a withdrawal of 
deposits and, therefore, loans and investments will con­
tract during those periods in which imports are excessive. 
Although imports were excessive in 1952, the tendency 
toward contraction did not materialize. The rather small 
net loss of gold and foreign exchange, amounting to about 
32 millions of pesos, was more than offset through the
®^United States Department of Commerce, Bureau
Foreign Commerce, Investment in Mexico, p. 87.
‘National Bank of Mexico, Review of the Economic 
Situation of Mexico. September, 1954, p. 6.
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operation of monetary and fiscal policy.
The only serious problem created in the external 
sphere was that of a sizeable long-term capital inflow 
which could cause an exceptional burden in subsequent 
years if not properly utilized.
The terms of trade remained favorable at the end 
of 1952.65 However, the figure .483 for 1951 revealed 
more favorable terms of trade than in 1952 (.654). Accord­
ing to the latter figure, for each unit of imports received 
.65 units of exports were given in return. In terms of 
the volume of imports and exports, a less satisfactory 
relationship prevailed. In 1951 the volume of exports, 
in tons, declined by 2 percentage points from the base 
year of 1950.®® “nevertheless, the volume in 1952 rose to 
3 points above the base year; it was larger than that in 
1951 by 5 points. Since the Korean War was partially 
responsible for both the increases in price and volume, 
the administrative authorities probably felt that this 
favorable export condition would not last. The volume of 
imports, measured In tons, stood at 37 points above the
®5The general index of the price of Imports rose 
19 points (base 1950 = 100) while the price of exports 
increased 29 points. The computation is: £± (M) -J* A  (E)
= 19 -v- 29 2 .654. Refer to the National Bank of Foreign 
Commerce, Foreign Commerce of Mexico 1955. pp. 55-56.
66Ibid.. p. 59.
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■base year. This index number was 1 point lower than in 
1951, but it revealed the effects of the higher income and 
prices of the domestic economy; that is, a larger portion 
of the national income was being spent for imports in 1952 
than in 1951. The result of price and volume changes in 
1952 showed that what Mexico lost in terms of volume it 
gained through price changes.
II
At the outset of 1955 the government decided to
reduce the inflationary pressure. As already stated, it
did curtail some of its own spending. However, it was
felt that the private sector should maintain or, better
still, increase its expenditures. In February, 1955, the
Bank of Mexico felt it necessary to Introduce some reforms
for the purpose of stimulating private spending and
67encouraging productive loans. It encouraged agri­
cultural banks to rediscount their paper by allowing them 
to present an amount up to 20 per cent of their paid-in 
capital and surplus for rediscounting purposes. In order 
to stimulate other loans, commercial banks were given the 
privilege of Increasing their demand deposits up to 12.5 
times their capital and surplus. Furthermore, banks In 
the Federal District were permitted to invest up to 10
67
See the Bank of Mexico, Annual Report. 1954. p p . 
17-18. ---
per cent of their cash reserves in government and other 
securities.®8 The Bank of Mexico nearly doubled its loans 
and discounts during the year.®9 It was evident too that 
the Central Bank increased its holdings of Federal Govern­
ment securities. Total holdings amounted to 1,717.5 
millions of pesos as shown by the balance sheet of this 
Bank.
The less stringent banking requirements facilitated 
the purchase of government securities by most of the banks 
consequently, the expansion of loans took place on a large 
scale. Although demand deposits constitute about 50 per 
cent, on the average, of the total money supply, the pro­
portionate rise of demand deposits was larger in 1953.
Money in circulation rose 215 millions of pesos while
70demand deposits increased 360 millions of pesos.
On the other hand, Federal Government expenditures 
in 1953 were lower than those in 1952 by approximately
1,000 millions of pesos. Slightly lower too was the 
government's budget deficit of 161 millions of pesos. 
Expenditures, by function, totaled 3,474.9 millions of 
pesos, as shown in Appendix E, page 180. Because some of
6aIbld.
g q
Refer to the Balance1'Sheet of the Bank of Mexico, 
Appendix D, p. 178.
70See Money and Credit of Mexico, Appendix C, p.
177.
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the data were unavailable, this figure was 1,045.2 
millions of pesos less than the total expenditures by the 
government for the year. However, the difference between 
the two above figures is narrowed if one considers the 
transfer expenditures which, fortunately, were available 
for 1953. They were utilized as follows (in millions of 
pesos)
Subsidies 420.2
To public institutions -----
To private institutions 391.1
To individuals 29.1
Social security payments 93.2
Acquisition of real property 3.6
Acquisition of securities
including investments 965.0
Other transfers 50.1
Total transfers 1,512.1
The deduction of the social security payments 
already accounted for would give a total transfer figure 
of 1,418.9 millions of pesos. Since a portion of the 
transfer payments was probably included in the expendi- 
ture-by-function figures,.a discrepancy occurred between 
the sum of the actual total expenditures by function 
amounting to 3,479.9 millions of pesos, plus the transfer 
payments of 1,418.9 millions of pesos. The total expendi­
tures of the Federal Government amounted to 4,518.1 
millions of pesos.
Total subsidy payments in 1953 were slightly less
^ T h e  Bank of Mexico, Annual Report. 1955, p. 161
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than one-half those of 1952. Furthermore, the authori­
tative figures indicated that government owned enterprises 
received none of this aid. Finally, the government helped 
to reduce the amount of money in circulation somewhat hy 
purchasing less corporate and public enterprise securities 
and hy making fewer investments with transfer funds.
An analysis of the Federal Government expenditure 
accounts for 1953 reveals no extreme shifts in expendi­
tures, An additional 243.1 millions of pesos were spent 
for communication and transportation, while the agri­
cultural sector received an increase of about 100 millions 
of pesos for development. However, the banking system and 
perhaps some of the autonomous government enterprises made 
available a large amount of money and credit for expansion.
Although total tax revenue was less this year than 
in 1952, direct taxes represented approximately 42.6 per 
cent of the total revenue. The chief reason for the 
smaller total of tax collections was the general business 
recession which took place rather than changes in tax laws. 
The reduction of income from taxes further reflected the 
more conservative attitude on the part of the government, 
especially during the first six months of the year.
The Federal Government decided that it had to do 
something in the latter portion of the year with respect 
to stimulating the economy since its anti-inflationary
policy during the first half spilled over into the private 
sector. Firms and individuals adopted the same attitude 
as the government with respect to spending, and the 
national product (income) was falling. The government 
could have imposed a higher income tax in order to combat 
the private sector*s apparent demand for higher liquidity. 
But such action probably would have discouraged the 
private sector. It was also possible to increase expendi­
tures via public works and other developmental projects 
already planned through foreign financing. This alterna­
tive was not employed either. A major reason for not 
accepting this choice was because the time necessary to 
reap physical benefits from such projects would be too 
extended, and foreign capital required the acceptance of 
other nations. Perhaps Mexico could have obtained 
additional funds from official sources to carry out these 
projects. However, the authorities did not attempt to 
seek a solution to its problem in this manner. The 
balance of payments of Mexico reveals that in 1953 the 
repayment of official loans (31.2 millions of dollars) 
was nearly as large as official loans obtained during the 
year (31.6 millions of dollars).
A third recourse involved government deficit spend­
ing along with import restrictions. Although such a 
policy would tend to place a good deal of pressure on the
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external sector unless applied rigidly, this was the
alternative chosen hy the authorities to solve their state 
72of depression. Nevertheless, the second part of the 
program— imposing import duties— was not made effective 
in 1952. Imports did decline somewhat, as the balance of 
payments of Mexico reveals, principally because of the 
reduced business activity. Yet, the difference between 
imports and exports was greater in 1953 than in 1952, 
imports being larger in both years.
The terms of trade turned unfavorable this year.
The index of import prices remained the same as in 1952, 
that is, 19 points higher than in the base year, 1950. 
However, the export price index was 16 points lower than 
the previous year, but it was still 13 percentage points 
higher than in 1950. Measured from the base year, the 
terms of trade was unfavorable at 1.1. A given unit of 
imports was exchanged for every 1.1 unit of exports. On 
the other hand, the volume of exports rose 15 points over 
the base year in 1953 while the index volume of imports 
was 49 percentage points larger than in 1950. To summa­
rize on the basis of these figures: the increase in the 
volume of exports was slightly larger than the rise in
uJnited Nations, Economic Survey of Latin Merica 
1954, pp. 174-175.
^^National Bank of Foreign Commerce, loc. cit.
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price of exports; the relative increase in import prices 
was much less than the relative volume of increase in 
imports; and once again a portion of the national income 
leaked away through the purchase of imports.
Foreign exchange reserves were reduced by about 
389 millions of pesos. However, the inward flow of gold 
helped offset the loss of foreign exchange in part, 
leaving a net loss figure of approximately 270 millions 
of pesos.
The resolute determination on the part of the 
authorities was quite clear at the end of this year. 
Economic development was to be stimulated even though it 
created more inflation. Moreover, the authorities were 
willing to allow a disequilibrium and subsequent depreci­
ation of the monetary unit in order to protect the 
domestic economy. However, depreciation occurred in the 
following year, 1954. Attention will now be focused upon 
some of the internal and external policies put into 
effect during this latter.year.
Ill
There were no new banking reforms enacted in 1954; 
nevertheless, there was great emphasis placed upon the 
channeling of funds into the various sectors of the 
economy. Agricultural loans were encouraged during the 
major portion of the year by continuing the policy of
148
allowing agricultural banks to rediscount paper up to 20 
per cent of their paid-in capital and surplus, and by 
establishing a limit upon such banks loans of 10 per cent
rfA
of their paid-in capital and surplus.'
Of the total credit made available during the year, 
approximately 58 per cent was directed into industry, 
about 25 per cent was channeled into agriculture, and the 
remainder was shared between commerce and mining.^ 
Industrial and agricultural credit together amounted to 
85 per cent of the total credit expended. In the preced­
ing year, total credit for these two sectors amounted to 
75 per cent. The effect was to reduce the amount of 
commercial credit this year for the purpose of stimulat­
ing, as far as possible, the production of commodities. 
Furthermore, commercial credits have had a poor repayment 
record. According to a banking source, "Approximately 
35 to 38 per cent of commercial paper presented for pay­
ments is returned uncollectable. . . ,n^
It is apparent from the above discussion that the
^^Bank of Mexico, Annual Report. 1955, p. 34.
^^United Nations, Economic Survey of Latin America 
1954, p. 176.
76National Bank of Mexico, Review of the Economic 
Situation of Mexico. December, 1954, p. 5.
77Ibid., issue of June, 1954, p. 7.
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banking system tried to channel funds into production as 
opposed to commercial credit and speculation. The latter 
was evidently a serious problem in the first three or four 
months of the year because of the high liquidity prefer­
ence attaching to such uses of funds. The Bank of Mexico 
introduced several measures to deal with speculation. In 
April new banking institutions were required to place a 
50 per cent down-payment on speculative security purchases. 
However, the margin requirement was lowered to 25 per cent 
in June. The Bank also refused to provide funds for 
speculation in stocks of private enterprises. Furthermore, 
the Central Bank suspended the authorization of long-term
bonds by public enterprises in order to prevent the satu-
78
ration of the market for such issues.
Loans and discounts granted by the Bank of Mexico
Increased at such a rapid rate that by the end of the year
79they had nearly doubled. In addition, the balance sheet 
reveals that loans to the Federal Government rose sharply 
while loans and discounts to national banks Increased 170 
per cent.
Government spending was at a high level in the 
early months of 1954. In fact, it was anticipated that
^®Bank of Mexico, Annual Report. 1955, p. 35.
79
See the Balance Sheet of the Bank of Mexico, 
Appendix D, p. 178.
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should spending be maintained at such a level, the govern­
ment would witness a budget deficit of about 1,000 millions 
of pesos at the end of the year.80 It was realized by 
April of this year that a firm policy requiring serious 
adjustments was necessary. The problems of utmost 
importance in addition to abundant government spending 
were: a large supply of money and credit in circulation 
causing prices to turn upward, a liquidity which is 
attractive to the general public with the probability of 
huge capital outflows, and the continuance of a strong 
demand for imports while exports were moving downward 
accompanied by an unfavorable terms-of-trade situation 
which had appeared at the close of 1953.
The attempts to make adjustments which these 
problems called for were of a mixed nature. From the 
discussion of banking activity during the year, it was 
found that conservative measures were not forthcoming. 
Nevertheless, a major adjustment took place in the external 
sector via depreciation. Internally, fiscal policy was 
the primary device employed to bring about a healthier 
economic situation. In other words, it was the govern­
ment which attempted to relieve the ensuing problems, 
with little or no reliance upon a co-ordination of banking
80
United Nations, Economic Survey of Latin America 
1954. p. 175.
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(monetary) and fiscal policy.
In December, the import duties which were in effect 
in 1955 were selectively raised while a 15 per cent ad 
valorem tax on exports was removed. A new ad valorem 
duty of 25 per cent was put into effect for the dual 
purpose of reducing exportersT profits and increasing the 
income of the Treasury. Obviously, these measures were 
instigated because of the depreciation.
These levies on exports and imports resulted in 
increased income for the Federal Government. Together 
they contributed 1,611.3 millions of pesos, which was 
201.2 millions of pesos more than similar levies yielded 
the preceding year.®-*-
There was no marked change in the income tax law, 
although a few modifications were made primarily for the 
purpose of creating a greater incentive toward production. 
The most important modification concerned Schedules I and 
III which allowed greater reinvestment of profits and 
larger depreciation reserves.®^ Income tax revenue was 
nearly 200 millions of pesos greater this year than in
1953. A larger number of persons were subject to income
Ol
OJ-See the Federal Government Accounts of Mexico, 
Appendix E, p. 180.
®^United Nations, Economic Survey of Latin America
1954. p. 176. The various tax schedules applicable in 
Mexico are given on pp. 137-138, footnote 61 of this paper.
taxes this year, and, at the same time, administrative 
efficiency reduced collection costs.
In order to stimulate consumption, federal employees
Q»2
were given a 10 per cent wage increase. Most industries 
followed suit; in fact, the general industrial wage 
increase averaged slightly higher than that given to 
'federal employees. The problem of wage Increases in Mexico 
is that the general purchasing power fails to rise because 
the larger number of potential consumers are employed in 
agriculture. These individuals do not share in enhanced 
wage benefits; therefore, consumption is augmented to 
only a small degree, if at all. Furthermore, wage 
increases have lagged far behind the increased living 
costs. Statistics indieatec n. . . that from 1939 to 
June 1954, the cost of living index rose 379.4$ whereas 
during this same period wages lagged behind registered a 
rise of only 280$. . .
Federal Government expenditures exceeded those of 
1953 by approximately 300 millions of pesos. By observing 
the Federal Government Accounts in Appendix E, page 180,
S^National Bank of Mexico, Review of the Economic
Situation of Mexico. June, 1954, p. 3. In July, 1954 the 
minimum wage law raised wages in the Federal District to 
9.50 pesos ($.76) and 7.50 pesos ($.60) outside the
district. See the August, 1954 Issue, p. 3.
84Ibid., issue of August, 1954.
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one finds larger spending figures for every functional 
item with the exception of the public debt. This year 
the payment on the debt was reduced by about 300 millions 
of pesos. Nevertheless, this was the first year in which 
the Federal Government realized a surplus in its accounts.
The immediate causes leading to the depreciation 
in April were explained in the following terms: ”. . .  the 
activities of speculators buying dollars during March and 
April of this year, and falling exports gave rise to fears
QC
that our reserves would soon become exhausted. . . .
In January the foreign exchange reserves held by the Bank 
of Mexico were reported as 243 millions of dollars 
(approximately 2,102 millions of pesos). At the end of 
April the reserves amounted to 157 millions of dollars 
(about 1,358 millions of pesos).®® One of the most 
rational guides for determining the effects of the loss 
of foreign exchange is a comparison of the reserves with 
the amount of money in circulation. Such a comparison 
for the two months mentioned above reveals that foreign 
exchange reserves represented nearly 27 per cent of the 
money in circulation in January while the reserves fell
Ibid.. issue of May, 1954, p. 4.
Ibid., issue of November, 1955, p. 7.
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to 17.5 per cent in A p r i l . T h e  authorities felt that 
the fall in exchange reserves was sufficient reason to 
depreciate the currency. Furthermore, the depreciation 
was sanctioned by the officials of the International 
Monetary Fund.
Exports were on the decline and imports were steady 
in the first quarter of 1954, but depreciation was expected 
to reverse this tendency. The result at the end of the 
year was that the general price index of exports, in pesos, 
rose to 145 above the base year. At the same time, the 
price index of imports increased to 153. Therefore, the 
terms-of-trade was 1.8 which meant that a given unit of 
imports exchanged for every 1.8 units of exports. In 
terms of volume, exports rose to 117 points above the 
base year. The result was that the higher peso price 
(lower foreign currency price) of exports did not create 
a corresponding increase in the volume of sales. With 
respect to Imports, the higher peso price maintained an 
index volume at 148 points above the base year. A com­
parison of the higher index price of imports, as given 
above, revealed that the volume of imports was nearly as 
large as the rise in the price index. The general
87
Ibid., issues of March and July, 1954, pp. 9 and 
14, respectively. Money in circulation In January was 
7,859 millions of pesos while In April it was 7,760 
millions of pesos.
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conclusion, then, is that at the end of the year depreci­
ation had provided only a small improvement in commodity 
movements.
Compared with 1953, the price index of exports 
rose 32 points, from 113 to 145, while the volume index 
of exports increased from 115 to 117, or by only 2 points. 
On the other hand, the price index of imports at the end 
of 1953 was 119, and it rose to 153 at the end of the 
following year. The rise amounted to 34 points. However, 
the volume index of imports fell by 1 point during the 
same period; from 149 in 1953 to 148 in 1954.88 The tax 
levies on both imports and exports were imposed to make 
possible a more even distribution of income, and to 
supply the government with additional revenue. Ho doubt 
the tax levies helped to achieve both results.
In summary, the rise in internal prices was immedi­
ate and direct. Government investment spending alone 
increased during the year by 1,068 millions of pesos
while money and credit in circulation was greater by some
894,741 millions of pesos. It appears that the basic 
error In the adjustment technique was the failure to apply 
a more stringent monetary policy in conjunction with
88National Bank of Foreign Commerce, Foreign 
Commerce of Mexico 1955. pp. 55-59.
®^See page 121.
fiscal policy. The result was that internal prices rose 
11.8 points.^0 This rise of the price level was larger 
than the 10 per cent increase in wages which was granted 
during the year. Moreover, the largest consumer group, 
the farmers, did not participate in higher wage benefits. 
Internal expansion was not as responsive as the authori­
ties evidently hoped it would be. It should have been 
realized that depreciation puts no corrective to work, 
and in Mexico the co-ordination and flexibility of mone­
tary and fiscal measures are of special importance in 
order to deal effectively with the results of adjustment 
factors such as depreciation.
IV
One of the first measures undertaken in 1955 was a
banking reform. Its purpose was to check the excessive
expansion of the circulating media. Circular 1279 of
January 10, 1955 affected all deposit banks. The decree
stated that increases in demand deposits in national money
must be deposited with the Bank of Mexico or applied in
91the following manner:
Banks in the Federal District 
30 per cent in cash in the Bank of Mexico 
20 per cent in government bonds 
15 per cent in financiers bonds
10 per cent in securities approved by the Ministry
^Refer to Table II, p. 96.
91Bank of Mexico, Annual Report. 1956, p. 48.
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of Finance 
10 per cent in equipment bonds 
15 per cent (remainder) unrestricted
A further condition stipulated that out of the 
total loans extended by the above banks 70 per cent must 
be channeled into production and the remaining SO per cent 
may be directed into commercial production.
Banks outside the Federal District 
20 per cent in cash in the Bank of Mexico 
30 per cent in securities approved by the Ministry
of Finance 
35 per cent in equipment bonds 
15 per cent (remainder) unrestricted
The quantitative and qualitative aspects of govern­
ment regulation are revealed once again in the new banking 
decree. From the quantitative viewpoint, it is clear that 
the authorities now intend to restrict the circulation of 
money to a greater extent than was evident in the older 
law. Perhaps even greater emphasis is placed upon the 
qualitative provisions. The amounts and direction of loans 
and investments are quite specific.
The financiera bonds are explained as securities 
issued primarily by the Nacional Financiera, the largest 
government investment bank, and they consist of issues for 
an industrial enterprise. The backing consists of a 
mortgage on the assets of the firm plus a general guaranty
Qp
of the Financiera institution.0'0 These bonds were to be
^^National Bank of Mexico, Review of the Economic 
Situation of Mexico. August, 1955, p. 9, footnote 1.
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purchased from the Bank of Mexico. By handling the
securities in this manner, the effect was an automatic
93open market sale by the Central Bank. Equipment bonds 
mentioned above, " . . .  are credits granted for a par­
ticular business purpose and secured on the equipment 
and/or product. . . .”94
The disposition of deposits held in foreign 
currency were included in Circular 1279. It was stated 
that increases in deposits of foreign money would be 
handled as follows:95
25 per cent in cash with the Bank of Mexico 
75 per cent invested in bonds of the International 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development and in 
securities of the Kacional Financiera
In August, Circular 1287 was issued, affecting 
deposits in savings banks and savings departments of com­
mercial banks. It explained that 100 per cent of the 
increase in savings deposits must be deposited in full 
with the Bank of Mexico. However, an escape clause 
relieved the banks from penalty payments of up to 90 per 
cent of such deposits provided the funds were invested 
accordingly:^6
Q *Z
Ibid.. p. 9.
94
Ibid., footnote 2.
95
Bank of Mexico, loc. cit.
96Ibid.. pp. 48-49.
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10 per cent in national and foreign currency in 
short-term loans 
5 per cent in plant expansion and equipment loans
37.5 per cent in intermediate loans approved by the 
Department of Interior and Public Credit
37.5 per cent in government securities
In addition, when total loans and investments of
these institutions were equal to SO per cent of their
deposits in national and foreign coins, new deposits were
to be treated as given below:97
10 per cent in cash in the Bank of Mexico
5 per cent in short-term plant expansion and
equipment loans 
10 per cent in short-term industrial securities
10 per cent in government securities
65 per cent (remainder) unrestricted
It is apparent that safety of deposits was the 
chief factor in the strict allocation of savings deposits. 
Liquidity and safety are excellent criteria for such 
deposits, but it would seem that the administrative 
expenses and particularly inspection costs would be exceed­
ingly high.
At least two other banking changes which occurred
during the year should be mentioned. The Bank of Mexico
liquidated its holdings in the Nacional Financiera and
reduced its ownership In the National Bank of Foreign 
98Commerce. The securities were sold to private banks
97Ibid.. p. 49.
98Ibid., p. 50.
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and Individuals. Total credit of the Bank was reduced 
because of the liquidation.99 Furthermore, a more general 
distribution of these securities was expected to encourage 
a greater interest in stock market activity as well as a 
withdrawal of hoarded funds from their hiding places.
The Central Bank curtailed its rediscounting privi­
lege for the National Agricultural Banks and Ejidal Insti­
tutions.^9 The latter provided funds for farmers with 
small landholdings.
An important monetary reform was passed by Congress 
on September 15, 1955. It was, In effect, a coinage act. 
New silver coins were Issued In various denominations, with 
their intrinsic and market values equal. Hence, they were 
100 per cent representative coins. Some older coins were 
demonetized at the current value of their silver content 
while others were to circulate but would be no longer 
minted. In addition, the new coins possessed limited 
legal tender qualities while the older issues were to 
become subsidiary coins.
The purpose of this reform was to present the public
99Refer to Money and Credit of Mexico, Appendix C,
p. 177.
^99Bank of Mexico, op. cit.. p. 50.
^^National Bank of Mexico, Review of the Economic 
Situation of Mexico. October, 1955, pp. 5-4.
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with coins of constant value and, therefore, to encourage 
savings. If the public were to accept the new coins on 
this basis, the reform could represent an important 
deterrent to inflation. Yet, the past experience of coin 
circulation in Mexico casts a shadow of doubt as to the 
accomplishment of the above objective.
These rather lengthy changes in banking and mone­
tary operations emphasized the determination on the part 
of the authorities to employ a more co-ordinated attack 
upon the problems associated with inflation. Nevertheless, 
the inelastic nature of such reforms could not cope with 
the excessive demand for funds, particularly the demand 
of the private sector. Furthermore, the banking system 
was unable to restrict or demonetize the receipt of foreign 
exchange reserves which began to flow inward in large 
amounts.
The government was evidently aware of the probable 
inflationary consequences which often follow depreciation, 
for public investment declined. Total government spend­
ing did increase somewhat this year, however, as the 
Federal Government Accounts of Mexico, Appendix E, page 
181, reveal. Total revenue rose to slightly more than
7,000 millions of pesos. This rise in income was large 
enough to create a surplus in the government accounts 
for the second consecutive year. The amount of the surplus
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in the current year was 486.1 millions of pesos.
Again this year, every revenue item showed a gain. 
Significant increases were noticeable in income, export, 
and taxes on trade. On the expenditure side of the ledger, 
communication and transportation accounted for 26.3 per 
cent of total government spending. This percentage repre­
sents the largest relative and absolute amounts for this 
particular item to date. The remaining items received 
their normal share of government expenditures.
Even though the Federal Government showed a surplus 
in its activities, other government owned enterprises were 
not usually so fortunate. A report at the beginning of 
the year indicated the need for economy in the functioning 
of these firms by stating that the prospect for economic 
growth in 1955 will brighten a good deal if the deficits of 
some of the government owned entities could be reduced.
There were no new fiscal policy measures instigated 
this year except for the reduction of government invest­
ment expenditures, and an additional 300 millions of pesos 
expended on the public debt.
As was mentioned earlier, money and credit in cir­
culation rose by some 2,975 millions of pesos (see page 
124). Demand deposits rose by approximately 1,500 millions
Ibid.. issue of January, 1955, p. 5.
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of pesos. This was the first year of this survey that 
demand deposits represented more then 50 per cent of the 
money supply. This is a healthy trend which indicates 
that the private sector is making greater use of the bank­
ing system* The exceptionally large increase in private 
investment this year revealed that the business slump and 
high state of liquidity during 1953 had ended. Also a 
portion of the rise in demand deposits could be attributed 
to the accumulation of foreign exchange reserves.
Credit rose by slightly more than 1,000 millions of 
pesos. The private banking institutions increased their 
loans by a much larger amount than the national insti­
tutions while the Bank of Mexico actually reduced its lend-
1 O'2!
ing during the year.
In the external sector, the price of exports rose 
to 164 (fell in terms of foreign currency) of the base year 
while the volume index ascended to 141. In other words, 
the peso price rise was larger than the increase in volume 
exported. However, in order to visualize the influence of 
depreciation, a comparison with last yearTs figures is 
essential. This comparison reveals that the price index 
of exports in 1955 was 19 points higher than 1954. On the 
other hand, the volume index of exports stood at 24 points
103
Money and Credit of Mexico, Appendix C, p. 177.
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higher in 1955. This yearly comparison meant that export
income should have increased by a large amount in the
latter year.10^ The Balance of Payments of Mexico in
Appendix A, page 174, does verify this trend.
Imports also rose in 1955. However, the increase
of the price index was larger than the volume index
expansion. The trend is in the same direction whether
compared to the base year or during the last year. The
price index of imports was at 168 compared with 1950, and
it was 15 points greater than the index at the end of 1954.
The volume index change recorded 155 above the base year
105while it was 7 points greater than last year. The 
result has been a larger rise in price than volume change. 
Nevertheless, the total expenditures for imports were less 
than the income received from exports, including the taxes 
In both categories.10®
Since money and credit in circulation increased 
during the year and the current account of the balance of 
payments registered its first surplus balance since 1950, 
one would expect that foreign exchange reserves had
104National Bank of Foreign Commerce, 0£. cit., pp.
55 and 59.
105
Ibid., pp. 56 and 59.
106See the Balance of Payments of Mexico, Appendix
A, p. 174.
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accumulated during the year. It was found earlier in this 
paper (page 126) that the rise of foreign exchange hold­
ings amounted to 1,652 millions of pesos. Adding the gold 
inflow (1,000 millions of pesos) to these foreign exchange 
reserves gives a total of 2,652 millions of pesos. This 
accumulation would normally lead to monetary expansion 
within the country unless monetary policy were flexible 
enough to cope with this new inflationary pressure.
How successful was the monetary policy of Mexico 
in dealing with this problem? Fortunately, quite suc­
cessful. On page 126 of this paper it was pointed out 
that, of the total additions to money and credit of some 
2,975 millions of pesos, 2,049 millions of pesos repre­
sented an increase in the money supply. Since the rise 
in gold and foreign exchange was less than that of the 
money supply, it would appear that the rise in prices 
could hardly be explained in terms of an increase in the 
exchange factor. A better explanation of the rise in 
prices would be one that relates to Internal pressures 
such as higher wages, more social benefits, taxation, and 
the increased costs of imported goods. Such pressures 
were created in 1954 and continued throughout 1955.
V
In reviewing the final year of this study, 1956, 
various estimates were employed. At the present writing,
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figures representing external activity are available only 
through the first half of the year. Nonetheless, a 
general appraisal with respect to the application of mone­
tary, fiscal, and external policy can be presented.
Although no new monetary reforms were evident in
1956, the extensive modifications in banking requirements
undertaken last year began to produce more favorable
results. By referring to the Money and Credit of Mexico
in Appendix C, page 177, it will be observed that the
money in circulation declined by 514 millions of pesos,
and credit was reduced by 1,265 millions of pesos. In
addition, figures indicated that saving had been rising
in a consistent fashion. In order to further stimulate
savings in national money, the Treasury Department
increased the interest rate from 4 to 4.5 per cent in 
107February.
The Bank of Mexico continued its policy of refusing 
to grant rediscounts to banks except when they showed a 
severe decline in their deposits.
Gold and foreign exchange holdings through August 
Increased by only 225 millions of pesos. This factor, 
which usually is a source of monetary instability, posed 
no problem for the authorities.
107Council for Inter-American Cooperation, Inc., 
Noticias. March 27, 1956, p. 4.
A major change in fiscal policy took place this 
year. The Mexican income tax law was modified in several 
respects. One of the major provisions raised the tax 
rates on earnings of: ”. . .  income from commerce and 
industry (tax schedules I and II) will he subject to pro­
portional and progressive tax rates as high as 59 per 
cent in place of the former top rate of 33 per cent. .
. .”108 Also, the excess profits tax was reduced for the 
purpose of stimulating development. The old law provided:
. . . that part of net taxable excess profits 
amounting to a sum greater than 15 per cent of 
invested capital was subject to excess profits tax­
ation at rates of up to 25 per cent.. Under the new 
amendments, . . .  the excess profits tax may not, 
under any circumstances, exceed 10 per cent of thein 
amount of net taxable excess profits income. . •
In addition, foreign branches or agencies of foreign 
business organizations were required to pay a higher excess 
profits tax. Other changes were incorporated into the new 
law which, In general, raised tax levies as applied under 
schedules I through V.
The effect of the tax changes were beginning to be 
felt at the end of the year. Income tax revenue was 
approximately 40 millions of pesos larger than in 1955. 
However, the force of the tax modifications should be
108United States Department of Commerce, Foreign 
Commerce Weekly. March 12, 1956, p. 7.
109Ibid.
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even greater in 1957 than in 1956,
Other forms of tax revenue declined somewhat in 
1956, Smaller export tax income was attributed to a 
selectivity which was accomplished by adjusting rates in 
such a way as to encourage shipments of those goods which 
had been moving slowly in trade. Import tax levies also 
brought in less revenue this year because tariffs had 
restricted the inflow of commodities to capital goods and 
certain basic foodstuffs. However, this is the first 
year under study in which export tax income exceeded that 
of import revenue.
It was anticipated that the Federal Accounts would 
be in balance at the end of the year. Available infor­
mation on this matter is scanty, but it does indicate that 
over one-half the total expenditures were divided among 
three items. These were Communications and Transportation, 
Agriculture, and Public Education and Cultural Services.
The year 1956 was, no doubt, the most prosperous 
one of the five years covered in this study. Internally, 
money and credit in circulation declined; the Federal 
Government budget was heading toward a balance, if not a 
surplus; real production and Income rose along with saving; 
and the price level rose only 5.S points. Externally, 
foreign exchange reserves were rising as of August but not 
enough to disturb the money in circulation, and the current
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account tended toward a surplus. Finally, relative 
economic stability in foreign countries, particularly in 
the United States, helped to contribute toward a most 
economically successful year.
SUMMARY
International equilibrium in Mexico was not realized 
during the five years included in this study. Neverthe­
less, one could hardly conceive the possibility of an 
international equilibrium situation occurring within a 
nation that is characterized with underdevelopment. Lend­
ing as a balancing factor does not seem to possess enough 
flexibility to help offset internal and external fluctu­
ations. At least this study reveals that such was the 
case with respect to Mexico. Capital tended to move into 
the country, but in none of the years surveyed did capital 
move outward on balance. Historically, capital would flow 
to the lesser developed areas. On the other hand, invest­
ment spending via inflation ultimately leads only to a 
more serious adjustment problem. Furthermore, should 
exports exceed Imports, as they did in the final two years 
of this study, capital would tend to move out of the 
country, especially If the lending function were to create 
International equilibrium. Once again, there is a con­
flict between the historical movement of capital and
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international equilibrium created through the lending 
function. In any event, lending was unable to create a 
condition of international equilibrium.
It was a contention in Chapter I that, if lending 
were to fail to bring about a condition of international 
equilibrium, monetary, fiscal, and external policy could 
help bring about that desirable situation. Although those 
policies were applied, in varying degrees, they did not 
establish international equilibrium during the rather 
short period covered in this survey.
By briefly reviewing the five years, one finds that 
monetary and fiscal policy were applied with little suc­
cess in 1952. Inflation was rampant during the year. 
Fiscal policy was the dominant force put into effect dur­
ing the first half of 1953. At the same time, some mone­
tary encouragement was forthcoming in order to maintain 
private expenditures. But private expenditures declined 
too, and this forced the government to increase its spend­
ing in the last half of the year. The Bank of Mexico was 
forced to contribute to the expansion through the purchase 
of government securities.
The most important policy change in 1954 occurred 
in the external sector. The justification of depreciation 
is still doubtful. One should consider, however, that 
economic development is the basis for almost all policy
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procedures. Since there was a good prospect that foreign 
exchange reserves would he drained away, action was taken 
to preserve the country’s holdings. Fiscal policy was 
intermixed with external policy; monetary policy was, how­
ever, neglected.
A change toward a more effective monetary policy 
characterized 1955. Fiscal and exchange policy found 
negligible expression, except for taxes levied upon imports 
and exports.
Some modifications of the various controls were 
evident in 1956. In the monetary area, the rates on 
savings accounts rose; the general policy, however, was 
marked with conservatism. The major fiscal policy change 
involved a new income tax law and external policy provided 
for export and import taxes and tariff modifications.
From a policy standpoint, perhaps the two factors 
which contributed most to the failure to solve the problem 
of International disequilibrium were lack of co-ordination 
and improper timing. The failure to co-ordinate policy 
measures is evident from the facts which have been pre­
sented in this chapter. Better timing, though difficult 
to accomplish, could have smoothed out the fluctuations 
in the national product and income. As an example, con­
servative policy measures really should have gone into 
effect early in 1952, but when they were finally applied
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in 1955, the reverse directional change was abrupt and 
turned into a sharp depression.
The Federal Government in Mexico is the leading 
decision-making body. It has control of the banking 
system and thus directs monetary policy to a great extent. 
Furthermore, it makes decisions as to external policy 
adjustments. In numerous instances it has been observed 
that the decisions made by the government created a 
psychological stimulation on the part of the general 
public, at one time, and a spirit of dejection at another 
time. Nevertheless, there appears to be a sincere desire 
to encourage private individuals and firms to take a 
larger part In helping to direct economic activity.
Judging from the rapid changes that have occurred 
within a short period of time, there appeared to be forces 
of a fundamental nature at work which will produce long­
term adjustments. The abrupt changes in income and prices 
are indicative of the inability of the country to increase 
and to diversify its production. The development of 
external economies and the spreading of firms and 
industries require an extended period of time.
The key factor in decision-making was an urgent 
desire for economic development. It seems that those 
responsible for policy measures were willing to accept the 
harmful effects of inflation and rising prices for the
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sake of channeling large amounts of funds into long-term 
development projects. The anxiety to industrialize can be 
appreciated, yet moderation is necessary in order to 
prevent the evils of inflation and high prices.
International equilibrium will probably not be 
achieved in Mexico for some time. In this connection, it 
would be well for those who are in a position to formulate 
policy in Mexico, to keep in mind a suggestion offered by 
Mr. Flores, a countryman, which reads:
It would seem that the best policy, suggested by 
the experience of Mexico during recent years, is to 
limit economic development to the point where balance 
of payments is attained, so long as this is compatible 
with the continuation of that progress. . .
To this, one should add a final note to the effect 
that monetary and fiscal policy must be co-ordinated and 
be made to possess the sort of flexibility that will help 
realize simultaneously the success of an economic develop­
ment program and the achievement of external equilibrium.
^^United Nations, Department of Economic Affairs, 
Domestic Financing of Economic Development, p. 176.
APPENDIX A
BALANCE OP PAYMENTS OP MEXICO 
(In millions of dollars)
Account 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 
(6 mos.
irrent Account
Exports, f.o.b. 531.5 620.6 619.6 589.2 655.3 810.2 454.9
Imports, c.i.f. -597.4 -889.2 -830.9 -807.6 -788.7 -883.7 -518.3
Nonmonetary gold --- --- 2.0 14.0 11.7 14.2 2.4
Foreign travel 238 . 9 271.7 275.1 302.3 336.8 364.8 223.6
Foreign travel - 82.2 - 96.5 -113.3 -140.1 -173.2 -164.6 -104.1
Investment income - 58.8 - 61.3 -123.5 - 93.6 - 85.7 - 93.3 - 57.9
Other (net) 30.9 30.8 28.7 28.6 23.3 20.8 9.1
Balance 62.9 -123.9 -142.3 -107.2 - 20.5 68.4 9.7
Capital Account
Long term 73.4 72.5 64.3 21.7 115.9 179.0 84.5
Private
Direct investment 45.5 31.0 53.3 40.9 104.6 111.8 60.4
Other private (net) 24.4 46.2 - 20.5 - 19.6 - 6.6 27.7 9.4
Official
Export-Import Bank, 
IBRD, and other loans 28.6 34.2 55.3 31.6 58.2 113.3 56.1
Official repayments 25.1 - 38.9 - 33.8 - 31.2 - 40.3 - 73.8 - 41.4
Short term 20.6 - 26.9 - 51^0 - 65.5 - 95.6 -121.9 48.2
Private
National and private 
banks’ assets0- (net) 31.6 b• • • « - 2.4 20.1 - 20.2 29.0 13.5
Official
Payments agreements 
(net) .6 - 14.8 11.4 .1 .6 8.5 .6
Use or repayment (-) 
of IMP resources - 22.5 — — 22.4 - 22.4 tm M  mm
Other foreign assets0 - 52.8 10.4 - 60.2 45.5 - 98.4 -137.0 34.1
Balance 52.8 45.6 13.1 87.2 20.3 57.1 132.7
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APPENDIX A (continued)
Account 1950 1951 1952 1955 1954 1955 1956
(6 mos.)
Unilateral Account 
Private donations 
Official donations 13.8 5.6
1.5
1.6
1.6
2.7
1.6
4.1
- 5.9
1.5
- 3.2 
.4
Balance 13.8 5.6 3.1 4.3 5.7 - 4.4 - 2.8
Gold Account 
Monetary gold -155.4 .5 63.7 - 13.8 96.4 - 79.9 - 22.6
Balance -155.4 .5 63.7 - 13.8 96.4 - 79.9 - 22.6
Errors and Omissions 25.9 73.2 62.4 29.5 -101.9 - 41.2 -117.0
Source: Bank of Mexico, Annual Report, 1954, 1955, and 1956; International
Monetary Fund, Balance of Payments Yearbook, Vol. VII, January, 1957; and United Nations, 
International Financial Statistics, particularly the issues of February, 1954 and 
January, 1957,
aIncludes gold holdings.
^Included under "Other foreign assets."
c0ther "short-term" assets include assets of the Bank of Mexico and private 
transactions such as loans and claims on United States banks and banker balances. The 
account includes $37.0 million on United States Stabilization Fund Loan for 1950.
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APPENDIX B
INDEX OF WHOLESALE PRICES IN MEXICO CITY
Year 210 Commodities Consumers1 Producers1
Goods Goods
1939 100.0 100.0 100.0
1950 311.2 302.9 323.8
1951 359.1 377.6 319.2
1952 394.4 383.2 402.9
1953 392.5 385.9 403.3
1954 429.4 412.9 454.6
1955 500.4 419.6 460.2
1956
J 546.1 465.5
F 562.7 476.9
M 564.2 479.7
A 571.1 476.6
M 562.1 477.8
J 557.0 478.6
J 554.8 473.4
A 549.3 468.1
S 551.7 468.8
0 551.2 468.1
Source: Bank of Mexico, Annual Report, 1954;
National Bank of Mexico, Review of the Economic Situation 
of Mexico, February, 1956; and National 6ank of Foreign 
Commerce, Foreign Commerce of Mexico, a monthly publication, 
December, 1956.
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APPENDIX C 
MONEY AND CREDIT OP MEXICO
Money In Circulation 
(in millions of pesos)
Year Total Currency Demand Deposits
1950 5,989 2,914 3,075
1951 6,800 3,458 3,342
1952 7,078 3,649 3,429
1953 7,653 3,864 3,789
1954 8,724 4,637 4,087
1955 10,773 5,244 5,529
1956 10,259 a a
Source: Bank of Mexico, Annual Report, 1956; United
Nations, Statistical Yearbook, 1955; and United States 
Department of Commerce, Foreign Commerce Weekly, October 
1, 1956.
information not available.
Distribution of Credit by Type of Bank 
(in millions of pesos)
Year Totala Private National Bank of
Institutions Institutions Mexico
1951 6,869.1 b b b
1952 7,639.1 4,183.9 2,929.4 505.8
1953 9,152.8 4,413.2 3,883.8 855.8
1954 12,823.2 5,390.0 5,921.1 1,512.1
1955 13,749.2 6,550.7, 6,124.3 1,074.2,
1956 12,483.5 b b b
Source: Bank of Mexico, Annual Report, 1954, 1955, 
and 1956; and United States Department of dommerce, Foreign 
Commerce Weekly, October 1, 1956.
aExcludes inter-bank credit.
information not available.
APPENDIX D
BALANCE SHEET OP THE BANK OP MEXICO 
(in millions of pesos)
Assets 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956a
Gold, silver, and
foreign exchange 2,562.5 2,337.3 2,913.2 2,553.0
Deposits with other 
banks 31.7 36.2 25.8
Loans and discounts 531.7 1,011.9 1,918.2
Loans to Federal 
government 2.4 70.4 99.7
to national banks 24.1 148.4 400.7
to private banks 1.8 7.7 5.4
Rediscounts:
30 days 33.9 25.2 53.4
90 days 219.3 257.3 439.3
180 days 102.2 154.4 409.0
360 days 148.0 348.5 510.7
Investments 2,664.6 2,682.0 3,063.5 2,481.1
Federal government
long term 1,614.2 1,717.5 2,277.9 1,889.3
short term --  --  --
State and local
government 11.0 6.4 3.6
Bank bonds 735.3 692.7 492.5
Bank stock 23.2 22.1 22.4
Industrial securities-
mortgages 164.1 109.1 138.1
Stock of Mexican 
companies 105.6 123.0 112.8
Stock of foreign 
companies 11.2 11.2 16.2
Other assets 529.7 621.1 772.8
Total assets 6,320.2 6,688.5 8,693.5
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Liabilities
Notes outstanding 
Metallic issues
Bank deposits
Treasury deposits
Individual and business deposits
Other obligations in domestic currency
Deposits and obligations in foreign currency
Other liabilities
Capital
Reserves
Total liabilities
Source: Bank of Mexico, Annual Report,
aInformation not available.
1952 1953 1954 1955 1956
3,479.4
388.3
3,603.4
474.7
4,376.1
491.1
1,182.7
119.1 
73.1 
68.6
204.0
512.2
1,309.6
59.9
78.1
80.0
192.8
541.4
1.244.7
46.8
86.8 
69.6
406.5
1.629.7
50.0
242.8
50.0
298.6
50.0
292.2
6,320.2 6,688.5 8,693.5
1954, 1955, and 1956.
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APPENDIX E
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTS OF MEXICO 
(in millions of pesos)
Source of Revenue 1952 % 1953 % 1954 % 1955 %
Income taxes 1,281.2 23.6 1,072.3 24.6 1,261.7 24.4 1,966.1 28.3
Excess profits 159.8 3.0 65.1 .1 a• •  • • a♦ • ♦ •
Taxes on lottery
and games 36.0 .7 42.9 .1 na na
Export taxes 898.2 16.6 778.7 17.9 900.2 17.4 1,454.0 20.6
Production taxes 738.3 13.6 714.4 16.4 710.4 13.7 817.5 11. *3
Mining and natural
resources 127.1 81.4 122.6 281.9
Industry 598.2 615.3 na na
Transportation 13.0 17.7 11 11
Taxes on trade 1,123.0 20.7 1,111.2 25.5 1,205.5 23.3 1,526.8 21.6
Imports 632.1 631.4 711.1 891.5
Domestic trade 490.9 479.8 494.4 635.3
Taxes on non-
mercantile documents 49.0 .9 48.6 .1 na na
Inheritance, legacy,
and gift taxes 14.6 .3 15.7 *- 11 11
Taxes on migration 8.7 .2 6.6 -* ? t r t
Income from govern­
ment property and
services 357.3 6.6 349.2 8.0 11 I t
Services 197.4 198.8 t r i I
Public or private
enterprise 357.3 349.2 t t n t i
Other income13 751.7 13.9 144.1 3.3 w• • • • c• •  •  *
Total income 5,425.1 100.0 4,357.1 100.0 5,179.9 100.0 7,001.3 100. C
1956
1,700.C
na
1,050.0
na
na
T I
I I 
f I
730. C 
na
II
t i 
! f
t  I
i r
i r 
11
%
25.4
15.7
10.9
100.0
CD
O
APPENDIX E (continued)
Expenditures 1952 % 1953 % 1954 % 1955 % 1956
by Function
Communication and
transportation 734.0 13.0 977.1 21.6 1,221.3 25.3 1,498.0 26.3 3,800.(5 56.7
Agriculture,
forestry, and cattle 420.0 7.4 510.1 11.3 653.5 13.5 649.0 11.4 ---
Industrial and com­
mercial promotion na na 345.0 7.1 459.0 8.0 na
Public education and
cultural services 660. Cf 11.7 479.7 10.6 583.1 12.0 732.0 13.0
Public health _ — - 180.0 4.0 234.5 4.9 296.0 5.2 na
Social security 106.0 1.9 93.2 2.1 177.6 3.6 258.0 4.6 11
Army and Navy 507.0 9.0 na 583.3 12.1 563.0 9.9 11
Genej^al
administration na 280.8 6.2 377.7 8.0 427. a 7.6 11
Public debt 954.0 16.9 954.0 21.1 651.7 13.5 799.0 14.0 »t
Totals 5,657.7 100.0 4,518.1 100.0 4,837.7 100.0 6,515.2 100. Oi 6,700.0 100.0
Surplus 342.2 486.1
Deficit 231.6 161.0 ---
Source: Bank of Mexico, Annual Report, 1955 and 1956; Council for Inter-American 
Cooperation, Inc., Noticlas, issues of December 20, 1955, January 17 and 24, 1956; National
Bank of Mexico, Review of the Economic Situation of Mexico, January, 1955; United States
Department of Commerce,"Business Information Service, various issues, 1952.
aIncluded in "Income taxes." ^Includes sale of national property, transfers, and so on .
cIncludes income from franchise and opportunity fees, products, and other income.
•^Includes irrigation, agriculture, and education. eIncludes health and education.
f
Expenditures of 834.2 millions of pesos not accounted for in 1955.
Less than one-tenth of one per cent. naInformation not available.
Components do not always add to one-hundred because of rounding.
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APPENDIX F
GOLD AND FOREIGN EXCHANGE HOLDINGS OF MEXICO
(In millions)'5-
Year Foreign Exchange Gold Total
(pesos) (dollars) (pesos) (dollars) (pesos) (dollars)
1951 398 46 1,790 207 2,188 253
1952 917 106 1,246 144 2,163 250
1953 528 61 1,358 157 1,886 218
1954 1,739 139 776 62 2,515 201
1955 3,390 271 1,764 141 5,154 412
1956a 3,315 265 2,064 165 5,379 430
Source: International Monetary Fund, International 
Financial Statistics, January, 1957.
-55-Conversions made at the following rates: 1951-1953,
8.65 pesos per dollar; 1954-1956, 12.51 pesos per dollar.
aIncludes holdings as of August, 1956.
CHAPTER III
THE CASE OF VENEZUELA: A Survey of Recent
Monetary, Fiscal, and External Practices
Venezuela was chosen as a second underdeveloped 
nation for study because it is an example of an export 
economy.^ It is recognized that special problems as well 
as certain benefits characterize the development of nations 
so dependent upon foreign trade. Nevertheless, many 
countries in the underdeveloped areas of Latin America 
depend in varying degrees upon the external sector for a 
sizeable portion of their income while, at the same time, 
they must rely in part upon capital imports for their 
domestic growth. This is certainly true of Venezuela.
The rise of the national product and income .of
O
Venezuela has not been as spectacular as that of Mexico.
On the other hand, the increase of these two important
1
The value of Venezuela’s commodity trade has 
averaged 57.S per cent of its national product during the 
period 1952 to 1955. Export income averaged 36.9 per cent 
of the national product over the same period, including 
the participation of foreign owned oil companies. Refer 
to the Central Bank of Venezuela, Memoria. 1955, p. 257; 
and the International Monetary Fund, International 
Financial Statistics. January, 1954, p. 233.
^The gross national product of Venezuela has risen 
from 13,370 millions of bolivares in 1952 to 17,096 
millions of bolivares in 1956. See the Central Bank of 
Venezuela, Memoria. loc. cit.: and the Council for Inter- 
American Cooperation, Inc., Noticias, November 29, 1955, 
p. 3.
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factors has been at a steadier pace in Venezuela. Further­
more, inflation and the problems connected with it have 
not been of such great magnitude as they were in Mexico 
over the same period of time.
A special aspect of the problem of international 
equilibrium is introduced when one is concerned writh an 
export economy. This special view consists, in the first 
instance, of the international equilibrium situation with­
out recognition of the significant external forces which 
characterizes the nation as an export economy, such as the 
contributions of foreign owned oil companies in the case 
of Venezuela; and secondly, the practical recognition of 
all the factors which contribute to a state of inter­
national equilibrium. In other words, the position taken 
here is one which attempts to explain the economic situ­
ation of the country, with private firms and the govern­
ment working hand-in-hand, then to incorporate the foreign 
element as a factor which, although responsible for a 
sizeable portion of economic activity, may at some time 
in the future be withdrawn.
A separate treatment of these two aspects of the 
problem of international equilibrium will present the 
growth, or lack of growth, of the economy in recent years. 
The following sections will be developed according to the 
two-aspect approach stated above.
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Monetary and fiscal policy and their effects upon 
the economic development of Venezuela will be analyzed in 
subsequent sections.
Venezuela maintains a multiple exchange rate system 
with few quantitative restrictions for the purpose of con-
nt
trolling trade and payments. Although the government 
does not practice exchange control through the exclusion 
of private sales and purchases of foreign exchange, it 
does maintain five buying rates and two selling rates.4
Since this paper is concerned with short run policy, 
this chapter will be limited to an analysis of Venezuela 
during the last five years, that is, from 1952 to 1956 
with emphasis upon the practical problems derived as 
concepts in Chapter I of this paper.
I. INTERNATIONAL EQUILIBRIUM: A Dual Aspect Approach
In Chapter I it was found that a condition of inter­
national equilibrium requires that intended saving equal 
intended investment and that imports equal exports, or that 
the difference between these two factors be offset through
2
R. F. Mikesell, Foreign Exchange In The Postwar
World (New York: Twentieth Century #und, 1954), p. 305.
^International Monetary Fund, Seventh Annual Report 
on Exchange Restrictions 1956. printed in Washington, D.
C *, p» 341.
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lending, positive or negative. It was further contended 
that should an international disequilibrium exist, mone­
tary, fiscal, and external policy could be so applied that 
together they would either prevent a tendency toward 
greater disequilibrium, or better still, they would reduce 
the degree of disequilibrium.6
This study will begin with the two factors of saving 
and investment during the five-year period. This will be 
followed by an appraisal of exports and imports (the 
current account) and a determination of the balancing 
factor of lending (the capital account). At this point 
an appraisal of the international equilibrium will be 
undertaken.
A. Saving and Investment
Table I, page 18 7, presents the estimated saving 
and investment relationship in Venezuela during the last 
five years excluding the contribution of the foreign owned 
petroleum companies. The saving figures account for the 
total saving of the nation. Figures revealing the savings 
of the petroleum companies were not available. Nevertheless, 
the oil companies would not be expected to maintain any
6See Chapter I, pp. 15-17.
6See Chapter I, pp. 18-19.
TABLE I
SAVING AND INVESTMENT OF VENEZUELA EXCLUDING FOREIGN OWNED OIL COMPANIES
(in millions of bolivares)
National
Product
(1)
As a 
% of 
Total
Saving
(2)
As a 
% of
(1)
Private
Sector
(3)
As a 
% of
(s)
Public
Sector
(4)
As a 
% of
(s)
Invest­
ment
(5)
As a 
% of
(1)
Private
Sectora
(6)
As a 
i of
(5)
Public
Sector^3
(7)
As a 
% of
(5)
1952
13,370 100.0 3,488 26.1 l,500c 43.0 1,988 57.0 2,167 16.2 1,232 56.9 935 43.1
1953
14,127 100.0 3,193 22.6 1,373° 43.0 1,820 57.0 2,273 16.1 1,281 56.4 992 43.6
1954
15,507 100.0 3,489 22.5 1,500 43.0 1,989 57.0 2,569 16.6 1,500 58.4 1,069 41.6
1955
16,282° 100.0 3,248 19.9 2,037 62.7 1,211 37.3 3,670 22.5 2,386 65,0 1,284 35.0
1956 . 
17,096 100.0 3,508e 20.5 2,210° 63.0 1,298 36.7 3,853 22.5 2,505 65.0 1,348 35.0
Source: Central Bank of Venezuela, Memoria. 1955.
aPrivate and national enterprises only.
^National government only.
cEstimated at 43 per cent of total saving for the years 1952 and 1953, and 63 
per cent for 1956.
^Estimated increase at a rate of 5 per cent. i-»
CD
p
^Estimated increase at 8 per cent over that of 1955.
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sizeable amounts of savings within the country. Profits 
of these firms are readily withdrawn to be paid out in 
part as dividends to investors located in the United States 
and other foreign nations. It may be further assumed that 
the remaining portion of the profits would be invested in 
plants and facilities within Venezuela. For these reasons, 
the savings of the petroleum firms are probably of small 
magnitude.
Figures representing the investment expenditures 
of oil companies were obtainable; therefore, they were 
deducted from the total investment figures.
The area referred to as the private sector should 
be viewed with reservation because the figures include the 
contribution of national enterprises. Perhaps a more accu­
rate classification would be to place the national enter­
prises in the same category as the public sector rather 
than the private sector. Since the figures for private 
and national enterprises were not segregated, they were 
placed within the category of the private sector.
The autonomous institutions have a peculiar existence 
of a quasi-public nature. An authoritative report explains 
their legal characteristics in the following manner:
♦ . . These government entities have a distinct 
legal existence, possessing property separate from 
and independent of the Treasury. Their income and 
expenses are not considered as public revenues and 
expenditures, and they are not subject to the regu­
lations governing the national budget.
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All capital contributions, contributions to operat­
ing expenses, and loans and grants that a ministry 
makes to these agencies are listed among expenditures 
of the ministry. However, the ministry receives no 
statement of agency expenditures of either ministry 
funds or agency earnings. On the receipts side the 
ministries list only the net amounts which the agencies, 
under their special regulations, must pay into the 
Treasury.”
These government entities compete with as well as 
supplement the activities of private firms, and this would 
seem to place the latter firms in a disadvantageous com­
petitive position.
The national product figures of Table I consist of 
the contributions of all sectors, including the foreign 
owned oil companies; therefore, the amounts are somewhat 
overstated. Nevertheless, this point does not appear too 
detrimental to the purpose of comparing the domestic 
relationship between saving and investment.
Figures of the private sector saving were available 
for the years 1954 and 1955 only. The saving-rate in 1954 
was applied to the two earlier years, 1952 and 1953, while 
the saving-rate for 1955 was extended to 1956.
The rise in the national product for the years 1955
Q
and 1956 was estimated at a rate of 5 per cent.
7
United States Department of Commerce, Office of 
International Trade, Investment in Venezuela. 1953, p. 82.
8This percentage figure was taken from a recent 
report. See the Council for Inter-American Cooperation, 
Inc., Noticias. November 29, 1955, p. 3,
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It may be observed from the figures presented in 
Table I, page 187, that total actual saving exceeded total 
actual investment during the first three years of the 
survey; namely, 1952 with a saving excess of 1,321 millions 
of bolivares, and 1953 and 1954 each indicating a saving 
surplus of 920 millions of bolivares. The saving balance 
would normally serve as a satisfactory explanation for a 
decline in the national product and national income for 
these years. However, this was not the result since both 
the national product and income continued to rise in each
Q
of the three years in which there was a saving excess.
Out of the total saving during the three year 
period (1952-1954), the public sector accounted for 
approximately 57 per cent while, over the same period of 
time, the private sector accounted for about 57 per cent 
of the total investment expenditures. Furthermore, the 
figures revealed that the private sector maintained its 
proportionate contribution to total investment expendi­
tures during the first two years, that is, 56.9 and 56.4 
per cent of total investment w-hile in the third year
®The national income figures for the period under 
study were as follows: 1952, 9,616; 1953, 10,257; 1954, 
11,042; 1955, 11,200; and 1956, 11,760, all in millions 
of bolivares. Refer to the Central Bank of Venezuela, 
Memoria. 1955, pp. 254 and 257. The figure for 1956 was 
based upon an estimated rise of 5 per cent over 1955.
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considered, 1954, private investment expenditures rose to 
account for 58.4 per cent of the total investment expendi­
tures. At the same time, the public sector held its pro­
portionate saving figures at 57 per cent (see Table I,
page 187, columns 4 and 6). Subsequently, in 1955, the
public sector reduced its saving to 57.3 per cent of total 
saving while, during the same year, private investment 
rose to 65 per cent of the total investment. The impli­
cation is that once the government reduced its saving, 
the private sector provided for a sizeable increase in 
its expenditures. Nevertheless, a note of caution should 
be mentioned; that is, the exceptional rise in private 
investment in 1955 could have been attributed to national 
institutions rather than private enterprises. The 
reduction of government saving implies that the saving 
was made available to national entities for investment 
expansion. However, this point cannot be established 
clearly, since private and national enterprise invest­
ments are not separated.
During the years when saving was larger than invest­
ment (1952-1954), one would expect a reduction in outstand­
ing credit or an increase in idle bank accounts. Total 
credit rose, however, from 1,117.8 millions of bolivares 
to 1,748.7 millions of bolivares during the period (refer 
to Money and Credit of Venezuela, Appendix A, page £79).
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Savings deposits did rise from 233.7 millions of bolivares 
in 1952 to 419.0 millions of bolivares at the end of 1954, 
but the increase in savings deposits was equally as large 
in the following two years, 1955 and 1956, rising to 635.2 
millions of bolivares at the end of 1956.^
The saving and investment relationship was reversed 
during the last two years. Actual investment expenditures 
exceeded actual saving. In other words, savings deposits 
rose during the whole period under study and, therefore, 
negated the reasoning that a rise in savings balances 
served to partially explain an excess of actual saving 
over investment expenditures. In addition, the rise in 
credit would not support the fact that saving was greater 
than investment.
At least one other factor could help explain the 
excess of saving during the years 1952 to 1954. High 
rates of taxation would imply that savings were at a high 
level. By referring to the Receipts and Expenditures of 
the National Government of Venezuela in Appendix B, page 
230, one finds an insignificant change in the yield from 
taxes on income. The amounts collected rose from 635.1 
millions of bolivares in 1952 to 680.6 millions of bolivares
■^Central Bank of Venezuela, Memoria, 1955, 
Statistical Appendix, Chart B-IX; and the Bulletin. May, 
1956, p. 8.
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in 1954. The income tax was modified somewhat in 1955, 
however, during the three earlier years ”. . .  the normal 
income tax rate never exceeds 4 per cent. . . . It 
was true that the greater proportion of taxes received 
hy the government came from the petroleum industry. No 
doubt a large part of the public sector saving was derived 
from this income source.
It is quite clear that the domestic investment of 
firms and the government were not large enough to maintain 
the national product and income at a given level. The 
saving balance did decline, however, from 1,321 millions 
of bolivares in 1952 to 920 millions of bolivares at the 
end of 1954. The explanation as to why the national 
product and income did, In fact, rise during this three 
year period is not apparent from a review of the domestic 
forces alone.
Table I, page 187, further reveals that actual 
investment exceeded actual saving in both 1955 and 1956. 
The amounts were 422 and 345 millions of bolivares, 
respectively. The rise of both saving and investment in 
the private sector is of particular importance. The 
figures also indicate that the government reduced Its 
absolute and relative share of saving. The governments
11United States Department of Commerce, Investment 
in Venezuela. 1953, p. 140.
194
investment expenditures continued to rise; nevertheless, 
the increase was at a slower rate than that of the private 
sector. The result in percentage figures indicated a 
smaller relative contribution to total investment.
The extent of indirect government assistance would 
seem to indicate that the figures given tend to under­
state the influence of the national government. The 
government classifies its debt according to direct and 
indirect groupings.^ The indirect public debt consists 
of obligations emitted by the autonomous institutions with 
the guarantee of the national government. The institutions 
include, among others, the Venezuelan Development Corpo­
ration, the National Institute of Sanitary Works, and the 
Central Simon Bolivar, C. A., an Institution created for 
the development of Caracas. These institutions received 
guaranties for expenditures from the national government 
to the extent of 461.1 millions of bolivares in 1954,
671.5 millions of bolivares in 1955, and although figures
were not available, the amount in 1956 probably exceeded 
1 ^that of 1955. These figures suggest that the national 
12The direct public debt of Venezuela has been 
relatively small. The figures in recent years v»rere as 
follows: 1955, 45.2; 1954, 55.4; and 1955, 50.7 millions 
of bolivares. Refer to the Central Bank of Venezuela, 
Memoria. 1955, p. 211.
15Ibid
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enterprises contributed in no small way to the increase 
in the private sector investment expenditures of 1,005 
millions of bolivares in the last two years, 1955 and 1956.
A partial explanation for the surplus of domestic 
investment expenditures over domestic saving (767 millions 
of bolivares during 1955 and 1956) comes from the expansion 
of loans by the national government and national enter­
prises. Furthermore, a resort to Appendix A, Money and 
Credit of Venezuela, page 279, reveals that money and 
credit rose by 573.2 millions of bolivares during the 
last two years of this survey. A recent statement which 
is indicative of the above reasoning states:
. . . The public sector is more important than 
the private sector in controlling the direction of 
economic development, for the Government also invests 
a large proportion of the private savings obtained 
from the capital market. . .
It appears that domestic development in general is 
progressing at a more rapid rate than current opinion 
indicates. Although saving and investment have not pro­
vided a balance, the discrepancy is not exceedingly large. 
It Is recognized that the oil industry is exceptionally 
Important to the development of the nation. Yet, domestic 
investment rose some 78 per cent during the period without 
the aid of the petroleum industry. Even though total
^International Monetary Fund, International 
Financial News Survey. November 2, 1956, p. 147.
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increase in saving was meager and sporadic, private sector 
saving rose approximately 61 per cent, i. e., from a low 
of 1,373■millions of "bolivares in 1953 to 2,210 millions 
of bolivares in 1956. In addition, the rise in saving of 
this sector has been consistently moving upward since
1953.
Bringing together some of the loose ends of the 
findings up to this point, it seems safe to state that 
the private and public sectors saving and investment 
relationships indicated that the national product and 
income would have declined from 1952 to 1954. However, 
during the year 1955 a turn of events occurred. The sav­
ing excess of 920 millions of bolivares at the end of 
1954 was reversed during the following year so that at 
the end of 1955 investment exceeded saving by 422 millions 
of bolivares. This was accomplished without giving rise 
to additional inf1ation.^ Furthermore, the investment 
balance continued in 1956. This meant that the two sectors, 
without the helping hand of the oil companies, were strong 
enough to maintain and perhaps to increase the national 
product and income. Recent literature refers to numerous 
evidences of the tremendous advances made by the private 
sector via increased investment and diversification of
^ S e e  the Index of Wholesale Prices In the Federal 
District, Appendix C, p. 282.
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facilities. A few examples will suffice:
Well-known group oa of Venezuelan businessmen are 
forming a real estate development company which will 
finance large city housing projects . . . and later
on will build factory buildings for rent and for sale,
office buildings, warehouses, and supermarkets through­
out the nation. , . .16 Also,
. . .  107 new industrial concerns were established 
last year, their total subscribed capital being 24.9 
millions of dollars . . . and bought machinery and 
equipment worth 15.1 millions of dollars. . . .17 And,
. . .  Venezuela is now self-sufficient in corn and 
rice, and all sugar requirements are expected to be 
covered by domestic production this year. . . .18
One should not forget, however, that the influence 
of the oil companies is perhaps greater than it appears on
the surface. For example, the earnings of petroleum firms
help to provide funds which private firms may utilize for 
the expansion of production and trade, and the oil compa­
nies contribute large sums of money which have made it 
possible for the national government to realize surpluses 
in its national accounts.
To take into consideration the precise influence 
of the petroleum industry, a second table, Table II, page 
198, has been constructed for the purpose of analyzing the
-I g
Council for Inter-American Cooperation, Inc., 
Noticias. October 18, 1955, p. 4.
l^Ibid., issue of September 27, 1955, p. 5.
^International Monetary Fund, International 
Financial Hews Survey. October 14, 1955, p. 131.
TABLE II
SAVING M D  INVESTMENT OF VENEZUELA INCLUDING FOREIGN OWNED OIL COMPANIES
(in millions of bolivares)
National
Product
(1)
As a 
% of 
Total
S aving 
(2)
As a 
% of
(1)
Private
Sector
(3)
As a 
% of
(2)
Public
Sector
(4)
As a 
% of
(2)
Invest­
ment
(5)
As a 
% of
(1)
Private
Sector
(6)
As a 
% of
(5)
Public
Sector
(?)
As a 
% of
(5)
1952
13,370 100.0 3,488 26.1 l,500a 43.0 1,988 57.0 3,469 26.0 2,268 65.3 1,203 34.7
1953
14,127 100.0 3,193 22.6 l,373a 43.0 1,820 57.0 3,249 23.0 1,887 58.1 1,362 42.0
1954
15,507 100.0 3,489 22.5 1,500 43.0 1,989 57.0 3,706 23.9 2,437 65.8 1,268 34.2
1955 . 
16,282t) 100.0 3,248 19.9 2,037 62.7 1,211 37.3 4,820 22.5 3,336° 65.0 1,484 35.0
1 9 5 6  V
17,096° 100.0 3,508d 20.5 2,210a 63.0 1,2.98 36.7 5,027e 29.4 3,479° 69.2 1,548 30.8
Source: Central Bank of Venezuela, Memoria. 1955,
Estimated at 45 per cent of total saving for the years 1952 and 1953, and 63 
per cent for 1956,
^Estimated increase at a rate of 5 per cent,
cEstimated a 5 per cent rise of petroleum industry investment during 1955 and 1956. 
^Estimated increase at 8 per cent over that of 1955. mto
« 00 ^Estimated private, national enterprises, and national government expenditures
at 5 per cent.
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aggregate saving and investment relationship in Venezuela. 
This table is the same as Table I except that it includes 
the investment expenditures of the petroleum industry and 
a small amount of foreign investment. The investment 
expenditures of the oil companies have been added to those 
of the private sector and, appropriately, the foreign 
investment figures have been included with the national 
government in the public sector.
Total actual investment has averaged about 25 per 
cent of the national product for the five-year period.
This may be compared with an 18.8 per cent average shown
iq
in Table I. These aggregate figures reveal the sig­
nificance of the petroleum companies along with the general 
increase of investment expenditures by the private sector. 
Investment expenditures have been separated and shown 
below as individual components, in millions of bolivares:^
Private investment 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956
Private and national 
enterprises 1,232 1,281 1,500 2,386 2,505
Petroleum companies 1.034 606 957 950 974
Total private sector 2,266 1,887 2,437 3,336 3,479
Public investment
National government 935 992 1,069 1,284 1,348
Other foreign invest- 
ment 268 370 199 200 200
Total public sector 1,203 1,362 1,268 1,484 1,548
-^For comparisons refer to column 5 and the per­
centages shown in Table I, page 187, and Table II.
20Central Bank of Venezuela, Memoria, 1955, p. 259; 
also see the explanations under Table II.
soo
This separation of the investment factors presents 
some important points with respect to the growth of the 
nation. The exceedingly large investment expenditures of 
the oil companies, which in 1952 amounted to nearly 50 
per cent of the total private investment, is attributable 
to the extension of operations which began a few years 
earlier. Large expenditures were made to construct homes 
and schools for the workers, to provide electricity for 
the communities, to pipe fresh water to the oil camps, 
and so o n . ^  The completion of the expansion of such 
facilities in 1952 brought a reduction of investment 
expenditures during 1955. Beginning in 1954, the con­
tinued rise in petroleum exports and the need for expanded
refinery capacity stimulated a constant increase of invest­
ment expenditures. The average investment expenditures of 
the oil companies from 1954 to 1956 were 51.6 per cent of
the total private sector investment.
A large rise of investment expenditures on the part 
of the private and national enterprises occurred in 1954 
and continued through 1955 and 1956. The absolute increase, 
in millions of bolivares, amounted to 219 during 1954 and 
886 at the end of 1955. Perhaps a large portion of the 
investment was channeled through the national enterprises.
Lfnited States Department of Commerce, Investment 
in Venezuela. 1955, p. 50.
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The following explanation would seem to support this view:
. . . The Government made large investments [19543, 
either in the form of public works or by granting 
development loans. . • •
. . . The use of the Government’s reserve fund in 
the Central Bank to finance a vast new programme of 
public works CwasJ provided for in the 1954/55 
budget. . •
The above quotation also gives cognizance to the 
fact that the national government expenditures expanded 
abruptly in 1954 and continued upward in the two subse­
quent years.
Reverting back to Table II, one finds that the 
private sector’s contribution to total investment varied 
from 58.1 per cent (1953) to 69.2 per cent (1956). 
Furthermore, investment expenditures were on the incline 
during the whole period except for the year 1953 as 
mentioned above.
In contrast, the public sector’s relative share of 
investment spending has declined (see column 7 and the 
relative percentages). However, the figures indicate 
that the absolute expenditures have risen during most of 
the current period. The reason for the opposite move­
ments of the relative and absolute figures was that the 
private sector spending increased at a more rapid rate
^United Nations, Department of Economic and Social 
Affairs, Economic Survey of Latin America 1954 (New York: 
United Nations Publication, 1955), p. 201.
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than that of the public sector.
Before analyzing the external accounts, a compari­
son of the saving-investment relationship of Venezuela 
may be presented. This comparison is shown in Table III. 
These figures reveal quite clearly some of the major 
points that have been presented. By observing the left- 
hand column of the table one is able to see that total 
actual investment was smaller than actual saving for the 
first three years of the five-year period. However, dur­
ing the last two years (1955-1956) Investment (A) rose to 
exceed saving (S). The gradual decline in saving during 
the first three years, the equality between saving and 
investment during the year 1954, and the investment excess 
thereafter, all serve to emphasize the rapid domestic 
growth of the economy. This observation is of special 
importance since the change in the saving-investment 
balances was accomplished without severe inflation.
TABLE III
EXCESS OF REALIZED SAVING (S) OR INVESTMENT (A)
(in millions of bolivares)
Excluding the Petroleum Industry Aggregate Balances
1952 1,321 S 19 S
1953 920 S 56 A
1954 920 S 217 A
1955 422 A 1,572 A
1956 345 A 1,519 A
Source: Table I, page 187, and Table II, page 198.
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Turning to the right-hand column of Table III, one 
may observe the great impact of the oil industry with 
respect to the domestic growth of the country. In only 
the first year, 1952, was saving larger than investment. 
Between the years 1952 and 1953 saving and investment 
were equated at a national product figure approximating 
13,749 millions of bolivares.
At the end of 1953 the figures indicate an invest­
ment excess of about 56 millions of bolivares. However, 
as Table II, page 198, reveals, the investment balance
for this year did not come about because of a rise of
investment expenditures. Those expenditures actually 
fell. Nevertheless, the balance was possible because 
saving declined by a larger amount than did investment.
The investment excess continued to swell during 
the next two years (1954 and 1955), Finally, at the end
of 1956, the already large investment balance declined by
a small amount. The extraordinary rise of investment 
would normally be explained by inflation. This expla­
nation would not be sufficient in the case of Venezuela.
As will be explained later, the rise of the real national 
product and the diversification of development, starting 
with a narrow base, are important points attempting to 
verify the growth of the nation nearly free of inflation.
Before analyzing the approximate state of
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international equilibrium of Venezuela, an appraisal of 
the nations external relations should he made. This is 
the purpose of the following section.
B. Imports, Exports, and Lending^3
The survey of the domestic factors of saving and 
investment just completed has shown that an equality 
between saving and investment has not been realized in 
Venezuela during the past five years. Chapter I of this 
paper states that if saving were greater than investment 
a condition of international equilibrium may be attained, 
provided that exports exceed imports by the amount of the 
saving excess. The opposite relationship may also allow 
international equilibrium to be maintained, that is, with 
imports exceeding exports by the exact amount of the 
investment surplus. Should either of these above require­
ments fail to be realized, lending should provide the 
appropriate directional flow in order to close the gap 
between the accounts.^
The present task is to analyze the current and 
capital accounts of Venezuela for the purpose of
P3Imports include all the current account minus 
items while exports represent the sum of all the current 
account plus items. Lending constitutes the (net) capital 
account balance.
^4See Chapter I, pp. 15-17.
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determining their final balances. The dual approach will 
be employed as it was in connection with the domestic 
sector. In other words, the current account will be 
explained, in the first instance, with the exclusion of 
the petroleum industry’s contribution to external trade.
By making this observation it will be possible to deter­
mine by rough measure the domestic and external sectors’ 
ability to achieve and maintain economic progress.
The second part of the dual approach in the external 
sector will be to present the aggregate current account 
figures which will include the external contribution of 
the oil industry.
Of course, the capital account Involves movements 
of funds and assets and, therefore, it will be employed in 
both of the above situations.
Table IV, page 206, presents the current account 
of Venezuela’s balance of payments exclusive of the 
petroleum industry’s contribution to the external trade 
of the nation.
A general view of Table IV yields some significant 
facts. Venezuela depends to a great extent upon its 
petroleum exports in order to achieve a favorable current 
account. The domestic sector contributes about 6 per cent 
of the total exports. The remaining 94 per cent is 
derived from the petroleum firms. At least this has been
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25the experience of the country during the last five years.
TABLE IV
IMPORTS AND EXPORTS OF VENEZUELA EXCLUDING 
FOREIGN OWNED OIL COMPANIES*
(in millions of bolivares)
Itema
Exports, f.o.b.
Imports, f.o.b.
Transportation 
and insurance 
Investment 
income 
Capital
Other services 
Other
Balance
Source: Balance of Payments of Venezuela, Appendix
D, p. 283.
*Minus items denote debits or a reduction of purchas­
ing power.
aAll items except exports and imports represent net 
figures.
•l.
Estimated at a rate of 10 per cent above the 1955
figures.
Minus balances accompany every item with the 
exception of the exports and the capital (net) item for
1952 1953 1954 1955 I956b
228.8
-2,015.4
288.1
-2,374.8
365.8
-2,783.9
373.9
-2,919.9
411.3
-3,211.9
- 235.8 - 281.4 - 338.4 - 351.8 - 387.0
-1,374.2
237.9
- 173.9
- 213.4 
-3,546.0
-1,355.7
169.2
- 216.7
- 207.8 
-3,979.1
-1,522.3
71.7
- 236.2
- 217.4 
-4,804.1
-1,847.9
66.7
- 346.4
- 175.4 
-5,334.2
-2,032.7
73.3
- 381.0
- 192.9 
-5,867.5
2^As noted under Table IV, the imports and exports 
figures for 1956 were estimated. The 10 per cent rise 
would seem to be adequate according to a recent report 
which states that petroleum exports rose 12 per cent dur­
ing the first half of the year and 14 per cent during the 
last six months. Refer to United States Department of 
Commerce, Foreign Commerce Weekly. May 13, 1957, p. 33.
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the first two years of this s t u d y . T h i s  result infers 
that the authorities must feel assured that large oil 
exports will continue, otherwise some of the items would 
tend to be reduced during the latter part of the period. 
Yet, nearly every item has progressively risen throughout 
the period considered in this survey.
The two main items in terms of size are the imports 
and investment income. Together they constitute an over­
whelming portion of the total debit balance. Imports have 
risen in every year considered and, during the five-year 
period, have risen to the extent of 59.4 per cent.
The investment income item showed the same upward 
tendency. A debit balance revealed by this item is con­
sidered normal for countries wtiich are in a state of 
underdevelopment. Nevertheless, the figures indicate a 
substantial rise for Venezuela, and may not be considered 
as indicative of a prudent accomplishment unless the 
exports of oil in the future are maintained on a plane at 
least equal to their present level, or even higher.
During the period under study, the investment 
income item has shown a persistent rising debit balance
^®The item capital (net) refers to that part of the 
Donations Account which consists of goods and services and, 
therefore, is charged to the Current Account. This expla­
nation may be found in the Central Bank of Venezuela, 
Memoria, 1955, p. 165.
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which amounted to a 47.9 per cent increase between 1952 
and 1956. The only year in which the investment income 
item registered a decline was 1953, and it was then less 
than 20 millions of bolivares. No doubt foreign invest­
ment in petroleum and other industries has contributed a 
good deal to the larger debit balances of this item. The 
extent of the nation’s ability to diversify its invest­
ment outlets rapidly will determine whether or not the 
amounts shown at the present time can be repaid in the 
future.
Table V, page 209, is constructed for the purpose 
of showing the aggregate current account figures. This 
table constitutes the total current receipts and expendi­
tures which include the petroleum industry’s contribution.
It is quite apparent from this table that the 
exports of petroleum made possible the credit balances in 
four out of the five years included in this survey. Page 
209 shows the yearly percentage changes of oil exports as 
compared to the yearly percentage changes of total imports. 
This comparison should reveal the capability of oil 
exports to support the rising demand of the nation for 
imports. The absolute figures for oil exports and total 
imports show that the former was approximately double the 
latter during the last five years.
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TABLE V
IMPORTS AND EXPORTS OF VENEZUELA INCLUDING 
FOREIGN OWNED OIL COMPANIES 
(in millions of bolivares)
Itema 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956^
Exports, f.o.b. 4,864.9 5,071.9 5,603.5 6,374.4 7,191.9
Imports, f.o.b. -2,615.7 -2,857.9 -3,193.9 -3,372.5 -3,709.8
Transportation
and insurance - 285.7 - 312.9 - 376.9 - 399.4 - 439.4
Investment
income -1,374.2 -1,355.7 -1,522.3 -1,847.9 -2,032.7
Capital 237.9 169.2 - 71.7 66.7 73.3
Other services - 173.9 - 216.7 - 236.2 - 346.4 - 381.0
Other - 273.4 - 207.8 - 217.4 - 175.4 - 192.9
Balance 439.9 290.1 - 14.9 166.1 362.8
Source: Balance of Payments of Venezuela, Appendix
D, p. 283.
aAll items except exports and imports represent net 
figures.
D0il exports estimated at a rate of 13 per cent. All 
other items at a rate of 10 per cent.
1952 1953 1954 1955 1956
oil
total
6.7
11.8
3.2
15.0
9.5
11.8
14.6
5.6
13.0
10.0
A definite pattern is indicated by the above per­
centages. On the one hand, oil exports increased by 6.7 
per cent in 1952, rose by over 3.2 per cent in 1953, and, 
in 1954, ascended by 9.5 per cent. On the other hand, 
imports shot upward by 11.8 per cent in 1952, moved even 
higher in 1953 which shows a 15.0 per cent rise, and, in 
1954, increased by 11.8 per cent over 1953, the same per­
centage rise as that of 1952. The year 1954 seemed to be
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a breaking point, since after that year oil exports rose 
rapidly in both of the following two years. Imports 
increased but at a much smaller rate in 1955. However, 
the estimated percentage rise in 1956 was somewhat larger.
In a relative sense, exports of petroleum have 
risen at a more rapid rate in the latter years of this 
survey than have total imports. In other words, the 
rising oil output has been large enough to support the 
growing imports. To say that this fortunate trend will 
continue would be only conjecture. Its continuation will 
depend upon political as well as economic decisions on 
the part of other nations, including the United States, 
along with those made in Venezuela.
A few comments should be made in connection with 
the debit balance on current account which appeared in 
1954. The figures in Table V show that imports and exports 
have been rising up to and including the year 1954.
Because of the total commodity rise, the service items 
would be expected to increase too. This they did as is 
shown by a glance at Table V. In addition, it was found 
that petroleum exports rose at a slower rate than total 
imports. The result was that the rise of imports plus 
the increases in the service items exceeded the increase 
of exports in 1954. Thereafter, the relative increase of 
exports was more than sufficient to offset the rise of
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imports and the service items taken together. One should 
further keep in mind the fact that exports, exclusive of 
petroleum, have "been rising steadily. The figures indicate 
that these exports increased by approximately 79.8 per cent 
from 1952 through 1956 (see Table IV, page 206). The 
reasons explaining why these exports have been increasing 
in recent years are presented in a later portion of this 
chapter (see page 262 ff.). At this point, it will suffice 
to state that export prices for coffee and cocoa were 
pegged. In addition, a portion of the export tax levied 
on petroleum was used to subsidize the production of coffee, 
cocoa, and perhaps other products. World prices were 
sufficiently high to encourage the production of coffee 
and cocoa for export. Finally, iron-ore deposits are being 
exploited on a larger scale facilitating an increasing 
quantity for export.
A survey of the current account of Venezuelan 
balance of payments has presented some interesting results. 
No doubt the flow of funds as represented by the capital 
account will be equally revealing. The task at hand is to 
describe the capital account items.
Table VI, page 212, shows the capital account items 
and their directional movements.2^ All positive items
P7
* Information was not available for 1956. Taking 
into consideration the erratic movements of capital, it 
was considered unwise to employ estimates for that year.
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represent inward movements of capital or negative lending 
(borrowing), or return on loans made. The minus items 
indicate outward flows of capital or positive lending, 
or the repayment of previous borrowings.
TABLE VI
CAPITAL ACCOUNT OF VENEZUELA 
(in millions of bolivares)
Item 1952 1955 1954 1955
Long-term 279.7 305.3 265.5 159.5
Private 267.7 305.5 290.4 170.9
Official and bank 
Export-import
bank loans 16.4 11.0 --  --
Amortization - 4.4 - 10.7 - S.4 - 5.4
Purchase of foreign
investment --  --  - 15.7 - 6.0
Short-term -234.5 -151.1 78.4 -171.5
Official and bank
Liabilities - 12.1 - 10.7 - 15.1 32.2
Foreign assets 
(increase -) -222.4 -140,4 93.5 -203.7
Balance 45.2 154.7 343.7 - 12.0
Source: Balance of Payments of Venezuela, Appendix
D, p. 283.
The long-term movements of capital were inward on 
balance in every year considered in this study. This 
directional movement of funds appears quite logical in the 
case of an underdeveloped country. Nevertheless, the trend 
seems to be one of reduced inflows of capital as one views 
the figures from 1952 through 1955.
Private long-term capital constituted the bulk of 
total long-term capital movements. The amortization of
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the Export-import Bank loans was nearly completed by the 
end of 1955. Loans from the Bank during the years 1951 
through 1'953 totaled 33.4 millions of bolivares while the 
amortization payments over the same period amounted to 
31.9 millions of bolivares, leaving only 1.5 millions of 
bolivares to be amortized.*3®
The purchase of foreign securities on the part of 
Venezuela has amounted to 21.7 millions of bolivares 
between 1952 and 1955. Although precise figures were not 
available, the larger portion of long-term foreign invest­
ment probably consisted of United States Government 
securities.
The short-term capital account showed a net out­
flow of capital from Venezuela in three of the four years 
surveyed. In 1952 the outflow of short-term funds was 
offset by an increase of foreign assets. In other words, 
the capital was employed in the purchase of stocks, bonds, 
or other assets, including foreign currency, bank deposits,
2®The 1951 Export-import Bank loan figure was 6 
millions of bolivares, and amortization amounted to 2.0 
millions of bolivares. See the International Monetary 
Fund, International Financial Statistics. January, 1957, 
p . 233.
PQFigures reveal that Latin American net long-term 
investments in United States Government securities totaled 
189 millions of dollars during the two-year period (1954- 
1955). Refer to the Board of Governors of the Federal 
Reserve System, Federal Reserve Bulletin. April, 1957, 
p. 479.
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or brokerage balances amounting to 222.4 millions of 
bolivares. In addition, non-residents withdrew their net 
bank deposits in Venezuelan banks to the extent of 12.1 
millions of bolivares. The total short-term outflow as 
revealed by the two above accounts amounted to 234.5 
millions of bolivares.
The following year, 1953, showed a similar short­
term capital outflow which totaled 151.1 millions of 
bolivares. At the end of 1954 the short-term balance was 
positive; that is, a net inflow of short-term capital 
took place. This inflow was possible since Venezuela^ 
foreign assets declined. This meant that the government 
or banks either sold some of their holdings of foreign 
stocks, bonds, or other assets, or they reduced their 
holdings of foreign currency, bank deposits, or brokerage 
balances abroad in an amount of 93.5 millions of bolivares. 
Furthermore, foreigners withdrew their bank deposits on 
balance in Venezuela again in 1954 by about 15.1 millions 
of bolivares.
The short-term minus balance at the end of 1955 
indicated a different situation which led to an outflow 
of short-term capital totaling 171.5 millions of bolivares. 
Foreign assets rose by 203.7 millions of bolivares while 
short-term liabilities also increased by 32.2 millions of 
bolivares.
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In summarizing the short-term capital items one 
finds that total liabilities changed by only 5.7 millions 
of bolivares, that is, foreign bank deposits in Venezuela 
declined on balance by the above amount. On the other 
hand, foreign assets held by the government and banks in 
Venezuela rose some 475.0 millions of bolivares.
To conclude the capital account survey, it may be 
stated that there was a positive balance in every year 
except 1955. During the first two years, 1952 and 1953, 
the long-term capital inflows were larger than the short­
term capital outflows. In 1954, both long- and short-term 
capital movements were inward on balance. Finally, the 
long-term capital inflow was larger than the short-term 
capital outflow in 1955.
As will be shown at a later point, the current and 
capital account balances must be offset by the unilateral 
account or gold movements in order to provide an equi­
librium in the balance of payments.
Now that the analysis of Venezuela's current and 
capital accounts has been completed, it is possible to 
examine the state of international equilibrium of that 
country. The procedure employed will be to analyze the 
various factors with the exclusion of the petroleum 
industry's contribution to the country in order to find 
out wrhether or not the domestic sector was able to achieve
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a condition of international equilibrium. After that 
analysis is completed, the contribution of the oil industry 
will be included for the purpose of determining the actual 
state of international equilibrium.
The discussion of this phase of international equi­
librium will be short. There is justification for brevity 
in this instance since the situation to be described is 
not actually found within Venezuela. However, some degree 
of benefit should be forthcoming from a consideration of 
the domestic sector because if that sector is contributing 
to greater disequilibrium, then those persons in responsi­
ble positions should not hesitate to do all they can to
develop the nation on a broader basis. In addition, this
discussion will indicate the approximate importance of 
the petroleum industry to the nation as a whole.
Before getting under way, a note of caution should
be mentioned. It is possible that the figures to be 
presented may not be entirely free of the impact of the 
oil industry.^ In fact, it was mentioned earlier (pages 
186 and 188) that saving figures Include those of the oil 
companies. Furthermore, some portion of the capital
For example, reinvested earnings of the Creole 
Petroleum Corporation were as follows (in millions of 
bolivares): 134, 1952; 160, 1953; 153, 1954; 59, 1955; 
and 152, 1956. Refer to the Creole Petroleum Corporation, 
Annual Report 1956. pp. 26-27.
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account may involve flows of funds created by the oil 
industry. The same reasoning holds true in connection 
with the movements of gold and foreign exchange.
An examination of Table VII Indicates that actual 
saving was in excess of actual Investment from 1952 through
1954. Thereafter, the nation encountered an investment 
surplus. In the external sector imports were greatly in 
excess of exports during the whole period.
TABLE VII
THE INTERNATIONAL EQUILIBRIUM OF VENEZUELA 
EXCLUDING FOREIGN OWNED OIL COMPANIES 
(in millions of bolivares)*
Year National Saving(S)- Lending Import(M)-
Product Investment(A) Balance Export(E)
Balance (*-inflow) Balance
1952 13,370 S > A 1,521 *- 45.2 M> E 3,546.0
1955 14,127 S > A  920 154.7 M > E 3,971.1
1954 15,507 S > A 920 343.7 M >  E 4,804.1
1955 16,282 A> S 422 ~ » 12.0 M> E 5,334.2
1956 17,096 A> S 545 a• « • • M> E 5,867.5
Source: Table I, page 187 ; Table IV, page 206; and
Table VI, page 212.
^Monetary conversions were made at the official 
rate of 5.55 bolivares per dollar.
information was not available.
The lending factor was relatively small In amount 
throughout the period, and it revealed a change in 
directional flow in 1955.
The saving balances during the first three years
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amounted to 1,321 millions of bolivares in 1952 and 920 
millions of bolivares in both 1953 and 1954. Since these 
were excesses of saving, it might be assumed that an 
equality between saving and investment could be realized 
should there be an outflow of capital in an amount equal 
to the above saving surpluses. The lending balances show, 
however, that capital moved inward. This directional 
flow of capital had the effect of aggravating the 
imbalance already created.
In order to ameliorate the domestic condition which 
ordinarily accompanies a saving excess, monetary policy 
would have needed to be expansive with the banking system 
providing for a downward revision of quantitative controls 
and a reduction of bank interest rates. Accordingly, 
fiscal policy would have called for a decrease in taxation 
and a rise in government lending, among other measures.
Monetary and fiscal joolicy together would have 
required a maximum expansion amounting to approximately
3,704.5 millions of bolivares. This figure represents 
the summation of the lending balances plus the saving 
excesses during the three-year period.^ However, a rise
31It is possible that some portion of the inflow 
of capital would have been utilized directly in investment 
endeavors. Monetary and fiscal policy could have been 
moderated If this were the case.
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in money and credit of this magnitude would probably have 
raised costs and prices a good deal, and would have forced 
savings to even greater heights.
The external sector indicated an excess of imports 
during the first three years of this study (1952-1354). 
Table VII shows that the import balances totaled about
12,321.2 millions of bolivares for those years. The nega­
tive lending balances amounting to 543.6 millions of boli­
vares were too small to cope writh the vast import surplus. 
Consequently, a rapid drainage of gold and foreign 
exchange would have taken place.
Internal conditions changed in 1955. Investment 
was larger than saving by approximately 422 millions of 
bolivares. This investment gap wrould have been closed 
through the inflow of capital (negative lending) equal 
to the above figure. Nevertheless, lending was positive 
and an outwrard flow of capital was encountered to the 
extent of 12 millions of bolivares.
Monetary and fiscal policy could have helped close 
the domestic gap through appropriate contractive measures 
which would have included an upward revision of quanti­
tative and qualitative controls, a rise of bank interest 
rates, an increase in taxation, stepped-up government 
borrowing, and so on. Yet, such a reversal of policy 
would not have been easy to instigate and, furthermore,
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the problem which evolved in the external sector would 
have perhaps prevented these contractionist measures from 
becoming effective*
Imports continued to be excessive in 1955. The 
figures in Table VII indicate the approximate amount to 
be 5,354.2 millions of bolivares. This balance would have 
called for negative lending, or an inflow of capital.
Since lending was positive by 12 millions of bolivares, 
the inflow that would have been needed to balance the 
import-export Items amounted to 5,346.2 millions of boli­
vares. However, since the inflow of capital was not 
forthcoming, gold and foreign exchange would have left 
the country again at the end of 1955.
The withdrawal of foreign exchange reserves of 
this magnitude, that is, approximately 15 times as large 
as total exports, would probably have created extensive 
borrowing and deficit financing in order to provide 
additional funds to satisfy foreign commitments.
A summation of the findings may now be presented. 
Negative lending (inflows) throughout the first three 
years would not have provided a balance between either 
saving and investment in the domestic sector or imports 
and exports in the external sector.
Monetary and fiscal policy would probably have 
contributed to extremely high prices because the rise of
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real Investment would have required a greater expanse of 
time in an underdeveloped nation. Externally, the loss of 
gold and foreign exchange would probably have created a 
demand for depreciation of the currency.
At the end of 1955 lending also failed to offset 
the saving-investment balance as well as the import-export 
balance. The apparent heavy loss of gold and foreign 
exchange would probably have created adverse effects upon 
monetary and fiscal policy of a contractionist nature.
The following year, 1956, was similar to that of 
1955 except for the fact that the internal Improvement via 
a smaller investment balance was more than offset by a 
larger Import balance. Although the lending figure was 
not available, It is reasonably safe to assume that it 
would not have created a balance between the internal or 
external accounts. Monetary and fiscal policy problems 
along with the external loss of gold and foreign exchange 
would have been accentuated during the year.
It is safe to say that the national product and 
income would have fallen during the period. There would 
have been a possibility that the downward movement might 
have been curtailed by the end of the period. This would 
have depended upon the extent of success in applying mone­
tary and fiscal policy. Also, exchange depreciation ?/ould 
have possibly been Imposed, particularly if emergency
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funds from abroad were not forthcoming.
This short survey of the domestic sector shows 
quite conclusively that there is a great need for further 
diversification of production. Should the petroleum market 
dwindle or some new invention or discovery lessen the need 
for petroleum, the domestic sector could not be expected to 
maintain a level of income anywhere near its present plane. 
The likelihood of a depression, inflation, or exchange 
rate modification would be a probable outcome.
In order to establish the current state of inter­
national equilibrium of Venezuela, the contribution of the 
petroleum industry should be included. Table VIII is con­
structed for the purpose of showing the aggregate contri­
bution of the total economy.
Year
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
TABLE VIII
THE INTERNATIONAL EQUILIBRIUM OF VENEZUELA 
INCLUDING FOREIGN OWNED OIL COMPANIES 
(in millions of bolivares)
National
Product
13,370
14,127
15,507
16,282
17,096
Saving(S)- 
Investment(A) 
Balance
S > A 19 
A> S 56 
A> S 217 
A> S 1,572 
A> S 1,519
Lending 
Balance 
(«—  inflow)
45.2
154.7
343.7 
12.0
Import(M 
Export(E 
Balance
E > M 439.9 
E> M 290.1 
M > E 14.9 
E> iff 166.1 
E > M 362.8
Source: Central Bank of Venezuela, Memoria. 1955;
and the International Monetary Fund, International 
Financial Statistics. January, 1957.
information was not available.
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A few general comments concerning Table VIII seem 
to be in order before analyzing the factor changes which 
occurred in the respective years. Overall, the national 
product rose approximately 27.9 per cent, in current 
bolivares, that is, about 5.6 per cent per year. Invest­
ment (A) exceeded saving (S) in every year except 1958. 
Furthermore, the rise of the investment balance was quite 
abrupt beginning with the year 1954. The directional 
flow of the lending balance was inward for the first 
three years, then, in 1955, the item showed a net out­
flow of capital. Finally, one observes that exports were 
larger than Imports four out of the five years under con­
sideration.
Each year contains its own unique set of factor 
relationships; therefore, the analysis will proceed in a 
chronological sequence.
I
At the end of 1952 realized saving wras larger than 
realized investment by about 19 millions of bolivares.
Even though this was a moderate surplus, negative lending 
(an inflow of capital) moved in the opposite direction 
from that required to balance the saving-Investment items. 
The summation of the lending balance, approximately 45 
millions of bolivares, and the saving excess produced a 
domestic imbalance of about 64 millions of bolivares.
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This is a small figure in terms of the national product 
totaling 13,370 millions of bolivares.
The rise of money and credit in circulation amounted 
to 435.9 millions of bolivares.32 Under this condition, 
the price level would be expected to rise somewhat. The 
index of wholesale prices indicates a small rise in the 
average level of prices amounting to 1.6 per cent for the 
year.35
Exports were 440 millions of bolivares greater than 
imports. Lending, moving inward on balance, failed to 
close this gap. If the movement of capital is included 
in the calculation, the gap amounts to 485 millions of 
bolivares. This difference had to be offset by unilateral 
and gold movements, foreign exchange reserves, and the 
unaccountable portion assigned to errors and omissions.
As for actual figures connected with such items, gold 
moved out to the extent of approximately 1 million of 
bolivares, donations left the country in an amount of 
about 64 millions of bolivares, foreign exchange reserves 
increased some 191 millions of bolivares, and the remain­
ing negative balance of 613 millions of bolivares was
*20
cRefer to Money and Credit of Venezuela, Appendix 
A, p. 279.
33See Index of Wholesale Prices in the Federal
District, Appendix C, p. 282.
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classified as errors and omissions.
The year 1952 was, in one sense, a turning point.
Each subsequent year produced an investment surplus in
the internal sector. A saving excess would normally
explain a fall in the national product. However, the
national product rose about 770 millions of bolivares
34during the present year. This rise is justified, in 
part, by reason of prior government expenditures which 
provided completed projects during the year, and of the 
large export surplus in the external sector. In addition, 
the national product figure would have been somewhat less 
than the figure shown if it were in terms of constant 
prices.
The export balance in 1952 was the largest accumu­
lated in any one of the five years. Also, the Index of 
Import and Export Prices of Venezuela in Appendix C, page 
232, reveals a 14.5 per cent rise in export prices between 
the base year, 1950, and 1952. Although a small amount 
of gold was exported, the gold and foreign exchange 
balance showed a net accumulation of 190 millions of 
bolivares.
II
The following year, 1953, produced an investment
34
The national product was estimated at 12,600 
millions of bolivares for 1951. The above figure repre­
sents a 6.1 per cent rise between 1951 and 1952.
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surplus of some 56 millions of bolivares. Lending was 
inward on balance to the extent of 155 millions of boli­
vares. The correct directional movement of capital was 
greater, however, than that required to achieve an equi­
librium between saving and investment. The influence of 
lending then had the effect of supplementing the apparent 
lack of saving to an amount greater than was required.
The precise figure was 99 millions of bolivares (155 - 56).
It would appear that monetary and fiscal policy 
should have revealed a contractionist tendency. Never­
theless, money and credit, taken together, rose some 476 
millions of bolivares. This expansion along with the 
lending balance provided funds amounting to 575 millions 
of bolivares.
In the external sector exports were 290 millions 
of bolivares larger than imports. The export excess 
required an outward directional flow of capital. Yet, 
lending was negative, or capital moved inward, as 
mentioned above. The export surplus plus the inflow of 
capital (155 millions of bolivares) produced an Imbalance 
amounting to approximately 445 millions of bolivares.
The remaining accounts in the balance of payments, 
including the movement of foreign exchange, produced off­
setting balances to equate the import, export, and lending 
figure of 445 millions of bolivares. To sum up the
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balancing factors, gold was exported in an amount of 
300,000 bolivares and donations indicated a net outward 
flow of 68.4 millions of bolivares. Foreign exchange 
reserves rose by about 143 millions of bolivares while 
the errors and omissions item accounted for a debit 
balance of some 519.3 millions of bolivares.
Overall, the year 1953 presented some unique 
relationships. Even though the national product rose, the 
amount was less than that for the preceding year. From a 
monetary standpoint, money and credit increased; however, 
the rise was less than that of the national product.
The average price level declined by slightly more 
than 3 points. Furthermore, both saving and investment 
fell, the former by more than the latter. The private 
and public sectors together contributed to the smaller 
saving balance while a reduction of petroleum investment 
expenditures explained the decline in private sector 
investment.®®
The current account yielded a large credit balance 
again this year, and the net gold and foreign exchange 
account rose.
Ill
The saving and investment items were not equated
35
Refer to Table II, page 198, and to the investment
figures given on page 199.
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in 1954. Table VIII, page 222, shows that investment 
exceeded saving by some 217 millions of bolivares. In 
order to close this investment gap, lending should have 
been inward or negative on balance. The flow of capital 
was in the right direction, but the amount was larger 
than that required to produce a saving-investment balance. 
The 544 millions of bolivares of negative lending created 
an excess of 127 millions of bolivares internally.
The internal condition as indicated in the above 
paragraph is similar to that of the preceding year except 
that in the current year the investment excess was larger 
and the capital inflow was greater.
Money and credit in circulation rose by 544 millions 
of bolivares, a sum larger than last year. This figure, 
added to the 127 millions of bolivares mentioned above 
created additional funds representing a maximum amount 
of 671.0 millions of bolivares. The figures seem to indi­
cate that monetary and fiscal policy should have been of 
a contractionist nature. Since such was not the case, 
prices should have risen. The average price did move 
upward but only to the relatively small extent of 2.7 
points.
The experience in the external sector was very much 
different from that of last year, 1955. This year imports 
were greater than exports by a small amount, only 15
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millions of bolivares* The import balance would lead one 
to believe that lending should be negative, that is that 
an inflow of capital should take place. The movement of 
capital was in the right direction in order to close the 
import gap. However, the capital movement was larger 
than that required to balance the external accounts. The 
excess totaled 329 millions of bolivares (344 - 15).
The external excess was accounted for in the balance 
of payments, including the foreign exchange reserve, in 
the following manner: gold moved inward to the extent of 
101 millions of bolivares, donations indicated an outward 
flow of funds of about 72 millions of bolivares, while 
foreign exchange holdings declined by 97 millions of boli­
vares. The errors and omissions item made up the remain­
ing debit balance of 261 millions of bolivares.
In conclusion, the year 1954 witnessed an invest­
ment excess. Lending, vdiich moved in the direction neces­
sary for closing the apparent investment gap, was too 
great. The result was a surplus of funds. Money and 
credit in circulation rose and further contributed to the 
supply of spendable funds.
The small import surplus which called for an inflow 
of capital resulted in a continued imbalance because the 
inward movement of capital was larger than that required
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to create an Import-export balance.5®
The gold and foreign exchange account remained 
nearly constant. The receipt of gold representing 101 
millions of bolivares and the loss of foreign exchange 
amounting to 97 millions of bolivares created a net accumu­
lation of 4 millions of bolivares.
Although money and credit in circulation rose, the 
national product increased by a larger amount (1,380 
millions of bolivares). Investment expenditures of earlier 
years continued to produce more real capital. Of particu­
lar importance in the present year was the expansion in 
private sector investment. The figures shown on page 199 
reveal that private and national enterprises increased 
their investment expenditures by more than 200 millions 
of bolivares. Furthermore, saving on the part of both 
the private and public sectors showed improvement*
The price level which rose by a few points resulted 
from the pressures exerted by the additional money and 
credit in circulation and the time interval required to 
produce goods and services.
IV
The year 1955 produced an abrupt variation in the
36Total exports did not decline. However, the 
rise of imports accompanied by greater current investment 
(income) payments were largely responsible for the current 
account debit balance.
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domestic sector. Table VIII, page 222, shows that invest­
ment was larger than saving by 1,572 millions of bolivares. 
Negative lending (borrowing) would have been required to 
close this large investment gap. Nevertheless, rthe flow 
of capital was outward by 12 millions of bolivares. Lend­
ing contributed, therefore, to the already large invest­
ment surplus which now approached the figure of 1,584 
millions of bolivares.
The expansive effect of investment and lending 
would seem to emphasize the necessity of a contractionist 
monetary and fiscal policy. Yet, money and credit in 
circulation rose by 472.6 millions of bolivares.^ Never­
theless, the rise was not exceptionally large in com­
parison to the investment surplus. Furthermore, the 
price level increased by less than one point.
Externally, exports were in excess of Imports by 
166 millions of bolivares. The directional movement of 
lending, that is, an outflow of capital, was in the proper 
direction to close the export gap. However, positive 
lending amounted to only 12 millions of bolivares. There 
was, therefore, a net accumulation in the external sector 
amounting to 154 millions of bolivares (166 - 12).
Movements of foreign exchange and changes In the
37See Money and Credit of Venezuela, Appendix A,
p. 279.
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remaining balance of payments accounts offset the external 
accumulation mentioned in the preceding paragraph. To sum 
up these movements: donations indicated an outflow of 
capital to the extent of 76 millions of bolivares. Foreign 
exchange rose by approximately 145 millions of bolivares, 
while errors and omissions absorbed the remaining 223 
millions of bolivares.
The year 1955 was one of marked changes which may 
cause a good deal of concern in the future. The most 
noticeable changes occurred in the domestic sector, which 
began with a large investment excess. Money and credit 
in circulation rose too. The price level was not 
responsive because of the constant accumulation of real 
capital which was made possible by reason of prior 
expenditures in both the private and public sectors. 
However, the current year investment expenditures of the 
national government rose quite sharply (see page 199).
In addition, the large rise of private investment expendi­
tures was forthcoming primarily from the national enter­
prises.^® The expenditures of these two bodies normally 
require a certain time interval before real capital is 
realized. This reasoning tends to explain why there 
existed a large investment gap in the current year.
*ZQ
^°Refer to the discussion of this subject matter 
on pages 200-201.
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Nevertheless, the 775 millions of bolivares increase in 
the national product was larger than the rise of money and 
credit in circulation.
Another point to keep in mind Is the fact that 
total saving declined in 1955. Even though private saving 
rose, public sector saving fell to a greater extent than 
the rise of the former (refer to Table II, page 198).
The excess of exports over imports presented a 
more normal occurrence. Although the export balance was 
not exceptionally large, it did contribute to the net 
accumulation within the gold-foreign exchange account.
The rise in the export price index to 132.5 from the 1950 
base year was partially responsible for the credit balance 
In the current account.
V
Unfortunately, the year 1956 does not present a
-zq
complete picture of events. ■ Internally, Investment was 
larger than saving by some 1,519 millions of bolivares.
This figure, though somewhat smaller than that of the pre­
ceding year, indicates the continuation of domestic spend­
ing. However, the expansion of money and credit in circu­
lation amounting to 100.6 millions of bolivares was a good
3 9 Information which was not available includes the 
capital account (lending) figures, the amount and direction 
of unilateral payments (donations), and the balancing 
account figure— errors and omissions.
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deal less than that of 1 9 5 5 . Also, the national product 
increased by approximately 814 millions of bolivares.
The estimated rise of private and public investment 
expenditures revealed the exceptionally large participation 
on the part of the government and national enterprises. 
Nevertheless, private firms were found to be expanding at 
a rapid pace too.4-1-
In the external sector, exports exceeded imports by 
about 362.8 millions of bolivares. This excess is greater 
than that of any prior year with the exception of 1952.
Since both saving and investment increased during 
the year, it is quite evident that money and credit at the 
end of the year would have been larger than that given at 
the end of the first four months. No doubt the gold and 
foreign exchange holdings of Venezuela rose by the year's 
end.
Having completed the survey of the state of inter­
national equilibrium, a few statements by way of conclusion 
may be given.
The national product of Venezuela rose in every 
year included In this study. Investment (A) exceeded
40This figure includes money and credit through the 
month of April only.
41Refer to pages 196-197 for a discussion of the 
expansion of investment on the part of private enterprises.
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saving (S) in four of the five years, while exports were 
greater than imports during every year except one.
Lending, as a balancing factor, failed to equate 
either the internal factors of saving and investment or 
the external accounts of imports and exports.
Money and credit in circulation Increased some 
2,029 millions of bolivares during the period under study. 
Nevertheless, the rise of the national product was of a 
greater magnitude, showing an increase of 5,726 millions 
of bolivares.
The above statement serves to explain, in part, 
why the average price level rose only 5*9 points through­
out the period.
Total saving and investment rose generally during 
the five years. Saving faltered in two years, 1955 and 
1955, while investment declined only in 1953.
The large investment excesses created during the 
last two years may pose a future problem for monetary and 
fiscal policy. In addition, the inflow of funds (lending) 
tended to create an even greater imbalance in the domestic 
and external sectors in some of the years. The normal 
inflow of capital contributed somewhat to the rise in the 
national product and partially to a larger supply of funds 
in circulation.
The preceding analysis has revealed many of the
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changes that have occurred within Venezuela during the 
last five years. Although many of the problems have been 
mentioned, the following section is to deal primarily 
with the means employed to cope with these problems via 
monetary and fiscal policy and external policy.
II. SOME OBSERVATIONS ON INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL POLICY
The Venezuelan economy which represents a typical 
export economy is a good deal more complex than is perhaps 
realized. The reason for the apparent complexity from the 
standpoint of short-term stability is found in the numerous 
elements which play such an important role in determining 
the direction in which the economy is moving at a given 
time.
Incorporated within the private and public sectors 
there is the influence exerted upon the economy by the 
petroleum industry. Furthermore, the influence of the 
national entities must be given recognition. It is also 
realized that a country so dependent upon the external 
sector must be able to deal immediately with changes 
occasioned by the desires of other nations. This is a 
fundamental problem of all nations which depend to a large 
extent upon the -world markets for a sizeable portion of 
their trade and income.
The dependence upon one industry for a relatively
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large portion of the country1s total export trade and 
national income further subjects that country to a more 
serious problem than if there were several industries to 
absorb external shocks. This is a current problem faced 
by Venezuela. In addition, the single industry dominating 
the external sector of Venezuela creates internal reper­
cussions. In other words, not only is the public sector 
dependent upon the petroleum industry for a large part of 
its income, but the private sector also feels the shock 
caused by the variations in the oil industry’s production 
and exportation.
The autonomous entities mentioned at an earlier 
stage (see pages 188-18S) must co-operate with fiscal 
policy measures in order to assure success of their imple­
mentation.48 It is not an easy task to obtain the full 
co-operation of these institutions, especially since they 
have separate identities and are not subject to laws bind­
ing them to measures Implemented by the National Treasury.
It is contended that fiscal, policy has been applied 
to a far greater extent than has monetary policy to main­
tain economic stability in Venezuela. According to one 
report, fiscal policy is heavily relied upon to provide
4% o r  a description of these institutions see the 
United Nations, Department of Economic Affairs, Public 
Finance Surveys: Venezuela (New York: United Nations 
Publication, 1951), pp. 22-27.
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both short-term and long rim stability.4^ It should be of 
some importance, therefore, to analyze the essential roles 
played by monetary and fiscal policy in this more recent 
period.
A. Monetary Policy
The Central Bank of Venezuela enjoys most of the 
powers attributed to such a bank. In Venezuela the Bank 
Is the sole issuer of money, acts as a depository for the 
government, and possesses the ability to control, in certain 
respects, the supply of money and credit in circulation.
There is, no doubt, a closer relation between the 
national government and the banking system in Venezuela 
than in the United States since the government of the 
former nation owns one-half of the capital stock of the 
Bank^
The Central Bank has the authority to adjust discount 
and rediscount rates. It may advise the Executive Depart­
ment with respect to changes in reserve requirements of the 
commercial banks. However, open market operation is not 
an important method of monetary control so far as the
A  IZ
°Juan Sarda, "Monetary and Fiscal Policy and the 
Balance of Payments In Venezuela," Inter-American Economic 
Affairs. Autumn, 1951, pp. 62-63.
^United States Department of Commerce, Investment 
in Venezuela, p. 84.
Central Bank is concerned.
The Bank cannot make direct loans to the national
government, and it cannot acquire securities or other
obligations of the latter body except those quoted in the 
45market. In other words, the government rather than the 
Central Bank utilizes these securities in order to influence 
the market.
At the end of 1955 there were 27 commercial banks 
in Venezuela. Fifteen of these were located in Caracas 
while the remaining twelve were scattered throughout the 
country.46
The law requires commercial banks to keep a 15 per 
cent reserve behind sight deposits and an 8 per cent 
reserve behind time deposits. In addition, one-third of 
the required reserves must be on deposit with the Central 
Bank. Other Important limitations include the following:4?
(1) Total obligations not supported by special funds 
or guarantees may not be larger than six times 
the paid-in eapital and reserves.
(2) Holdings of foreign exchange and foreign securi­
ties may not be greater than 10 per cent of the 
paid-in capital and reserves.
46Venezuelan Embassy, Venezuela Up-to-date. 
(November, 1952), p. 4.
A £?
Central Bank of Venezuela, Memoria. p. 220.
4?A more comprehensive coverage of commercial bank 
activities may be found in the United States Department 
of Commerce, Investment in Venezuela, pp. 84-85.
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(5) Loans cannot extend beyond two years in duration 
while advances and discounts are limited to one 
year, and so on.
The dependence of a nation upon monetary policy
as exercised through the Central Bank requires a certain
amount of liquidity on the part of the Bank. The legal
reserve of the Central Bank of Venezuela cannot be less
than 50 per cent of its demand obligations.4® The figures
below indicate that the reserves averaged 92.6 per cent
of the current obligations for the five-year period.4®
Current Legal reserve Actual Actual reserve
obligations requirement—  reserve of as a % of
50% of current Central current
obligations Bank obligations
1952 1,423.7 711.85 1,326.7 93.2
1953 1,564.8 782.40 1,462.7 93.5
1954 1,625.3 812.65 1,453.7 89.4-
1955 1,744.9 872.45 1,606.9 92.1
1956(May) 2,011,7 1,005.85 1,892.6 94.8
One other interesting comparison may be made for
the sake of revealing the degree of liquidity of the Bank.
The following figures, in millions of bolivares, show the
ratio of gold to notes in circulation:80
48Ibid.. p. 84.
4®See the Central Bank of Venezuela, Memoria. 1955, 
Part IV, Statistical Charts, Chart A-II, and the Bulletin. 
May, 1956, p. 2. This information is also presented in 
the Balance Sheet of the Central Bank of Venezuela, 
Appendix E, p.
5®Refer to the Central Bank of Venezuela, Memoria. 
1955, Part IV, Statistical Charts, Charts A-I and A-II, 
and the Bulletin. May, 1956, pp. 1-2.
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Notes in Gold Gold as a %
circulation reserve of notes in 
circulation
1952 1,000.3 1,140.8 114.1
1953 1,041.1 1,140.8 109.6
1954 1,121.3 1,233.0 110.0
1955 1,154.1 1,233.6 106.9
1956(May) 1,063.9 1,233.5 115.9
The total gold reserve has not fallen below 106.9 
per cent of the total note circulation for the period 
covered by this survey. The above calculations emphasize 
not only the extreme liquidity of the Central Bank but 
also a good deal of conservatism on the part of the 
officials. The point is, however, that the Bank has main­
tained a high degree of liquidity with the aid of which 
it should have been able to direct a flexible monetary 
policy in such a way as to help provide for stability 
within the economy.
The reliance placed upon the Central Bank in the 
interest of stability in the domestic economy created by 
changes in the external sector may be expressed in terms 
of the variations of gold and foreign exchange as compared 
to changes in the money supply and credit extended by 
banks. The following figures (in millions of bolivares) 
show that during the first two years (1952-1953) gold and 
foreign exchange holdings rose some 328,5 millions of 
bolivares.^ On the other hand, money in circulation and
Cl
xSee Money and Credit of Venezuela, Appendix A,
242
bank credit increased to a maximum figure of 919.5
millions of bolivares. This latter figure is well over
double the amount of the external earnings.
Change in gold and Change of money Change in 
foreign exchange hold- in circulation commercial 
ings— Central Bank bank credit
1952 201.8 4 263.4 4 189.2 4
1953 126.7 4 166.5 4 300.4 4
1954 5.9 — 103.9 + 368.1 4
1955 158.9 4 241.3 4 300.4 4
1956 281.9(April) 4 2.B(April) 4 85.0(April) 4
In 1954 gold and foreign exchange declined by about
5.9 millions of bolivares. Yet, money and credit rose by 
nearly the same yearly amount, that is, 472.0 millions of 
bolivares.
Once again, in 1955, external earnings increased 
approximately 158.9 millions of bolivares. The internal 
expansion, however, amounted to more than three times the 
rise of gold and foreign exchange earnings.
The incomplete data for 1956 indicate that the
281.9 millions of bolivares rise of gold and foreign 
exchange was accompanied by a relatively small increase 
of money and credit in circulation amounting to about 
87.2 millions of bolivares.
Although the above comparisons must take into con­
sideration other pertinent factors such as the change in
p. 279; and the Balance Sheet of the Central Bank of 
Venezuela, Appendix E, p. 285.
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national income, variations in the price level, and so on, 
the internal shocks caused by yearly vicissitudes in the 
external sector were not smoothed out by action of the 
Central Bank.
To substantiate the case, the rise of gold and 
foreign exchange in the years 1952 and 1953 should have 
been offset through a reduction of money and credit in 
circulation. One would further expect that the decline 
of gold and foreign exchange accumulations in 1954 would 
be counteracted by a small rise of money and credit in 
circulation. Nevertheless, money and credit rose by a 
larger amount than that in either of the two prior years.
In .addition, the increases of gold and foreign exchange 
holdings during 1955 and 1956 were accompanied not by a 
decline of money and credit in circulation, as one would 
think, but with a rise of the latter amounting to nearly 
one and one-half times the total gold and foreign exchange 
inflow.
The inflexibility with respect to the application 
of monetary controls is quite evident as one reviews the 
period. The information at hand does not indicate a change 
in reserve requirements over the five-year period, fhe 
rate applicable to discounts and advances was 2 per cent.52
52Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 
Federal Reserve Bulletin. April, 1957, p. 489.
i
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This rate has been in effect since 1947. However, one 
type of control exercised by the Bank revealed some flexi­
bility. The Central Bank granted loans to autonomous 
entities upon the presentation of collateral. The rates 
on these loans moved from 6.4 per cent in 1951 to 7 per 
cent in 1955.53
There are perhaps many reasons which help to explain 
the relatively inflexible nature of monetary policy as a 
short-term expedient contributing to economic stability. 
Some of the reasons are offered at this point. Apparently, 
the officials of the Bank were not free to alter the vari­
ous controls at their disposal. Instead, they had to 
recommend to the Executive their desire to make changes.
The ultimate decision was, however, in the hands of the 
Executive.
Again, since inflation had not been a pressing 
problem in Venezuela, the authorities may have felt that 
there was little reason to create a contractionist tendency. 
Furthermore, any suppressive action might have slowed down 
economic development. In terms of objectives, the latter 
held a key position.
No doubt it was felt that fiscal policy may be so 
implemented that it could provide for both economic
Central Bank of Venezuela, Memoria. p. 229.
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development and relative stability at the same time.
Before discussing some of the more important 
aspects of fiscal policy, a few comments should be made 
with respect to prices. As stated before, the price level 
of Venezuela, unlike those of many other countries, has not 
risen sharply. This is not to say, however, that prices 
were not high in the major cities. They were. The high 
price level was influenced primarily by the export 
(petroleum) industry on the one hand, and the relatively 
high prices paid for imports from the United States, and 
the internal shortage of many commodities on the other 
hand.
Wages and salaries of workers who were employed by
the oil companies compared favorably with those of workers
*54almost anywhere else in the world. Wage increases have 
>
been quite extensive in recent years. The last wage boost
attained in October, 1956, amounted to 10 per cent and
55affected approximately 51,000 oil workers.
The price of most commodities tended to keep abreast 
of the rising wage trend. A few examples of retail food
54The average direct wage for oil workers is about 
seven dollars per day. Fringe benefits bring the average 
total to nearly fifteen dollars per day. Refer to 
Venezuelan Embassy, Venezuela Up-to-date. (November, 1956), 
p. 16.
55Ibid.. p. 17.
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prices, although not current, will be sufficient:56
Meat Price
Tenderloin pound $1.30
Pork chops T I 1.20
Fruits and vegetables
Apples, imported each .15
Tomatoes, fresh pound .40
Carrots, fresh 11 .35
Dairy products
Butter, local pound 1.20
Eggs, fresh dozen 1.05
Eggs, imported 11 .90
Milk, pasteurized quart .30
Groceries
Bread pound loaf .30
Flour pound .20
Sugar r t .15
Canned goods
String beans, peas, carrots Wo. 2 can .75
Peaches, apricots, pears Wo. 2-2- can .90
Price indices were based largely upon prices in
Caracas, the capital, but sometimes included a few of the 
other large cities. Prices of most commodities, where 
available, were no doubt much lower as one proceeded into 
the interior of the country. In some sections barter was 
employed as a means of exchange.
One other aspect to consider in this section is that 
of savings of the general public.57 Savings deposits in
56United States Department of Commerce, Bureau of 
Foreign Commerce, Business Information Service: World Trade
Series (Washington: United States Printing Office)' ", June, 
1954, p. 8.
57There are no savings banks in Venezuela. Commercial
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commercial banks have been steadily rising, as the follow-
C O
ing figures show. °
Year Saving deposits
(in millions of bolivares)
1952 253.7
1953 321.0
1954 419.0
1955 584.4
1956(April) 635.2
Though the amounts are quite small, the increase of 
commercial bank savings deposits amounted to 170.9 per 
cent during the five-year period. Smaller amounts of sav­
ings were deposited with other institutions such as the 
Agriculture and Livestock Bank and the WorkerTs Bank.
The rise of savings deposits is encouraging. How­
ever, the figures above indicate that a relatively small 
portion of the population had funds available for saving.
Savings through the purchase of stocks and bonds
has been growing in recent years too. The securities 
exchange of Caracas began operations in 1947. The follow­
ing figures reveal the growing trend of securities trans­
actions.5®
and other kinds of banks provide saving facilities. See 
the United States Department of Commerce, Investment in 
Venezuela, p. 86.
5(3
°Central Bank of Venezuela, Memoria, 1955, Part IV, 
Statistical Charts, Chart B-IX, and the Bulletin. May,
1956, p. 3.
5®The figures for 1952 were taken from the United 
States Department of Commerce, Investment in Venezuela, 
p. 87, and the figures for 1955 were obtained from the 
Central Bank of Venezuela, Memoria. p. 238.
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Month Total Bonds Stocks
transactions 
(in thousands 
of holivares)
Sept., 1952 9.2 6.6 2.6
Sept., 1955 15.8 10.2 5.6
Security listings included those of the government, 
government guaranteed bonds, and securities of numerous 
enterprises. A comparison of stock and bond transactions 
is of particular importance. Bonds were traded to a far 
greater extent than were stocks. This relation suggests 
that government and government guaranteed obligations pre­
dominated on the market. Also, the smaller stock-trading 
showed that private firms were not being financed to the 
same extent as were the government and quasi-public enter­
prises. nonetheless, this outlet for savings was becoming 
more important as time passed. Its continued growth is 
essential for the expansion of privately owned firms.
B. Fiscal Policy
The two apparent objectives of fiscal policy are to 
encourage economic development and to maintain stability 
within the economy of the country. Since the utilization 
of monetary measures have not been very effective in recent 
years, an inquiry into the application of fiscal measures 
employed to carry out the aforementioned objectives will 
be undertaken.
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The taxation policy appears to have been applied 
for the purpose of producing mixed results. The tax law 
which applied to individuals and most firms was incorporated 
within a section called the Supplementary Tax. The tax 
rate applied varied from 1.5 per cent on taxable income up 
to 10,000 bolivares (approximately $3,000) and ascended to 
26 per cent on amounts earned in excess of 28,000,000 
bolivares (about $8,500,000).®^
The progressive nature of the income tax indicated 
the desire to extract only small sums from the large group 
of low income earners. The higher rates in the larger 
income groupings were for the purpose of diverting large 
sums previously invested in land holdings.
The normal tax contained in the Venezuelan tax 
structure applied to income obtained from exploiting hydro- 
carbons, refining, transportation, and so on. This levy 
was a major one and pertained to the petroleum industry.
The rate was a flat 2.5 per cent assessment on the net 
income derived from operations.
This tax seemed to be imposed for the purpose of 
maintaining a formidable contribution to the national 
budget. It also suggested an expected penalty imposed 
upon foreign owned firms.
60
Venezuelan Embassy, Venezuela Up-to-date. (July—  
August), 1956, p. 12.
61Ibid.. p. 11.
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A third major form of taxation was also associated 
with the oil industry. It was referred to as the Additional 
Tax. The idea behind its implementation was that of making 
sure that the government shared on an equal basis with the 
petroleum firms whenever there existed a taxable excess of 
the enterprises’ profits after the normal tax had been 
deducted.®2
Customs duties were levied primarily for protection, 
although the yield was quite high. Of the five groups of 
receipts contributing to the income of the national govern­
ment, customs duties ranked third.63 Rates were low on the 
importation of machines, equipment, and some foodstuffs 
while the charges were extremely high on import competing 
products.
Other forms of taxation included the Inheritance 
tax and commodity taxes imposed upon cigarettes, liquors, 
matches, and other such commodities.
The ability of the government to make large expendi­
tures and yet create a balanced budget depends to a great 
extent upon the revenue obtained from the petroleum industry. 
The figures which follow (in millions of bolivares) empha­
size the importance of the oil industry in. providing revenue
62Ibid.. p. 13
g*Z
See the Receipts and Expenditures of the National 
Government of Venezuela, Appendix B, p. 280.
for the Treasury.
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Item 1955 1954 1955
Surface tax and royalties 826.4 904.5 1,034.4
Income tax 593.7 507.1 585.1
Customs duties 65.7 60.6 65.3
Others 112.0 25.7 29.3
Total 1,597.8 1,497.9 1,714.1
The total of the itemized taxes compared to total
fiscal income of the government yields the following
results:
Year Total govern- Revenue derived Revenue of
ment receipts from petroleum petroleum industry
industry as % of total
government receipts
1953 2,533.5 1,597.8 63.1
1954 2,631.9 1,497.9 56.9
1955 2,994.9 1,714.1 57.2
These figures clearly reveal the dependence of the 
Treasury upon a single export industry. It is no wonder 
that economic development was a major objective of the 
authorities. Even though the oil industry carried on most 
of its trade with the United States, a recession or 
depression, or even a change in the tariff in the latter 
country could have created a serious depression in Venezuela, 
A three-year period is almost too short a time 
period to make fully satisfactory comparisons; however, it 
may be possible to explain changes in the national budget 
which were caused by variations of oil revenues. The 
budget balancing figures were taken from Appendix B, page
^Central Bank of Venezuela, Memoria. p. 206
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280, and are expressed in millions of bolivares.
Year Revenue derived from Budget receipt-
the petroleum industry expenditure balance 
(4 surplus)
1953 1,597.8 128.6 4
1954 1,497.9 39.1 +
1955 1,417.1 153.6 f
1956 ---- 10.0 -
There is a direct correlation between the changes in 
petroleum revenue and those of the receipt-expenditure 
balance. Of course, there are many items composing the 
expenditures of the government, and their variations have 
helped to bring about changes of the balancing figures; 
nevertheless, it seems reasonable to state that changes in 
petroleum revenues were one of the dominant causes of the 
variations in the surplus of the national government 
accounts.
The decline of petroleum revenue in 1954 amounting 
to 99.9 millions of bolivares was accompanied by a receipt 
over expenditure balance which was 89.5 millions of boli­
vares less than in 1953. Again in 1955, petroleum revenues 
fell by 80.8 millions of bolivares. The budget receipt 
balance rose that year, however, by 114.5 millions of boli­
vares. Yet, at the end of 1956 budget figures reveal an 
expenditure balance of 10.0 millions of bolivares. It 
appears reasonable, therefore, that the declining oil 
revenues influenced the downward trend of the budget 
balances.
£53
The changes in oil revenues and total expenditures 
tended to relate the indirect importance of the petroleum 
Industry to economic development. Reduced exports of 
petroleum would create the necessity of finding a new 
financial source for a portion of the economic development 
program. The ever-present threat of such necessity may 
he, in part, the reason why the tax structure of Venezuela 
has been more varied than that of many other under­
developed nations.
Government deposits in the Gentral Rank were 
employed for the purpose of counteracting the increase in 
currency and credit in circulation. The deposits con­
sisted of revenues derived from the petroleum industry, 
along with other sources mentioned above. The government 
created a special deposit reserve which consisted of a 
portion of its total deposit set aside in the Bank. The 
special deposit reserve tended to monetize a part of the 
total deposit. As money and credit in circulation changed, 
the government varied the size of its special reserve fund. 
The figures for the various years are presented along with 
the variations of currency in circulation.66 All the 
figures are expressed in millions of bolivares.
65See the Central Bank of Venezuela, Memoria. 1955,
p. 300, and the Bulletin. May> 1956, p. 2.
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Year Change of currency Government special
in circulation reserve deposits
in Central Bank
1952 77*9 + ----
1953 25.4 + --
1954 60.0 + 19.5
1955 51.5 + 108.5
1956(April) 76.5 - 108.3
The emission of hills and coins have been quite 
moderate; yet, the rise has been constant during the last 
five years. Although special reserve deposit figures were 
unobtainable for the years 1952 and 1953, the intent of 
the government is quite clear. The figure of 19.5 millions 
of bolivares in 1954 represented one-half of the Treasury 
surplus. This meant that the government monetized, in 
effect, that portion of the surplus to counteract the 
emission of bills and coins.
The special reserve deposit balance at the end of 
1955 was 108.5 millions of bolivares. This increase was 
considerably in excess of the rise of currency in circu­
lation. Furthermore, the decline of bills and coins in 
circulation as of April, 1956, was not occasioned by a 
reduction of the special reserve fund. The latter rose 
slightly.
The increase of the special reserve deposit in the 
last two years (1955-1956) may be explained in terms of 
the rise of credit rather than changes of currency in 
circulation.
It appears, therefore, that variations of government
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deposit reserves are part of a program to provide for 
stability on the one hand and to allow for economic develop­
ment with moderate amounts of money and credit on the other. 
This particular device could not, by itself, achieve much 
success should the petroleum industry earnings decline 
abruptly.
Furthermore, a large expansion of expenditures in 
one or more areas would tend to drain away both the official 
and special reserve deposits. This may be occurring at the 
present time. It was found that government investment 
expenditures principally for development rose sharply in 
1955 and 1956 (see Table II, page 198). Because actual 
expenditures may not be encountered for a short period of 
time, government deposits and the budget surpluses con­
tinued to rise. Yet, the large deposit balance in the 
Central Bank at the end of 1956 may start to decline in 
the following year. This movement seems to prevail in the 
case of the special reserve fund which declined from 108.8 
millions of bolivares in April, 1956 to 72.6 millions of 
bolivares at the end of May of the same year. In 
addition, the surplus balance in the national accounts of 
the prior years turned into a deficit balance at the end 
of 1956. The point is that Increased government spending
86
Refer to the Central Bank of Venezuela, Bulletin.
May, 1956, p. 2.
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will prevent deposits and reserves in the Central Bank 
from acting as a buffer against changes of money and credit 
in circulation.
The autonomous entities are of special importance in 
helping to achieve the developmental goals of the nation.®? 
Nevertheless, they could pose a serious threat to economic 
stability.
During the period of this study, the national 
product has been constantly rising. Expansion in all 
sectors, though uneven, has been upward. Therefore, there 
is little opportunity to test the probable course of action 
which would have been taken by these entities if economic 
conditions presented violent fluctuations. Nevertheless, 
some important comments may be made concerning the autono­
mous entities.1
It would probably have been impossible for the 
national government to stimulate economic development toward 
its present stage unless a deficit had accrued in one or 
more of the years considered in this survey.
f?7Autonomous entities are government owned enter­
prises. Their legal existence allows them to possess 
property and to finance themselves by selling securities 
In their own name. In addition, the Treasury has no control 
over their income and expenditures. Some examples of autono­
mous entitles include the Venezuelan Development Corporation, 
the Agricultural and Livestock Bank, the State Railways 
Administration, the National Sanitation Institute, and the 
Venezuelan Navigational Company. Refer to the United States 
Department of Commerce, Investment in Venezuela. 1955, p. 82.
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The autonomous enterprises engaged, however, in 
development projects which tended to reduce the need for 
national government expenditures in this area except for 
guarantee obligations. These obligations accounted for 
the indirect debt of the government. The following figures 
indicate the rising trend of financing undertaken by the 
autonomous entities.®® The government guaranteed debt 
consisting of mortgages and bonds increased in 1955 from 
between 2 to 5 times the 1952 level.
Year Government guaranteed obligations
(in millions of bolivares)
1952(June) 157.1
1954 461.1
1955 671.5
Hundreds of investors and perhaps thousands of 
workers are directly connected with the numerous enter­
prises. Should a sizeable depression occur, workers wrould 
probably suffer unemployment. The government could proba­
bly pay off its guarantee responsibilities if it were 
forced to, but if the issues of these obligations continue 
to rise at the present rate a later depression may cause 
deficit financing on a broad scale. Furthermore, should 
inflation develop, the cost of selling securities involved
in this financing would rise. In such event, the govern­
ment would probably be left holding the inflated securities.
68Refer to the United States Department of Commerce, 
Investment in Venezuela. 1955, p. 85, and the Central Bank 
of Venezuela, Memoria. 1955, p. 211.
258
The numerous and varied development projects 
carried on directly through the autonomous entities would 
seem to interfere, to some extent, with private enter­
prises. It is difficult to appraise the extent of this 
interference accurately. However, it would be interest­
ing to see if a private firm could successfully carry on 
the activities of one of the autonomous enterprises. The 
Development Corporation of Venezuela has been boldly offer­
ing its holdings to private firms. A fairly recent 
announcement states that 11. . . i t  will sell all holdings, 
cos. Cc o m p a n i e s ^ , farms owned by it if they can be
better developed by private capital or do not satisfy the 
needs of economic development. . . .
Since these autonomous entities are not accountable 
to the Treasury or other ministry for their receipts and 
expenditures, it would probably be difficult to make com­
parisons between the operations of such enterprises and 
those of privately owned firms.
The basic criteria for judging the benefit received 
from autonomous enterprises is based upon long-term develop­
ment and the utilization of economic resources. At this 
early stage of development almost any type of activity 
would be beneficial to the nation. However, as time
Ui7Council for Inter-American Cooperation, Inc., 
Noticias, November 15, 1955, p. 4.
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elapses, cost differences will make their importance 
known.
Development through private firms constantly changes 
as cost and price varies. In this respect, private firms 
would tend automatically to develop the nation based upon 
comparative costs and prices. The later consequences of 
making accurate decisions now must depend upon the action 
of those who are responsible for setting the policy of the 
autonomous entities.
A balanced budget is essential not only for foster­
ing economic development but as a stimulant to private 
sector expansion. Venezuelans budget surpluses in the 
first four years of the five-year period, abundant credit, 
and a high but relatively stable price level, have all 
aided in creating an atmosphere conducive to economic 
expansion. There is little wonder as to why private sector 
investment expenditures— national enterprises included—  
have approximately doubled (see page 199) during the period 
covered in this study. Furthermore, bank savings and 
security purchases on the part of the public were expanding 
at a favorable rate.
In summarizing this section on monetary and fiscal 
policy one must keep in mind the fact that the economy was 
In a state of progression throughout the period. This 
setting has not been very conducive to an analysis which
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is intended to suggest the immediate steps necessary for 
remedying certain unfavorable influences such as a 
depression.
Although most of the usual controls employed by the 
banking system existed within the structure of the Venezuelan 
banking system, there has been much apathy with respect to 
their utilization. The absence of a powerful tool, open 
market operations, appears to have reduced the effective­
ness of monetary policy. In addition, reserve requirements 
and loan and discount rates were held rigid throughout the 
period. Even though currency in circulation rose moder­
ately, credit expanded about 18 per cent during the last 
two years of the period.
The requirement that the Central Bank officials must 
seek the approval of the Executive before they are able to 
implement policy changes seemed to reduce the effectiveness 
of monetary policy.
The liquidity of the Central Bank is unquestioned; 
therefore, it has been in a position to deal with short­
term shocks created either at home or abroad. Neverthe­
less, the reliance upon stability and economic development 
appeared to be a manifestation of fiscal policy.
Various taxes were Imposed in Venezuela during this 
period, but the revenue secured from the petroleum firms 
was the most important source of tax income.
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The new tax law which went into effect in 1956 
altered only slightly the existent rates; nevertheless, it 
did produce a simplification of the tax structure.
The income derived from the petroleum industry has 
helped to make possible budget surpluses. A comparison of 
the changes of petroleum revenues and variations of the 
national budget balances showed the extent of the reper­
cussions in the public sector attributed to the single 
export industry.
Government deposits and special reserve funds in 
the Central Bank were used as stabilizing factors. As 
currency in circulation and credit rose the government 
monetized funds by increasing its official deposits and 
special reserve funds, particularly the latter.
The possibility of inflation which was evident in 
the last two years of the survey was not offset through 
increased deposit reserves in 1956. Instead, the govern­
ment increased its investment expenditures and thereby con­
tributed to the expansion. The decline of the special 
deposit fund and the budget deficit were evidence of the 
above fact.
The autonomous entities played a crucial role in 
economic development. Their existence, however, could 
cause a special problem for fiscal policy. Government 
guaranteed obligations of these enterprises were expanding
26S
rapidly. If the trend continues and a depression or 
serious inflation sets in, the government may he required 
either to make good its guarantee or absorb these securi­
ties .
The autonomous enterprises rather than private enter­
prises seemed to direct economic development. This 
responsibility is a grave one since the manner in which 
they encourage or discourage the various industries will 
determine whether or not the nation will make the best use 
of its resources.
Private industry was assigned an Important part in 
the development of the nation. The surpluses accumulated' 
in the national budget produced a stimulative effect upon 
privately owned firms. This effect was quite pronounced 
as private investment expenditures increased over the 
five-year period.
C. External Policy
In Chapter I of this paper it states that there is
only one income level at each exchange rate that would
assure international equilibrium, given the rate of lending
70and the influence of monetary and fiscal factors. This 
statement suggests that the market forces would bring about
70Refer to Chapter I, p. 24.
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the desired exchange through the operation of a freely 
fluctuating exchange rate system.
It also explains in Chapter I that some of the 
authorities who support the modern theory of international 
trade accept the proposition that it is justifiable for a 
nation to apply controls in the export sector in order to 
carry out Internal adjustments of a short run nature.^
The exchange rate system of Venezuela did not appear 
to support either of the two concepts presented above. The 
multiple exchange rate system operated by that country 
differed from a freely fluctuating system. Yet, the 
exchange control authorities did not rigidly control the 
application of exchange to the external sector. The 
following explanation of the exchange rate system will make 
this distinction more clear.
For the purpose of technical classification, 
Venezuela employed a multiple exchange rate system. 
Practically speaking, the exchange rates were not employed 
for the purpose of controlling the balance of payments.
The official exchange rate was established at 3.35
72bolivares to one United States dollar. This rate
ibid., pp. 32-33, and footnote 24.
72The technical material explaining the exchange 
rate system was taken from the following sources: United 
States Department of Commerce, Investment in Venezuela.
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prevailed throughout the five-year period. All exports 
were consummated, however, at a rate of 3.35 bolivares per 
United States dollar except those of petroleum, coffee, 
and cocoa.
Petroleum exporters converted their foreign exchange 
earnings into bolivares at a rate of 3.09 bolivares per 
dollar. This rate was effective in amounts up to a limit 
which was equal to the Central Bank’s sales of foreign 
exchange during any one year. A lower rate of 3.046 boli­
vares per dollar was received by the oil companies for 
conversions of foreign exchange into bolivares which were 
in excess of the Central Bank’s sales of foreign exchange 
during the year.
The exchange rate for coffee and cocoa exports was 
3.33 bolivares per dollar with the provision that, should 
world prices decline by a certain amount, the coffee rate 
would rise to 4.80 bolivares to the dollar.
The exchange rate for cocoa was also pegged. If the 
world price fell below the fixed rate, cocoa exporters 
would receive 4.25 bolivares for every dollar surrendered 
to the Bank. On the other hand, if the world price rose 
above the fixed rate, cocoa exporters would receive 3.33
pp. 90-91 and 97-98; International Monetary Fund, Seventh 
Annual Report on Exchange Restrictions. 1956, pp. 339-341; 
and the Venezuelan Embassy. Venezuela Up-to-date. (May, 
1957), p. 11.
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bolivares per dollar.
The premium rate for coffee ranged from 112.00 per 
bag for inferior, unwashed coffee to $18,00 per bag for 
fine grade, washed coffee. In a similar manner, the 
premium rate was applied to cocoa exports if world prices 
fell below $29.00 per bag.
The exchange rate system also allowed for a partial 
premium payment should world prices for coffee range from 
$18,00 to $50.50. At prices above the latter figure no 
premium was allowed. In the case of cocoa, a partial 
premium was allowed if world prices for this commodity 
varied between $29.00 and $59.00. At higher world prices 
no premium was given. The cocoa exporters received the 
premium rate only during 1952 and 1955 while coffee 
exporters did not receive any premium between 1952 and 
1956.
An export tax was applied to both coffee and cocoa 
whenever the world price rose above the fixed rates. This 
tax revenue along with a portion of the export tax levied 
on petroleum was used to subsidize coffee and cocoa growers.
On the selling side of the market, the Central Bank 
made foreign exchange available to importers and others 
who had payments to make at the official rate of 5.35 
bolivares to the dollar. The only exception to this rate 
was allowed in the case of purchases of foreign exchange
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by the government from the Bank. The rate for government 
purchases was 3.09 bolivares per dollar.
All purchases and sales of foreign exchange were 
carried on without restriction except that the petroleum 
companies were required to surrender their foreign exchange 
to the Central Bank.
Purchases and sales of foreign exchange between 
the Central and commercial banks were at a rate of 3.335 
bolivares per dollar. The commercial banks (free market) 
purchased exchange from the public at 3.33 bolivares to 
the dollar and sold exchange to individuals at 3.35 boli­
vares per dollar.
This multiple exchange rate system of Venezuela 
produced various results. Most foreign exchange trans­
actions were accomplished without restriction. In addition, 
the general buying and selling rates were extremely narrow 
(3.33 to 3.35 bolivares to the dollar). These features 
are characteristic of a freely fluctuating exchange rate 
system in which there are no restrictions and the buying 
and selling rates are nearly identical.
On the other hand, the exchange rate system 
resembles an exchange control system with different rates 
and compulsive sales of the bulk of foreign exchange enter­
ing the country. However, this situation applied only to 
the oil companies.
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The pegging of exchange rates in terms of world 
prices Is a practice which one may expect to find within a 
strict exchange control system for the purpose of stimu­
lating certain industries. In Venezuela that practice 
was limited to only two products. Furthermore, the high 
world prices in recent years resulted in little use of 
the pegging process.
The application of some fiscal policy measures was 
evident in the operation of the multiple exchange rate 
system. Export taxes were applied in order to subsidize 
certain favored commodities for export (coffee and cocoa). 
Also, the government (through the Central Bank) realized 
additional revenues from the difference between the price 
of its purchases of foreign exchange from the petroleum 
firms (3.09 and 3.046 bolivares per dollar) and its sales
of foreign exchange to the commercial banks and others
(3.335 and 3.35).
From a monetary standpoint, the Central Bank was 
assured a constant source of supply of foreign exchange, 
since the petroleum firms were forced to sell their 
exchange to this one institution in order to satisfy 
their local currency needs. Consequently, the Bank not 
only acquired foreign exchange, but it obtained its hold­
ings at a low rate of exchange.
The official and free rates of exchange were
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maintained throughout the five-year period of this study.
It does not appear that Venezuela’s multiple exchange rate 
system was employed for the purpose of controlling the 
external sector. As was mentioned earlier in this study, 
the country has no balance of payments problem as such.
Of course, there would be a serious problem if the 
petroleum industry were to lose its dominant position. 
However, the exchange rate system seemed to be used for 
the purpose of aiding internal stability.
The question may be posed: how important was the 
external sector to the development of the nation over the 
ensuing five-year period? A partial answer to this 
question has already been given in various sections of 
this chapter. For example, it was found that the domestic 
sector could not maintain the given levels of national 
production and income without the contribution of the 
external sector* Furthermore, internal sector develop­
ment depended primarily upon export income. Finally, it 
was shown that the financial stability of the country was 
contingent upon the activities in the external sector.
A few more points bearing upon an answer to the 
question stated above may be added to those already given. 
The relatively favorable international standing of Venezuela 
made it possible for the country to receive outside capital. 
More important still, the nation could perhaps make use of
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additional foreign investments in order to develop the 
country more rapidly.
The following figures specifically indicate, in 
millions of bolivares, the relative size of export income 
in relation to the national product. The export income 
constituted a formidable contribution to the national
7 ,z
product.' The overwhelming portion of export income 
consisted of exports of the petroleum industry.
Year
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
The above calculations help to explain why the year 
1955 was less prosperous then the remaining four years.
It may be recalled that the national product rose by its 
smallest amount in 1953 (757 millions of bolivares). This 
was the only year included in the survey in which both 
saving and investment declined. The larger portion of the 
smaller total saving was attributed to the private sector. 
Even though public sector investment rose, the fall of 
private sector investment was more pronounced. Further­
more, the petroleum industry was responsible for the
National Export Export income
product income as % of
national product 
36.4
\j (<, 35.9
15,507 5,604 36.1
16,282 6,374 39.1
1 rt nc ta  rt 1 q o
13,370 4,865
14,127 5,072
5,604
6
17,096 7,192 42.1
73See the International Monetary Fund, International 
Financial Statistics. January, 1957.
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74reduced investment expenditures.
The figures clearly reveal that the rise of export 
income in the year 1953, 207 millions of "bolivares, was 
the smallest realized during the period. In other words, 
the failure of the petroleum companies to increase domestic 
investment was influenced somewhat by the smaller expansion 
of export earnings. In addition, the smaller increase of 
export income contributed to the smaller rise of the 
national product at the end of the year. This finding is 
evident from the percentage figure (35.9), page 269, repre­
senting the relationship between the increases of export 
income and the national product of 1953 and those of the 
other four years.
Imports are vital to the country from the stand­
point of both consumption and capital expansion. Accord­
ing to figures taken from an official source, capital 
goods imports averaged about 64 per cent of total commodity 
imports. The following figures indicate the percentage 
division between consumption and capital goods imported 
during the four-year period (1952-1955).75
74
Refer to Table II, page 198, and the discussion 
which follows.
^See the Central Bank of Venezuela, Memoria, 1955,
p. 145.
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Year Capital Imports as % Consumption goods as % 
of total commodity of total commodity
imports imports
1952 64.1 35.5
1953 64.5 35.1
1954 65.1 33.7
1955 64.9 34.5
The small remainder in each instance consisted of 
imports by the Federal Government. The figures reveal 
small differences in relative imports between the two 
groups of commodities. However, the larger portion con­
stituted vital capital goods which seemed to be in keep­
ing with the major objective of economic development.
The final comments in this area will pertain to 
the terms of trade of Venezuela, This would seem proper 
because the terras of trade relate to many influences, 
internal and external, which are brought together and 
connoted by a single expression.
Although*figures were unavailable for the last 
year of this survey, 1956, some interesting comments may 
be presented. The base year employed was 1950, and the 
changes in the figures refer to yearly variations 
beginning with 1952.
Year ^  Imports A  Exports M-J-E
( -unf avor abl e)
1952 8.2 4- 3.7 + -2.22
1953 3.4 - 5.5 + .62
1954 3.0 4- 4.2 4- .71
1955 1.4 - 8.2 f .17
76Ibid.. p. 152.
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It was found that only one year, 1952, produced 
an unfavorable terms of trade* This meant that for each 
unit of goods imported 2*22 units of exports were given 
up in return. On the other hand, the three following 
years were characterized by either smaller price rises of 
imports than those of exports, or actual price declines.
Export prices dominated by petroleum products con­
tinued to move upward because of the rising demand for 
these products and the interruption of production In other 
areas of the world. Selectivity in the case of imports 
through the employment of a license system and the rising 
national demand for Venezuelan goods, along with the grow­
ing competition in world markets, all contributed to lower 
prices paid for imports.
Although favorable terms of trade prevailed in the 
last three of the four years included in this survey, 
volume changes should be taken Into consideration as well. 
The index figures based upon the year 1950 represent 
yearly changes in millions of tons.^
Year Changes of quantum Changes of quantum 
index of imports index of exports
1952 11.7 - 9.2 4
1955 5.9 4 4.1 -
1954 11.7 4 14.5 4
1955 17.7 + ' 10.4 4
^Figures were taken from the Central Bank of 
Venezuela, Memoria, p. 133. The above figures were rebased 
for 1950 in order to provide for comparisons of other 
material on the same basis.
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By comparing the volume changes with those of price 
changes shown on page 271, one finds a close parallel with 
respect to the import price-— quantum data. For example, 
the price rise of imports in 1952 amounting to 8.2 points 
was occasioned with a decline in commodities imported by 
11*7 points. Conversely, the fall of import prices in 
1953 by 3.4 points brought a rise of imports of 5.9 points. 
Yet, the price increase of imports for the year 1954 
amounting to 3.0 points was accompanied by a 11.7 point 
rise of goods flowing into the country. But in 1955 the 
small price decline of 1.4 points was more than matched 
by a 17.7 point rise of imports.
Price and volume changes were quite sensitive and 
tended to move in opposite directions. This movement 
infers that importers acted quickly whenever prices varied. 
The licensing system, which is not extensively employed, 
suggested, however, that the authorities were using keen 
judgment with respect to keeping the current account of 
the balance of payments in a favorable condition.
The only year in which the price and quantum indices 
did not move in the opposite direction was 1954. An expla­
nation as to why both prices and volume rose would seem to 
be related to the greater improvement of economic activity 
after the slower expansion which characterized the previous 
year. The rapid increase of investment expenditures in
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1954 as shown in Table II, page 198, required a greater 
amount of imports. The result was that even though the 
price index rose 3.0 points, imports flowed into the 
country in larger volume.
The price and quantum indices of exports increased 
together in each year concerned except 1953. The continued 
demand for petroleum and the rise of exports of iron ore 
and coffee tended to explain this favorable condition.
The reduction in the quantum index amounted to 4,1 
points in 1953. This result could be expected since there 
was a sharp reduction of petroleum investment expenditures 
during the year. This point was developed more fully on 
pages 269 and 270 in connection with export income contri­
butions to the national product.
SUMMARY
A state of international equilibrium was not achieved 
in the case of Venezuela in any one of the five years under 
consideration. The analysis of the equilibrium condition, 
ignoring, as far as possible, the influence of the external 
sector, revealed that the national product (income) would 
have declined throughout the period. There was, however, 
a possibility that the downward movement would have been 
curtailed by the end of the five years under study. Although 
there is evident need for greater diversification in
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production, the survey indicated that a good deal of 
expansion has already occurred.
The inclusion of the petroleum industry in the study 
showed that a state of international equilibrium was not 
maintained principally because of the constant rise in the 
national product and the inability to produce an equality 
between saving and investment on the one hand and imports 
and exports on the other hand*
The major objectives seemed to have been those of 
economic development and financial stability* The oil 
industry provided the greatest source of the direction 
that was necessary in carrying out the objectives.
The exceptional stability of the period would seem 
to be quite unusual in a nation which is underdeveloped. 
Nevertheless, considering the period as a whole the 
national product rose by a greater extent than did money 
and credit in circulation. The price level was prevented, 
therefore, from encountering extreme vicissitudes.
The autonomous entities appeared to take the lead 
in directing economic development. Their close connection 
with the Federal Government on the one hand and the need 
for rapid expansion on the other hand, provided many new 
completed projects within the last five years.
The Federal Government seemed to carry on its 
objectives in the capacity of a moderator. The force of
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moderation was created, primarily, through fiscal measures. 
It allowed expansion to be pursued chiefly by the autono­
mous entities via guaranteeing the latter*s securities. 
However, the government provided extra stimulation when­
ever it was felt desirable. A case in point was the extra- 
large expenditures in 1955.
In addition, the Federal Government maintained a 
surplus in its national accounts during four of the five 
years of the survey. Private enterprises were stimulated 
to a certain extent by this policy. Other measures were 
instigated for the purpose of stimulating the private 
sector; such as, a low rate of taxatibn and abundant credit.
Fiscal policy was employed to a greater extent than 
monetary policy. Although the Central Bank appeared to 
maintain a high state of liquidity and possessed most of 
the instruments of control, the banking authorities used 
their resources to only a minor degree. Perhaps the 
control of the Federal Government over the Central Bank 
and the relative prosperity of the period explain the 
minor role assigned to monetary policy.
Variations in the official deposits and particularly 
the special deposit reserve funds appeared to be a major 
instrument of fiscal policy. Other important fiscal 
measures were the Indirect debt created through loans to 
autonomous entities and the utilization of petroleum
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revenues.
External policy was dominated by a multiple 
exchange rate system. Nevertheless, this system incorpo­
rated features characteristic of a freely fluctuating 
exchange rate system. Most all foreign exchange trans­
actions were accomplished without restriction, and the 
buying and selling rates were nearly identical.
The exchange rate system resembled an exchange 
control system with different exchange rates. Yet, the 
various rates were not applied for the purpose of con­
trolling the external sector but to supplement internal 
stability. Quantitative devices were used to some extent 
in order to encourage internal development.
The system contained other features of exchange 
control. The petroleum firms were required to sell their 
foreign exchange earnings to the Central Bank. Although 
those earnings represented a large portion of the total 
foreign exchange entering the country, there were no other 
restrictions with respect to purchases and sales of 
foreign exchange.
The pegging of exchange rates for coffee and cocoa 
are normally practiced within a strict exchange control 
system. Nevertheless, recent high world prices resulted 
in little use of the pegging process.
External policy was closely related to fiscal policy.
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Export taxes were applied in order to subsidize certain 
commodities for export. Furthermore, the Central Bank 
created additional revenue for the government through the 
different buying and selling rates levied on foreign 
exchange.
Venezuela, a nation which is representative of an 
export economy, has realized unusual economic progress 
in recent years. The petroleum industry made its 
influence felt in all sectors of activity. The reliance 
of the country upon this one industry places the whole 
economy in a precarious situation. This condition has 
been realized, however, and domestic development is 
expanding at a steady pace.
The long run outcome with respect to the degree 
of prosperity to be enjoyed by this country will depend 
quite largely upon the extent and direction in which it 
develops the internal sector, and also, of course, upon 
the general state of world prosperity.
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APPENDIX A 
MONEY AND CREDIT OP VENEZUELA
Money In Circulation 
(In millions of bolivares)
Year Total Currency % of Demand % of
Total Deposits Total
1951 1,613.4 818.0 50.8 795.4 49.2
1952 1,876.8 895.9 47.7 980.9 52.3
1953 2,043.3 921.3 45.1 1,122.0 54.9
1954 2,147.2 981.3 45.7 1,165.9 54.3
1955 2,388.5 1,032.8 43.3 1,355.7 56.7
1956a 2,390.7 956.3 40.0 1,434.4 60.0
Sources Central Bank of Venezuela, Memorla, 1955, 
and the Bulletin, May, 1956.
aData available for the first quafter of 1956 only.
Central and Commercial Bank Credit 
(In millions of bolivares)
Year Total Central % of Commercial $ of
Bank Total Banks Total
1951 945.3 67.5 7.1 877.8 92.9
1952 1,117,8 50.8 4.5 1,067.0 95^5
1953 1,427.3 59.9 4.2 1,367.4 95.8
1954 1,867.4 131.9 7.1 1,735.5 92.9
1955 2,098.7 62.8 3.0 2,035.9 97.0
1956a 2,197.1 76.2 3.4 2,120.9 96.6
Source: Central Bank of Venezuela, Memoria, 1955,
and the Bulletin, May, 1956.
aData available for the first quarter of 1956 only.
APPENDIX B
RECEIPTS AND EXPENDITURES OP THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT OF VENEZUELA
(In millions of bolivares)
Receipts 1952
Direct taxes on
income and wealth 653.1
Royalties (mining
and petroleum) 822.7
Custbms- revenues 506.2
Indirect taxes on
consumption 252.7
Other receipts 172.8
Total receipts 2,407.5
Expenditures
(ministry)
Interior relations 366.2
Foreign relations 22.8
Treasury 209.0
National defense 208.1
Development 118.3
Public works 797.7
Education 137.1
Health and welfare 150.4
Agriculture and
livestock 129.0
Labor 21.0
Communications 121.6
Justice 75.1
Mining and
petroleum 27.4
% 1953 % 1954
27.1 745.0 29.4 680.6
34*2
21.0
826.6
508.4
32.6
20.1
901.1
544.8
10.5
7.2
264.5
189.0
10.4
7.5
292.3
213.1
100.0 2,533.5 100.0 2,631.9
15.4 366.8 15.2 368.7
1.0 24.9 1.0 32.9
8.8 234.8 9.8 284.8
8.7 230.6 9.6 239.3
5.0 126.5 5.3 112.6
33.5 744.0 30.9 806.9
5.8 144.0 6.0 156.8
6.3 157.1 6.5 167.2
5.4 123.5 5.1 126.2
.9 22.1 .9 26.7
5.1 133.7 5.6 157.2
3.1 76.5 3.2 78.0
1.1 20.2 .8 34.6
i 1955 % 1956
25.9 792.3 26.4 686.0
34.2
20.7
1,035.3
587.2
34. 6 
19.6
846.4
393.1
11.1
8.1
313.6
266.5
10.5
8.9
416.0
198.5
100.0 2,994.9 100.0 2,540.0
14.2 386.1 13.6 317.5
1.3 23.4 .8 na
11.0 344.8 12.1 11
9.2 253.3 8.9 224.4
4.3 147.4 5.2 na
31.1 876.3 30.8 11
6.0 158.9 5.6 163.2
6,4 172.3 6.1 177.0
4.9 140.7 4.9 na
1.0 28.0 1.0 f r
6.1 145.1 5.1 i r
3.0 78.7 2.8 i t
1.3 85.9 3.0 i i
%
27.0
33.3 
15.5
16.4
7.8
100.0
12.4 
■ 8.8
6.4
6.9
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APPENDIX B (continued)
Expenditures 1952 % 1953 % 1954 % 1955 % 1955 %
(ministry)
Interest on debt .8 * .4 .7 * .4 * .5 •»
Other expenditure - -------  ---  ---  1,667.4 65.4
Total expenditures 2^384*3 100.0 2,404.9 100.0 2,592.8 100.0 2,841.3 100.0 2,550.0 100.0
Surplus 23.2 128.6 39.1 153.6
Deficit 10.0
Source: Central Bank of Venezuela, Memoria, 1955; United Nations, Statistical
Yearbook, 1956.
naInformation not available.
*Less than five-tenths of one per cent.
Components do not always add to totals because of rounding.
to
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APPENDIX C
INDEX OP WHOLESALE PRICES IN THE FEDERAL DISTRICT
Year General Index National Product
Index
(1938 base) (1950=100) (1938 base) (1950=100)
1950 164.7 100.0 163.3 100.0
1951 173.7 105.5 172.4 105.6
1952 176.4 107.1 172.6 105.7
1953 170.9 103.8 169.5 103.8
1954 175.4 106.5 172.7 106.8
1955 176.5 107.2 171.0 104.7
1956(May) 173.3 105.2 176.2 107.9
Source: Central Bank of Venezuela, Memoria, 1955.
INDEX OP IMPORT AND EXPORT PRICES OP VENEZUELA
Year Import Index Export Index
(1948 base) (1950=100) (1948 base) (1950=
1950 77.3 100.0 74.4 100.0
1951 87.3 112.9 82.4 110.8
1952 93.6 121.1 85.2 114.5
1953 91.0 117.7 89.3 120.0
1954 93.3 120.7 92.4 124.2
1955 92.2 119.3 98.Q 132.5
1956(May) na na na na
Source: Central Bank of Venezuela, Memoria, 1955,
naInformation not available
APPENDIX D
BALANCE OP PAYMENTS OP VENEZUELA 
(in millions of bolivares)
Account 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956&
irrent Account
Exports of oil, f.o.b. 4,636.1 4,783.8 5,237.7 6,000.5 6,780.6
Exports, f.o.b. 228.8 288.1 365.8 373.9 411.3
Imports, oil firms, f.o.b. - 600.3 - 483.1 - 410.0 - 452.6 - 497.9
Imports, f.o.b. -2,015,4 -2,374.8 -2,783.9 -2,919.9 -3,211.9
Transportation and
insurance, oil firms (net) 49.9 31.5 38.5 47.6 52.4
Transportation and insurance (net) - 235.8 - 281.4 - 338.4 351.8 - 387.0
Investment income (net) -1,374.2 -1,355.7 -1,522.3 -1,847.9 -2,032.7
Capital, oil firms 237.9 169.2 71.7 — 66.7 73.3
Other (net) - 213.4 - 207.8 - 217.4 - 175.4 - 192.9
Balance 439.9 290.1 14.9 166.1 362.8
ipital Account13
Long term 279.7 305.8 265.3 159.5
Private 267.7 305.5 290.4 170.9
Official
Export-Import Bank loans 16.4 11.0 --— - -
Amortization 4.4 10.7 9.4 - 5.4
Purchase of long term
investment — ... 15.7 — 6.0
Short term - 234.5 - 151.1 78.4 - 171.5
Liabilities 12.1 10.7 15.1 32,2
Foreign assets (increase-) - 222.4 - 140.4 93.5 - 203.7
Balance 45.2 154.7 343.7 12.0
APPENDIX D (continued)
Account 1952 1955 1954 1955
Unilateral Account
Private donations - 64.0 - 68.7 - 73.0 - 76.4
Official donations .5 .3 .7 .7
Balance - 63.7 - 68.4 - 72.3 - 75.7
Gold Account**
Monetary gold .7 ,3 -101*2 ---
Errors and Omissions13 -422.1 -376*7 -155.3° - 78.4
Source: International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics, January,
3.957.
aEstimated oil exports at 13 per cent, all other items at a rate of 10 per cent. 
^Figures for 1956 were unavailable.
0 Amount given is 30.2 millions of bolivares less than that presented by the 
source material because the item ”0fficial and Bank Capital” does not total the correct 
figure of the items presented.
to
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APPENDIX E
BALANCE
Assets
SHEET
(in
1951
OP THE CENTRAL BANK OF 
millions of bolivares)
1952 1953
1VENEZUELA 
1954 1955 1956a
Reserves
Gold at home 904.8 904.8 904.8 905.6 906.1 906.1
Gold abroad 236.0 236.1 236.1 327.4 327.4 327.4
Deposits .9 202.6 329.4 231.3 389.7 671.6
Less: foreign bank 
obligations 31.7 16.8 7.6 10.6 16.3 12.5
Total 1,110.0 1,326.7 1,462.7 1,453.7 1,606.9 1,892.6
Loans and discounts 
Agriculture and 
livestock 50.7 61.6 45.7 62.3
Commercial and 
industrial 16.8 70.3 17.2 10.9
Total 67.5 50.8 59.9 131.9 62.9 76.2
Other assets 75.9 60.2 56.2 54.4 90.5 42.9
Unpaid capital 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 • • • •
Total assets 1,258.4 1,442.7 1,583.8 1,645.0 1,765.3 2,011.7
Liabilities
Notes in circulation 870.7 1,000.3 1,041.1 1,121.3 1,154.1 1,063.9
Deposits
National government 73.4 119.7 209.4 222.3 230.8 544.5
Banks 209.8 222.6 218.2 180.2 238.6 292.6
Other deposits 37.5 34.9 44.8 24.2 32.8 32.7
Other obligations^ 49.3 46.2 51.3 77.3 88.6 78.0
Capital 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 • • • •
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APPENDIX E (continued)
1951 1952 1955 1954 1955 1956
Reserves
General and special
funds 7.7 9.0 9.0 9.7 10.4 ....
Total liabilities
and capital 1,258.4 1,442.7 1,583.8 1,645.0 1,765.3 2,011.7
Source: Central Bank of Venezuela, Memoria, 1955. Also the Bulletin, May.
1956. --------
aIncludes first 5 months only.
^Includes deposits in foreign money, other foreign bank obligations, expired 
letters of credit, dividend accumulations, and so on.
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APPENDIX F
GOLD AND FOREIGN EXCHANGE HOLDINGS OF VENEZUELA 
(in millions of bolivares)
Year Total % of Gold % of Foreign % of
Total Total Exchange Total
1952 1,371.0 100.0 1,180.0 86.1 191.0 13.9
1953 1,513.7 100.0 1,179.7 77.9 334.0 22.1
1954 1,508.9 100.0 1,271.8 84.3 237.1 15.7
1955 1,653.6 100.0 1,271.8 76.9 381.8 23.1
1956a 2,497.4 100.0 1,390.3 55.7 1,107.1 44.3
Source: Central Bank of 'Venezuela , Memoria, 1955.
aFigures taken from International Monetary Fund, 
International Financial Statistics, January, 1957, and 
include holdings through September, 1956 only.
CHAPTER IV
SOME CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS
The two preceding chapters dealing with Mexico and 
Venezuela revealed the varying effects upon income and 
price levels caused, in part, by monetary, fiscal, and 
exchange practices. Specifically, the Mexican experience 
suggested that the authorities In charge of these policies 
failed to provide proper co-ordination between them so as 
to achieve a higher national income at stable price levels. 
The Venezuelan experience seemed to reveal a special prefer­
ence toward fiscal, and to some extent, external policy 
over that of monetary policy.'*' Yet, both nations appeared 
to have greater success In the application of these policies 
at the close of the five-year period.
It should be recalled tiaat these two nations were 
selected for study on the basis of their dissimilar economic 
structure. This means that although both countries repre­
sent underdeveloped nations, Mexico is primarily a domestic 
economy; that is, industry and agriculture account for a 
major portion of the national product (income). Further­
more, its external trade is free from exchange restrictions.
^ven though the price level appeared to be quite 
stable, it was maintained at a relative high level. In 
addition, the tremendous influence of petroleum exports 
created a special need for adequate fiscal and external 
measures.
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On the other hand, Venezuela Is typical of an export 
economy. Export income provides a large portion of the 
national income of the nation. In addition, exchange 
control is employed to some extent by the application of 
multiple exchange rates.
Many of the Latin American countries may be classi­
fied, in a broad sense, according to the above distinguish­
ing factors characteristic of Mexico and Venezuela.
Table I, page 290, presents a small number of 
selected Latin American nations which are separated into 
two general groups on the basis of the contribution of 
their export income to total income. There is a good deal 
of uncertainty as to the amount or rate of export income 
which clearly reveals that a country is a domestic economy 
or an export economy. By employing an approximate 20 per 
cent rate, this figure should be large enough to definitely 
place a nation within Group II, or an export economy.
Thus, Country Group I of Table I Includes three Latin 
American nations that are recognized as domestic economies 
according to the above criteria.
During the last five years, or a lesser number of 
years for those countries in which information was lacking, 
the contribution of export income to the national product 
was a good deal less than the 20 per cent rate arbitrarily 
employed as a dividing-point rate. On the other hand, the
TABLE I
EXPORT INCOME IN RELATION TO NATIONAL PRODUCT (INCOME) IN SELECTED LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES
> (in millions of domestic units)
Country Group I 
Argentina (pesos)
National product*
Export income 
Export income as % 
of national product 
Brazil (cruzeiros)
National product*
Export income 
Export income as % 
of national product 
Mexico (pesos)
National product
Export income 5,363. 5;095. 8^188. io',128'. ~5'688.' (6 mos.)
Export income as % 
of national product
Country Group II 
Chile (pesos)
National product*
Export income 
Export income as % 
of national product 
Peru (soles)
National product 
Export income 
Export income as % 
of national product 
Venezuela (bolivares)
National product 
Export income 
Export income as %
of national product 36.4 35.9 36.1 39.1 42.1
o
Source: International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics. January,
1957; the Balance of Payments Yearbook. Vol. 7, 1957; United Nations, Statistical Yearbook 
1956: and the Annual Reports of Central Banks of Mexico and Venezuela, 1955 and 1956.
*National income figures. naInformation not available.
1952 1953 1954 1955 1956
82,811. 93,965. 104,839. na na
4,392. 7,189. 6,757. 11 f t
5.3 7.7 6.4 11 11
292,100. 356,500. 439,900. 549,300. 11
26,056. 32,047. 42,968. 54,521. 11
8.9 9.0 9.8 9.9 1i
58,300. 56,300. 66,478. 84,000. 92,400.
, , 10 8 ,688.
9.2 9.0 9.2 12.3 6.2
190,480. 226,600. 498,630. na na
53,929. 44,945. 80,200. 11 11
28.3 19.8 16.1 r t 11
20,970. 22,650. 25,080. t ? 11
3,827. 3,879. 4,952. 11 11
18.2 17.1 19.7 i i r i
13,370. 14,127. 15,507. 16,282. 17,096.
4,865. 5,072. 5,604. 6,374. 7,192.
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export income of Country Group II nations represents 
approximately 20 per cent, or more, of the national 
product.
The division of the countries into two groups should 
not be construed to mean that each of the three nations 
within a grouping have nearly exact, or even closely 
related, types of domestic development or similar external 
policies. For example, Brazil is perhaps less industrial­
ized than is Mexico while Argentina has nearly attained a 
position of balance between agriculture and industry.
Externally, Argentina and Brazil have been utiliz­
ing exchange controls in order to protect their domestic 
economies. Yet, Mexico does not employ such restrictions.2 
Furthermore, Argentina and Brazil are considered as non­
dollar countries since the major portion of their trade 
is directed toward Europe. Mexico, on the other hand, is 
recognized as a dollar nation because the bulk of its 
trade is with the United States.^
A similar differentiation may be offered in con­
nection with the three remaining countries in Country 
Group II, namely: Chile, Peru, and Venezuela. Peru and
C
Tariffs compensate, in part, for the lack of mone­
tary control.
^Raymond Mikesell, Foreign Exchange In The Postwar 
World (New York: The Twentieth Century Fund, 1954), pp. 
305-307.
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Chile are predominately agricultural countries which 
export one, or a few, basic agricultural commodities. How­
ever, Venezuela has a proportionately larger industrial 
development and exports large quantities of petroleum along 
with iron-ore and coffee. In addition, Chile has a severe 
restrictive exchange control policy while Peru and Venezuela 
utilize a more moderate form of exchange restrictions.
The above differences among the countries are pointed 
out so as not to infer a kind of fixed relationship between 
one another. In other words, each individual nation con­
tains characteristics which are peculiar to it, and no 
other.
Since the six Latin American nations now have been 
segregated into two general groups, three of which are con­
sidered as domestic economies and the other three as export 
economies, one may apply various measures to determine the 
effectiveness of monetary, fiscal, and external policies 
of the countries within the two groups. Perhaps it may be 
possible to draw some broad conclusions with respect to 
their effectiveness.
I. MEASURES OF THE EFFECTIVENESS OF 
INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL POLICIES
It is realized that the authorities in charge of 
establishing policies which are conducive to a higher 
standard of living in the underdeveloped countries have a
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tremendous task before them. It is further contended that 
in their desire to raise the plane of living they are apt 
to lose sight of the over-all influence that their poli­
cies exert, whether beneficial or harmful, to the function­
ing of the economy.
Three types of measuring devices ane offered in 
order to better visualize the general effects of internal 
and external policies which, if taken into account, may 
modify extreme downturns or sharp upsurges in income and 
prices. The three measuring devices are: (1) the relation­
ship between gold and international reserves and the money 
supply, (2) a comparison between the money supply, national 
product, and price level, and (3) changes in current 
account balances and long-term capital movements*
A. The Relationship Between Gold and International 
Reserves and the Money Supply
By analyzing comparative changes in gold and inter­
national reserves and the supply of money and credit, one 
may obtain a general impression of the influence of the 
external sector upon the domestic economy.^ Of perhaps
^Mr. Brovedani explained that this measuring device 
is used to control money and credit in Uruguay. Refer to 
Bruno Brovedani, "Latin American Medium-Term Import 
Stabilization Policies and the Adequacy of Reserves," 
International Monetary Fund, Staff Papers. Washington,
D. C., Vol. IV, No. 2, February, 1955, pp. 272-273.
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greater importance to the nation of the direct comparative 
relationship between the changes in gold and foreign 
exchange holdings and the changes in money and credit is 
the fact that should the variations in money and credit 
fail to reflect comparable changes in international 
reserves, there is good reason to believe that the authori­
ties, have lost sight of the objective of attaining equi­
librium. Furthermore, it would suggest that monetary, 
fiscal, and exchange policies are either not being employed, 
or are being used with little success.
Table II, pages 295 and 296, shows the changes in 
gold and international reserves compared to that of the 
money supply and credit extended during the five-year 
period. Of special Interest is the fact that money and 
credit rose in every country for the five-year period with 
only one country revealing an exception to this trend.
Money and credit of Mexico declined during the first seven 
months of 1956. Although the percentage decline in 1956 
was quite small in terms of the rise of money and credit 
in the four prior years, it indicates that a real effort 
is being displayed in order to stabilize economic con­
ditions and to make effective use of monetary and fiscal 
policies.
On the other hand, Table II indicates that inter­
national reserves fluctuated a great deal during the
TABLE II
CHANGES IN MONEY, CREDIT, AND INTERNATIONAL RESERVES*
(in millions of units)
Country** 1952 Yearly % 
Change
1953 Yearly % 
Change
1954 Yearly % 
Change
1955 Yearly % 
Change
1956
Argentina^-
Money
Credit
Reserves
5,606 
6,810 
- 105
12.8
15.3
-42.2
11,942
10,552
267
24.2
20.6
185.4
10,972
11,958
9
17.9 
19.4 
- 2.2 -
14,069
16,602
219
19.5
22.5 
-54.5 ■
19,405
19,247
106
Brazil
Money
Credit
Reserves
13,500
25,200
18
14.9 
20.2 
- 3.0
20,000
26,400
77
19.2 
17.6 
13.0 ■
27.400
45.400 
130
22.1 
25.8 
-20.0 -
26,400
28,700
2
17.4 
13.0 
- .4
21,200
33,400
100
Mexico
Money
Credit
Reserves
278
770
6
4.1 
11.2 
2.3 -
575
1,514
34
8.1 
19.8 
- 12.5 ■
1,071
3,670
13
14.0
40.1 
- 5.5
2,049
926
211
23.5
7.2
93.8
514 
- 1,265 
15
Chile
Money
Credit
Reserves
8,720
9,015
20
35.8 
27.2
27.8
16,190
12,540
2
48.9
29.7
2.2 ■
25,870
17,270
32
52.5
31.6 
-34.4
52,710
33,360
46
70.1
46.3
75.4
31,680
24,080
6
Peru
Money
Credit
Reserves
320
934
4
13.3 
25.7 
- 5.4 -
366
692
4
13.4
15.2
.4
193
367
5
6.2
7.0
.5
181
756
2
5.5
13.4
.1
163
132
1
Venezuela
Money
Credit
Reserves
264
173
61
16.4
18.3
15.6
166
309
45
8.8
27.6
10.0
104
240
1
5.1
16.8
.2
242
432
55
11.3
25.9
11.0
38
377
189
Change
22.5
21.3
11.9(Aub) 
13.3 *»
19.0 I’
5.4(Adb)
24.8(0ct) 
22.9 ii 
■ 5.6 ii
4.7(Jun^ 
2.1 11 
.0 11
1.6(80*0 
18.0 ii 
34.2 ii
to
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Federal Reserve Bulletin, $
various issues, and the International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics.
TABLE II (continued)
January, 1957,
*Money comprises the monetary liabilities of the Central Banks to the private sector, 
including official entities and development banks, Treasury coin outside banks, and 
monetary deposits of the private sector— including official entities and development 
banks— with the commercial and savings banks. Credit includes claims on the government, 
private sector, and official entities.
**Money and credit are expressed in domestic units, international reserves in 
dollars.
^Refers to Central Bank only.
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five-year period. Only Venezuela revealed a consistent 
trend in its international reserve holdings. They rose 
throughout the period. Yet, the international reserves 
of Peru indicated a much smaller percentage change than 
did the remaining four nations. Overall, the changes in 
international reserves were as follows: Mexico, rose in 
three years and fell in two years; Argentina, rose in one 
year and fell in four years; Brazil, rose in two years, 
fell in two years, and remained constant in one year; and 
Chile, rose in three years and fell in two years.
There seems to be little, if any, correlation 
between the changes of money and credit and international 
reserves among the nations within Groups I and II. Never­
theless, the figures do indicate that the larger percentage 
increases in money and credit were found in Argentina and 
Brazil in the Group I countries and Chile of Group II.
If a fourth nation were included, it would be Mexico. The 
result is that three out of the four nations which enlarged 
their money supply most were Group I countries.
With respect to changes in international reserves, 
there was a lack of consistency in the size of reserve 
holdings. For the five-year period, exchange reserves rose 
(on a percentage basis) in five out of the six countries. 
Only Peru showed a slight decline in its holdings. The 
largest increases in gold and foreign exchange reserves
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were those of Mexico, 81.5 per cent and Argentina, 28.6 
per cent in Group I countries, and Venezuela, 71 per cent 
and Chile, 65.4 per cent in Group II.
The international reserve accumulations are, how­
ever, misleading. For example, Argentina realized a rise 
in gold and foreign exchange In only one of the five years. 
Yet, the increase in the one year, 1953, was larger than 
the total decline of exchange in the remaining four years. 
In other words, the nation tended to lose reserves quite 
consistently even though the gain in one year was large. 
Thus, the longer the time period considered, the greater 
the probability of loss in reserve holdings.
Another important factor relating to changes in 
gold and exchange reserves Is the amount and frequency of 
exchange rate changes. From a short run standpoint, a 
rise in the country*s exchange rate (depreciation) may 
bring with it a spontaneous rise in gold and foreign 
exchange holdings. Nevertheless, the new, high rate may 
be offset shortly because of a volume decline. Then too, 
retaliation on the part of other nations as well as the 
possibility of internal price increases may become too 
serious to bear.
As one examines the external policies of the six 
nations, it becomes apparent that increases in the inter­
national reserves were possible, in part, because
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depreciation was quite common during this relatively short 
period of time. It may be recalled that Mexico changed 
its exchange rate in 1954. Table II shows the effect of 
the depreciated rate which increased international reserves 
in 1955 by some 93.8 per cent. Every nation considered 
here with the exception of Venezuela had its exchange rate 
altered at least once during the five years.®
It is now possible to compare the relative changes 
in the money supply and international reserves. One way 
to prevent money and credit from getting out of hand would 
be to keep credit in line with changes in international 
reserves. Should credit rise by a much greater percentage 
than the accumulation of International reserve holdings, 
either the banking system should refuse to increase the 
money supply, reduce it, or it should reduce credit.
The effectiveness of such manipulation would be 
expected to vary between nations, and would directly depend 
upon the relative importance of the external sector to the
"Exchange rate changes for the six nations included 
In this section were as follows (rates are either basic, 
preferential, or free selling rates and express domestic 
units per dollar): Argentina 7.5 per dollar 1951-1955, 18 
per dollar 1956; Brazil 18.38 per dollar 1951-1952, 23.26- 
1953, 31.50-1954, 37.06-1955-1956; Mexico 8.65 per dollar 
1951-1953, 12.51-1954-1956; Chile 90.0 per dollar 1951, 
118.6-1952, 110.0-1953, 200.0-1954, 300.0-1955, and 563.0- 
1956; Peru 15.28 per dollar 1951, 15.43-1952, 16.85-1953, 
19.39-1854, and 19.0-1955-1956; and Venezuela 3.35 per 
dollar 1951-1956. Refer to International Monetary Fund,
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domestic sector. Yet, even if a nation depended to only a 
small extent upon the income contribution of the external 
sector, it would still be desirable to utilize the above 
measuring device. It is true that the limitations placed 
upon the money supply as determined by international 
reserves would be of lesser importance than purely domestic 
measures. Nevertheless, the former could be employed in 
conjunction with internal measures to provide greater 
stability.
All the six nations being observed in this section 
rely to a great extent upon the external sector of their 
economies to provide for economic stability and growth.
The relation of export income to national product (income) 
as presented in Table I, page 290, is not indicative of 
the full reliance that these nations place upon external 
activity. Of great importance to them besides export 
income is the import of goods, particularly capital goods, 
and the flows of international capital. Thus, it seems 
quite logical that all six countries would benefit from 
the use of the controlling device discussed at this point.
To what extent have the Latin American countries 
made use of this measure? Table II, page 295, shows that
International Financial Statistics, January, 1957; and the 
United Nations, Statistical Yearbook 1956.
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very little effort was expended in attempting to provide 
monetary stability by regulating money and credit in 
accordance with international reserve variations.
Reviewing the countries in Group I, one finds that 
in Argentina credit rose by 15.3 per cent in 1952. At the 
same time, international reserves declined some 42.2 per 
cent. Yet, the money increased, too, by about 12.8 per 
cent. International reserve holdings increased approxi­
mately 185.4 per cent in 1953 while total money and credit 
rose some 85.8 per cent. The exceptional rise of inter­
national reserves in this latter year was more than enough 
to offset the total increase of money and credit for the 
same two-year period. The last three years, 1954-1956, 
showed a continual decline in gold and foreign exchange 
while money and credit moved in the opposite direction.
The experience in Brazil was similar to that 
occasioned by Argentina. Credit rose about 20 per cent 
in 1952, and international reserve holdings declined by 
3 per cent. Money followed the course of credit, and rose 
some 15 per cent. The expansion of credit amounted to 
nearly 18 per cent in 1953. This Increased rate was nearly 
offset by a rise of international reserves by approximately 
13 per cent. The money supply rose, however, by 19 per 
cent. During the years 1954 and 1955, credit and money 
rose while gold and foreign exchange declined. But an
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abrupt change was encountered in 1956; credit was larger 
than in the previous year by 'about 13 per cent while inter­
national reserves rose by some 19 per cent. Money expanded 
by almost 12 per cent leaving a money and credit balance 
of approximately 5 per cent over that of gold and foreign 
exchange accumulation.
Mexico, the last of the three Group I nations, 
experienced a more mixed-pattern relationship than either 
Argentina or Brazil. Credit increased by about 11.2 per 
cent in 1952, but international reserve holdings were 
larger by approximately 2.3 per cent. Money did rise, but 
the increase was only about 4.1 per cent. A consistent 
change was noticeable during 1953 and 1954. The increase 
in credit amounted to some 59.9 per cent. On the other 
hand, international reserves declined by about 18.0 per 
cent. During 1955 and the first seven months of 1956, a 
reversal occurred. The rise in credit for 1955 was but 
7.2 per cent while gold and foreign exchange accumulations 
amounted to nearly 93.8 per cent. Money also increased 
about 23.5 per cent. Finally, credit and money declined 
in 1956, the total amounting to 14.0 per cent. At the 
same time, international reserve holdings were larger by 
some 3.4 per cent.
With respect to the above three nations, only 
Mexico seemed to pay attention to the relative changes in
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credit, money, and international reserve holdings, and 
then only in the latter two years. Furthermore, only 
Brazil, and to a lesser extent Mexico, revealed a downward 
trend in the rise of money and credit.
Turning to the Group II countries, the analysis
will show results similar to those of the Group I nations.
A definite trend emerges as one reviews the credit,
money, and international reserve holdings of Chile. At 
the end of 1952, the rise in credit of some 27.2 per cent 
was nearly equal that of the rise of gold and foreign 
exchange— 27.8 per cent. Yet, the money supply also 
increased by about 35.8 per cent. Beginning with 1953 
and continuing through 1956, with the exception of the 
year 1955, Chile’s international reserve holdings declined 
while credit and money continued to rise.
Peru’s experience indicates a more fixed pattern in 
that the annual rise in credit has been at a decreasing 
rate beginning with a 25.7 per cent increase in 1952 and 
falling to a 2 per cent increase by June, 1956. The only 
year excepted was 1955 when the rise in credit was 13,4 
per cent. In addition, there was only a small change in 
gold and foreign exchange reserve holdings during the 
period. A decline of about 5.8 per cent occurred during 
1952 and 1953. Thereafter, a 0.6 per cent rise was 
occasioned. The downward pattern also applies to changes
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in money. The money supply rose by approximately 13.3 per 
cent in 1952. During the remaining four years, the 
increase was smaller each year; it was 4.7 per cent for 
1956.
Venezuela, the only country which realized an 
increase in all three items throughout the five-year period, 
reveals a more determined approach with respect to money, 
credit, and international reserves. At the end of 1952, 
credit rose by some 18.3 per cent. Although gold and 
foreign holdings fell short of the rise in credit, they 
were larger by nearly 15.6 per cent. The money supply 
increased too, the total amounting to approximately 16.4 
per cent. The following year witnessed a reversal since 
credit rose by about 27.6 per cent while international 
reserves increased by some 10.0 per cent. Yet, the money 
supply was only 8.8 per cent larger. This trend is also 
noticeable during 1954. The last two years of the period 
revealed a continuous rise in credit; however, gold and 
foreign exchange accumulations were larger than the 
increase in the money supply.
It would appear correct to say that only Venezuela 
as one of the three Group II countries showed a serious 
determination to restrict the expansion of money and 
credit according to variations in its gold and foreign 
exchange reserves.
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To summarize the findings at this point, it is 
quite clear that of the six nations considered, only two, 
Mexico and Venezuela, showed an inclination to directly 
relate the changes in money and credit with variations in 
international reserve holdings.
There seemed to he no clear-cut trend with respect 
to the domestic economies of Group I countries and the 
export economies of Group II nations. Perhaps a part of 
the explanation as to why the Group I countries attached 
little importance to the measuring device described above 
is that the internal problems overshadowed those of the 
external sector. On the other hand, one should consider 
the fact that these countries were evidently having 
problems In their external trade. No doubt this is true 
because of the numerous changes they made in their exchange 
rates. Such problems as were related to the external 
sector appeared equally important to the Group II nations.
It is quite clear from the information in Table II 
that only a few of the Latin American nations sought relief 
from the pressing inflation by making co-ordinated use of 
monetary, fiscal, and exchange policies. The frequent 
change in exchange rates, along with financial controls in 
some of the countries, may have been employed to seek 
relief in both the external and internal sectors of the 
economy. Surely depreciated exchange rates were used to
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increase exports or to reduce imports, or both. In brief, 
they were attempts made for the purpose of relieving the 
strain on the balance of payments. Nevertheless, their 
imposition may have been a manifestation of a more recent 
development; namely, the desire to protect the domestic 
sector from foreign repercussions. At any rate, monetary 
and fiscal policy failure was quite evident.
The lack of success in applying the measuring device, 
the subject of this section, suggests that the overwhelming 
desire to develop the countries was of greater importance 
than clinging to the objective of international equilibrium.
A comparison of the money supply, national product, 
and price level of five of the Latin American countries 
should serve to throw more light upon the relative situ­
ation with respect to saving and investment as well as to 
indicate the approximate influence of monetary and fiscal 
policy.
B. A Comparison Between the Money Supply,
National Product, and Price Level
A comparison between the money supply, the national 
product, and the price level of the several countries 
presents a basis for estimating the relationship between 
saving and investment. If the change in money supply 
is not accompanied by an approximately equal change, and
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in the same direction as that of the national product, 
then the price level will vary in such a way as to reflect 
the difference. According to the development pattern in 
the underdeveloped countries, the money supply appears to 
rise faster than the real national product. This pro­
portionately larger increase in the money supply suggests 
that if an excess of investment over saving were realized, 
it would be attributed, in part, to the larger money supply. 
The national product must be deflated by using the price 
level indicator for the purpose of showing the influence 
of the larger money supply.
Since the study of Mexico and Venezuela, two of 
the more advanced underdeveloped nations in Latin America, 
revealed the tendency of excessive investment balances 
along with exceptional increases in money and credit, 
particularly in the case of Mexico, it may be safely 
assumed that most all of the remaining countries in Latin 
America have realized similar effects. From the saving 
side, the constant pressure of insufficient saving was 
noticeable in Mexico and Venezuela, especially the former. 
This saving trend would also be expected to prevail in 
most of the other Latin American nations.
An attempt to approximate the saving-investment 
relationship through the money supply and national product 
allows for only rough estimates of the actual situation.
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Furthermore, it does not allow one to manifest sound 
judgment with respect to the approximate state of inter­
national equilibrium of a nation because of the failure 
to take into account the external contribution via exports, 
imports, capital, and unilateral movements.
Yet, the influence of the current account may be 
closely estimated if a comparison between the international 
reserve movements and the supply of money is known. For 
the most part, the movement of gold and foreign exchange 
reveals the relationship between exports and imports. In 
a sense, they represent the money flow of the two accounts.
This second measuring device, which Is to be 
employed in connection with the six countries chosen, 
should help in determining the success, or lack of success, 
of monetary, fiscal, and external policy application.
Table III, page 309, has been constructed to better 
visualize the changes in the national product and money 
supply of the five nations involved.® In current terms, 
the percentage changes In the national product of the 
several nations appear exceptionally large (column 2). In 
many Instances the national product figures seem to rise 
at a rate greater than that of the money supply. Yet, 
the yearly changes in real national product figures
Argentina was omitted because of insufficient 
price data.
TABLE III
COMPARATIVE CHANGES IN NATIONAL PRODUCT, MONEY SUPPLY, AND PRICE 
LEVELS IN SELECTED LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES 
(in millions of domestic units)
Country National
Product
(see
Table I)
Yearly % 
Change 
(decrease-)
Real
National
Product
Yearly 
(real) % 
Change 
(decrease-)
Money
Supply*
(see
Table II)
Yearly
%
Change
Wholesale
Price
Index
(1953=100)
Year
Brazil 40,100 15.9 12,671 3.9 38,700 18.0 87 1952
64,400 22.0 20,753 5.8 46,400 18.3 100 1953
83,400 23.4 -20,698 - 5.8 72,800 24.2 131 1954
109,400 24.9 37,872 11.3 55,100 14.7 147 1955
na na na na 54,600 12.8(Aug) 186(Sept) 1956
Mexico 6,500 12.5 4,300 8.1 1,048 7.7 102 1952
- 2,000 - 3.4 857 - 1.5 2,089 14.2 100 1953
10,178 18.1 4,689 8.3 4,741 28.2 109 1954
17,522 26.4 3,753 6.2 2,975 13.8 124 1955
8,400 10.0 7,446 11.5 - 1,779 - 7.2 128(0ct) 1956
Chile 45,390 31.3 15,314 7.0 17,735 30.8 81 1952
76,126 40.0 31,446 13.4 28,730 38.2 100 1953
232,027 87.0 50,995 19.1 43,140 41.5 157 1954
na na na na 86,070 58.5 277 1955
1 1 1 1 i i 1 1 55,760(0ct) 23.9 485(Aug) 1956
Peru 2,260 12.1 1,278 6.4 1,254 20.8 99 1952
1,680 8.0 1,468 6.9 1,058 14.5 100 1953
2,430 10.7 150 .7 560 6.7 110 1954
na na na na 937 10.5 119 1955
1 1 T t T 1 f T 295(June) 3.0 13l(Sept) 1956
Venezuela 960 7.7 814 6.7 437 17.1 103 1952
757 5.7 1,146 8.8 475 15.9 100 1953
1,380 9.8 928 6.2 344 9.9 103 1954
775 5.0 753 5.0 674 17.7 103 1955
814 5.0 630 4.0 415 9.2 104(0ct) 1956
Source: International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics, January, 
1957; United Nations, Statistical Yearbook 1956; and Tables I and II, pages 290 and 295.
■^Includes money and credit. naInformation not available.
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(column 4) are of much smaller proportion.
A glance at the price level index in Table III 
reveals the tremendous pressure exerted upon the price 
level caused, in part, by the exceptionally large increases 
in money and credit. There does seem to be a trend toward 
reducing the amount of money and credit in some of the 
countries. For example, the rise of mdney and credit in 
Mexico was reduced by nearly one-half in 1955, and together 
they actually declined in 1956. The money supply of 
Venezuela increased by a much smaller proportion in 1956 
than in 1955. In addition, a similar trend occurred in 
Peru.
To make some specific observations, one finds that 
the percentage rise of the money supply of Brazil was 
several times that of the increase in the real national 
product. Although the percentage increase in the real 
national product was favorable, on the average, to the 
rise of the national product in industrialized nations, 
it was obvious that the money supply had to be enlarged 
by nearly SO per cent each year in order to raise real 
national product figures to the amounts shown in Table III.
Mexico appeared to be in a much better situation 
than Brazil. The real national product showed larger
t
yearly percentage increases with smaller proportionate 
Injections of money and credit. Nevertheless, the
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effectiveness of greater amounts of money and credit was 
quite small as compared to those of the more developed 
nations.
It is evident, too, that Chile has suffered because 
of especially large injections of money and credit ranging 
from 25 per cent to 58 per cent a year. On the other hand, 
the real national product rose from 7 to 19 per cent during 
the years for which information was available. According 
to the price index for the last two years of the period, 
prices rose to 277 and 485 per cent of the 1953 base year. 
These price increases, along with the exceptional rise in 
the money supply, would seem to support the conclusion 
that the real national income would have been a good deal 
lower in 1955 and 1956 than in the three earlier years.
National product (income) information was also 
lacking for Peru during 1955 and 1956. It required, how­
ever, an approximate 41 per cent increase in the money 
supply in the first three years of the survey to raise 
the real national product by about 13 per cent.
A more moderate rise in money and credit was evi­
denced in the case of Venezuela. Furthermore, the real 
national income rose In a consistent fashion throughout 
the five-year period. The relatively small changes in 
the price index is a manifestation of the greater degree 
of success in the employment of money and credit than is
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true of the remaining four countries. On the other hand, 
the average price level was quite high throughout the 
period from 1952 to 1956. One reason which explains this 
condition is the fact that Venezuela’s trade was closely 
allied with that of the United States (refer to the price 
data presented on page 246).
It may be recalled from an earlier analysis of 
Venezuela that large capital expansion occurred during 
1952 and 1953. This expansion was attributed both to 
the oil companies and the private sector. The result of 
the added investment is revealed in Table III by a larger 
increase in real national product than that of the nominal 
national product at the end of 1953.
Table III makes possible several general conclusions 
with respect to the five nations under observation.
Planned saving and investment were probably at a low level. 
At least one-half of the total expansion in the money 
supply was accomplished by credit expansion. The remainder 
consisted, therefore, of continuous injections of new 
money. In other words, realized investment may have been 
larger than realized savings in the respective nations 
because of the expansion of the money supply. . The 
inflationary impact would tend to support this statement. 
Also, the large expansion in the money supply failed to 
yield proportionate yearly returns in the real national
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output of these relatively underdeveloped nations. The 
opposite result would normally be expected in such 
countries. By this it is meant that added expenditures 
should provide immediate results via increased output.
Once again, this effect suggests a partial long-term 
answer to the problem of growth, that is, a probability 
of mal-allocation of resources.
Evidently, little attention was directed toward the 
application of monetary and fiscal policy. Yet, and as 
pointed out on page 310, the expansion of money and credit 
appears to have been reduced in some of the countries by 
the end of 1956. In fact, the money supply of Mexico 
actually declined in the latter year. Furthermore, there 
seemed to be no apparent trend developed by either Group 
I or Group II countries that would distinguish one group 
from the other with respect to these matters.
Overall, Table III presents a picture which suggests 
that those in charge of guiding economic activity were 
unable to create a condition within the domestic sector 
which would contribute toward a state of international 
equilibrium.
Since it is quite clear that monetary and fiscal 
policy was rather ineffective and that the concept of 
international equilibrium was not a major objective of 
the domestic sector activity, the question posed is: what
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was the contribution of external policy toward inter­
national equilibrium in the countries under observation 
during the five-year period?
In order to express judgment with respect to short­
term capital movements and, hence, the relative condition 
of the current account of the balance of payments, the 
findings from the analysis of the first measuring factor—  
international reserves and the money supply of the several 
nations— may be helpful at this point.
It was found that international reserve holdings 
rose about as often as they declined. The total movement 
of these holdings indicated a net loss for the countries 
involved. Furthermore, the acquisition of international 
reserves was often possible only at the expense of depreci­
ated currencies.
A partial result of this action was realized by 
imposing added difficulties in the domestic sectors. One 
of the most important problems created was the extensive 
rise in prices which occurred during the period. Venezuela 
was the lone exception in this respect. To carry the 
point a step further, the external problem caused by 
depreciated currencies which were reflected in the domestic 
sector, did not occur in Venezuela. In other words, the 
money supply of Venezuela rose by small amounts, and the 
real national product constantly increased. Thus, a
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partial explanation for this effect was the fact that the 
country did not depreciate its currency.
The imposition of strict exchange controls by some 
of the countries further revealed their inability to 
attain a current account balance.*^
It would seem safe to state, therefore, that external 
policy was employed, in part, for the purpose of insulating 
the domestic sector, but apparently produced little bene­
ficial results. To the extent that external policy was 
applied to accomplish a current account balance, the effect 
was either a failure to accomplish the goal or, if real­
ized, the domestic sector suffered a setback. To sum it 
up, the authorities responsible for external policy did 
not co-ordinate such policy with a view toward accomplish­
ing a condition of international equilibrium.
Before one can pass judgment in connection with 
the external sector, a more accurate measurement must be 
forthcoming. This is the purpose of the third measuring 
device which will now be observed. It was possible to 
estimate the approximate state of the current account 
based upon the flow of gold and international reserves.
^The following countries maintained government 
control of the purchase and sale of foreign exchange as 
well as multiple exchange rates: Argentina, Brazil, and 
Chile. A lesser degree of exchange restrictions were 
imposed by Peru and Venezuela. Mexico did not impose 
exchange control.
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Yet, in order to provide a more accurate interpretation of 
the effectiveness of external policy, information with 
respect to both short-term and long-term capital movements 
is essential. This measuring device will now be considered.
C. Changes in Current Account Balances 
and Long-Term Capital Movements
A comparison of the current account balances vfith 
long-term capital movements provides us with a rough guide 
as to the directional flow of capital of the countries 
involved. A favorable current account balance (exports in 
excess of imports) indicates that long-term capital should 
move out of the country, on balance. The reverse capital 
flow would be occasioned if imports exceed exports, or an 
unfavorable current account balance prevailed.
There is, however, a serious shortcoming in such an 
analysis because capital movements are not likely to change 
as suddenly or abruptly as are the variations in imports 
and exports. In other words, the longer the time period 
involved as a basis for comparing these two factors, the 
greater is the accuracy in terms of need for capital.
Capital, as used here, is one of the major factors 
which supports saving and investment and, therefore, has 
an important role to play in helping to maintain the 
national product.8 The lack of saving and the tendency
Q
United Nations writers have developed an investment
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toward unfavorable current account balances are character­
istic of underdeveloped nations. Primary reliance is 
placed, therefore, upon the (inward) flow of capital to 
uphold a given income level.9 No doubt the inability of 
some countries to find a source of constant capital flow 
has, in turn, caused them to alter their exchange rates 
in an effort to provide a stable national income. Also, 
their inability to attract capital has forced them to 
create it internally. The result of such activity has 
contributed to inflationary pressures. This explanation 
suggests that if expanded sources of capital could be 
found, the problems relating to monetary, fiscal, and 
exchange policies would be alleviated to some extent.
coefficient which may be used as a partial basis for 
determining the capital needs of underdeveloped countries. 
See United Nations, Department of Economic and Social 
Affairs, Economic Survey of Latin America. 1954 (New York: 
United Nations Publications, 1955), pp. 3-18.
9
A new approach for providing capital to under­
developed areas is suggested by Professors Max F. Millikan 
and W. W. Rostow. Among other things, it provides for:
(a) a long-term program of economic aid to be initiated 
by the United States, (b) America should make about $12 
billion available to underdeveloped countries over a five- 
year period, (c) governments of other advanced industri­
alized countries should make available approximately #3 
billion over the same time period to the underdeveloped 
nations, (d) measures should be taken to expand private 
investment to some $2.5 billion during the first five 
years, (e) the total funds of $17.5 billion should be 
loaned according to sound banking principles rather than 
allocated to specific countries, and (f) loans and grants 
should be made by existing national and international
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It is not the purpose of this undertaking to spe­
cifically measure capital needs of the countries, but 
rather to show the wrong directional movements of capital, 
and, hence, the external problems associated with such 
capital movements and an explanation of how the lack of 
capital has influenced internal activity.
Table IV, page 319, is constructed for the purpose 
of revealing the relationship between current account 
changes and variations of long-term capital movements. 
Unilateral transfers are omitted from the calculations 
primarily because they consist of erratic types of capital 
movements. In addition, they are of minor significance 
to the majority of the countries considered here.
To begin the summary of Table IV, it would seem 
prudent to consider the relationship between the current 
account balances and long-term capital movements for the 
period as a whole. Five of the six countries realized 
import surpluses. Only Venezuela achieved an export 
surplus, on balance, for the four years reported. This 
result infers that the nations which obtained Import 
surpluses should have witnessed an inflow of capital which 
would have helped to offset the current account balances.
agencies. For a more detailed analysis of the program 
refer to Max F. Millikan and W. W. Rostow, A Proposal: 
Key to an Effective Foreign Policy (New York: Harper and 
Brothers, 1957), pp. 126-129.
TABLE IV
CURRENT ACCOUNT BALANCES AND LONG-TERM CAPITAL MOVEMENTS*
(in millions of dollars)
Country** 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 Total
(net)
Balances
Argentina
Current account balance 
Long-term capital movements(net)
-406 
- 1
349 
- 3
83 
- 10
-215 
- 14
-189 
- 28
Brasil 
Current account balance 
Long-term capital movements(net)
-708
655
70 
- 61
-230
94
- 25 
264
-893
+919
Mexico 
Current account balance 
Long-term capital movements(net)
-142
64
-107
22
- 21 
117
68
142
10(June) 
74 "
-202
+419
Chile
Current account balance 
Long-term capital movements (net)
8
39
- 69 
65
3
- 24
28
4
- 30 
+ 84
Peru
Current account balance 
Long-term capital movements(net)
- 56 
47
- 71
53
- 20 
19
- 42 
37
-189
+156
Venezuela 
Current account balance 
Long-term capital movements(net)
13
84
9
91
- 4 
79
50
29
108 + 68 
+283
Source: International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics. 
June, 1957; Balance of Payments Yearbook. 1957; and United Nations, Statistical 
Yearbook 1956.
*Unilateral transfers omitted.
**Direct investments included for most countries
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One of the five nations which occasioned import surpluses 
for the period— Argentina— did not achieve a capital 
inflow. In addition, Venezuela with an export surplus 
acquired an inflow of capital. This effect is contrary 
to normal expectations of a nation which realized an 
export surplus.
Looking at the account balances as a group, one 
finds that four of the six countries, all with import 
surpluses for the period considered, managed to import 
long-term capital. The other two nations witnessed wrong 
directional flows In their long-term capital balances.
To review the results in the specific countries, 
Argentina acquired an import surplus of $189 million. 
Instead of moving into the country, long-term capital 
moved outwTard to the extent of #28 million. Furthermore, 
gold and foreign exchange holdings declined during the 
period by #172 m i l l i o n . T h e  failure of this country to 
reduce its import surplus, to attract long-term capital, 
and its inability to prevent the loss of gold and foreign 
exchange, all contributed to the explanation of its 
external policy, i. e., strict exchange control. At that, 
exchange control brought with it a depreciation of
■^Refer to Table II, Changes in Money, Credit, and 
International Reserves, p. 295.
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Argentina’s exchange rate,-^
The depreciation of the exchange rate was employed, 
in part, to reduce imports and to increase exports. The 
desired effect was not realized, however, during the period 
under observation. This kind of external policy apparently 
was not conducive to attracting long-term capital.
Since both short- and long-term capital declined 
over the period, the major portion of an increased supply 
of money and credit was accumulated internally. Although 
the internal factors as presented in Table III, and which 
are necessary to substantiate the prior statement, were 
unavailable for Argentina, all indications point toward 
such a result. In other words, the supply of money and 
credit should have risen along with prices, and the real 
national product should have declined, or,.at least, 
remained quite constant.
One other point with respect to the external policy 
of Argentina should be made. It has to do with the effect 
of external policy and international equilibrium. In 
Chapter I of this paper it was contended that there is 
only one exchange rate and national income level which 
would provide an equilibrium condition; and that the 
national income may rise or fall, but there is only one
^For a review of exchange rates see page 299, foot­
note 5.
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exchange rate at each income level which would support an 
equilibrium. Furthermore, there may be different exchange 
rates but there is only one income level at each exchange 
rate that would assure equilibrium.12
As far as the national income (product) is concerned, 
it has risen during the period, that is, at current prices.13 
On the other hand, Argentina's exchange rate rose (depreci­
ated) once over the same period of time. The question that 
arises, then, is: what significance may be attached to the 
change in the exchange rate with respect to the variation 
in the national income? The answer is that such exchange 
rate change apparently had very little to do with the 
variation in national income. In other words, such portion 
of external policy as was related to an alteration in the 
exchange rate was carried out for the purpose of allevi­
ating the balance of payments rather than maintaining 
national income. And even at that, it has not been suc­
cessful. Of course, the depreciation of the exchange rate 
may indirectly contribute to a rate of income which is 
conducive to maintaining a condition of equilibrium. This
12Chapter I, pp. 24-25.
IS
Refer to Table I, page 290. It should be noted 
that the national (product) income figures were not avail­
able for 1955 and 1956. It is assumed that their upward 
trend, in current prices, continued during these latter 
two years.
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effect, however, has not occurred in Argentina. It would 
seem, therefore, that internal factors rather than external 
policy were primarily responsible for changes in the 
national income.
The experience in the external sector of Brazil 
presents a different picture from that of Argentina.
Table IV reveals that Brazil encountered an import surplus 
during the period. In addition, only one year, 1953, 
revealed an export surplus. Long-term capital was attracted 
to Brazil in an amount greater than the current accountrs 
import surplus. Nevertheless, the gold and foreign exchange 
account showed a loss of these holdings (see Table II, page 
295)• The result was a near-equality in the balance of 
payments. Expressed in figures, they are: import surplus 
of $893 million and long-term capital inflow of $919 
million, less short-term capital outflow of $73 million, 
or a capital movement balance of $846 million. From this 
vantage point, the external sector was nearly in balance. 
Yet, this result occurred, in part, because the nations 
currency depreciated in nearly every year of the period 
considered.
According to the information presented thus far, 
it seems a bit strange that Brazil was able to attract a 
sizeable portion of long-term capital when the current 
account showed a negative figure, short-term capital was
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moving out of the country, and the exchange rate wras 
subject to numerous changes. The answer seems to be that 
the major portion of the long-term capital inflow consisted 
of foreign government or institutional funds, along with 
some private direct investment, rather than portfolio 
capital.14
Depreciation of the effective exchange rates 
apparently contributed somewhat towrard relieving the 
current account imbalance. The internal result of exchange 
rate changes appeared to be of minor significance except 
for the probable influence registered in the higher price 
levels. More specifically, the change in the money supply 
was quite constant , and revealed no changes that were 
proportionate to the variations of the exchange rate.
Although long-term capital was the major factor 
which closed the balance of payments import gap, the inflow 
of such capital created an internal problem. Long-term 
capital must provide a means of payment, in short, an 
export surplus. It was found, however, that the real 
national product did not rise at rates considered normal 
for underdeveloped areas. Furthermore, the rise in the 
real national product required huge increases in the money
^^nited States provided approximately $600.0 million 
of long-term capital during the three year period 1953-1955. 
See the International Monetary Fund, Balance of Payments 
Yearbook. Vol. 7, 1957.
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supply.3*^  It is conceded, however, that in the near future 
greater efficiency in the application of capital is proba­
ble. The 11.5 per cent rise in the real national product 
of 1955 suggests this likely outcome.
There further seems to be little direct correlation 
between the changes in national income and the pattern of 
external policy. Yet, external policy contributed more, 
no doubt, toward realizing an equilibrium situation in 
Brazil than it did in Argentina. The rise in Brazil’s 
exchange rate did contribute to some extent toward a 
nearly-realized current account balance. A current account 
balance is necessary before a state of international equi­
librium may be established. On the other hand, the 
depreciated exchange rates and the long-term capital 
inflows tended to transfer a part of the external responsi­
bility to the domestic economy. Thus, the responsibility 
of monetary and fiscal policy became more onerous.
According to the information presented in Table IV, 
page 319, Mexico has witnessed an experience in the 
external sector somewhat different from that of Argentina 
and Brazil. An import surplus of |202 million accumulated 
from 1952 to June, 1956. Yet, the nation obtained an 
export surplus during the last one and one-half years of
15
Refer to Table III, page 309, and to page 310 of
the present chapter.
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that period.
With respect to capital movements, Mexico was able 
to acquire an inflow of long-term capital amounting to 
approximately $419 million. In addition, gold and foreign 
exchange showed a positive balance of about $185 million.
To round out the external picture, only one change 
was occasioned in the exchange rate. The authorities' 
raised the Mexican exchange rate (depreciated the currency) 
in 1954. One result of such action was mentioned above; 
that is, an export surplus arose in 1955.
To what extent the depreciation of the exchange 
rate was beneficial or harmful is difficult to say. As 
a part of short run policy it appeared beneficial. There 
is some question as to the method employed in dealing with 
the deterioration of the current account balance which 
lasted until 1954. It would seem commendable, however, 
that the authorities chose currency depreciation in prefer­
ence to some form of exchange control. Yet, the domestic 
sector appeared to be as responsible for the inflationary 
impact as was the external sector. Table III, page 509, 
shows that the money supply expanded rapidly through 1954. 
Thereafter, monetary and fiscal measures were applied 
with more success. This result occurred even though export 
income was contributing to the money supply.
Returning to Table IV once again, one finds that
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long-term capital flowed into Mexico in a constant stream. 
This flow does not mean that the amounts of capital were 
especially large in any one year. Nevertheless, capital 
accumulation for the period as a whole totaled $419 
million. In order to visualize the effectiveness of this 
capital inflow, one must consult the results registered 
by the real national income. The year 1953 occasioned a 
decline in both the nominal and real national income 
(product). But beginning with 1954 and continuing through 
June, 1956, the real national Income rose at something 
more than moderate rates. In addition, the money supply 
in 1955 increased by only one-half that of 1954, and it 
declined In 1956. Surely this explains that the 
efficiency of capital was much greater near the end of 
the period than in the earlier years.
But what about the contribution of external policy 
toward a condition of international equilibrium? The 
depreciation of the peso did convert an import surplus 
into an export surplus. This action, In itself, may not 
solve the current account problem. There is created, how­
ever, an atmosphere for the free rate to be subjected to 
the forces of demand and supply. So far, the new rate has 
been maintained and an export surplus has been created.
The situation may change as the long run forces make their 
weight felt. The depreciated rate no doubt was influential
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In raising the price level hy nearly fifteen points in 
1955. Nevertheless, the increase amounted to only four 
points between 1955 and October, 1956 (see Table III, 
column 7, page 309).
The stock of gold and foreign exchange reserves 
were larger by some $185 million. This accumulation can 
be utilized in case of a temporary current account deteri­
oration.
The external sector has been favorable enough to 
attract long-term capital. The desirability of capital 
inflow depends upon the relation between exports and 
imports and saving and investment plus the ability of the 
economy to show a larger output. Recent Mexican experi­
ence reveals that the export surplus reduces the need for 
so much outside capital. On the other hand, it was found 
that, in general, the deficiency in saving required the 
inflow of capital. The tedious balancing of these factors 
seemed to create a more favorable result in the latter 
years of this study, particularly after depreciation 
became effective.
With respect to the influence of capital inflows, 
it was found that the country could better utilize 
increasing amounts of capital as time passed. The reason 
for this is found in the greater efficiency that was evi­
dent in the domestic sector. Also, the inflow of capital
329
seemingly reduced the need for continued expansion of 
money and credit. Finally, the export surplus which was 
required to service capital imports became a reality.
For these reasons, it is quite certain that those 
in charge of external policy were concerned with the state 
of international equilibrium as they made their decisions 
relating to the external sector. In conclusion, one 
should further state that monetary and fiscal policy were 
responsible, in part, for the reorientation of the more 
sound economic condition which has been accomplished in 
Mexico.
Turning to Chile, Table IV, page 319, shows that 
this nation has acquired an import surplus for the period 
(1952-1955) amounting to about $30 million. Oddly enough, 
there was only one year (1953) in which Chile occasioned 
an import surplus. Nevertheless, this figure was greater 
than the export surpluses of the remaining years.
Capital, on balance, flowed inward. The extent of 
the inflow ($84 million) was more than enough to offset 
the import surplus of the current account. Gold and 
foreign exchange holdings increased, too, by about $36 
million.
On the surface it would appear that Chile was 
witnessing little trouble in carrying out its external 
policy. Looking further into the matter, one finds that
sso
the opposite situation prevailed. An important reason 
which explains the prevalence of an export surplus in 
every year except 1955 was the continual depreciation of 
the exchange rate. The rate change was violent. In 1951 
the exchange rate was 90 pesos per dollar; in 1956 the 
rate was 565 pesos per dollar.
A short review of exchange rate variations will 
begin with the year 1952. An export surplus amounting to 
about $8 million was realized. This surplus was possible 
primarily because of the depreciated rate which changed 
from 90 to 118.6 pesos per dollar at the close of 1952.
At the end of 1953 an import surplus of some $69 
million occurred. Perhaps a good explanation as to why 
this result took place is found in the variation of the 
exchange rate. In 1953 the effective rate was appreciated, 
that is, from 118.6 to 110.0 pesos per dollar. Evidently, 
the external sector of the economy was extremely sensitive 
to this new, lower (appreciated) rate. The result was 
that imports rose while exports declined, or, at least, 
the two failed to move proportionately. With the reali­
zation of the sensitivity in the external sector, the 
authorities allowed depreciation of the exchange rate to 
continue throughout the remainder of the period. In 
other words, the only way in which an export surplus could 
be accumulated was by repeated depreciation.
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As for capital inflow, figures relate that long­
term capital moved into the country in three of the four 
years for which information was available. As in the case 
of Brazil, a major portion of the Chilean inflow has come 
from foreign governments or financial institutions rather 
than from individuals.
The gold and foreign exchange reserve balance for 
the period amounted to approximately $36 million (refer to 
Table II, page 295). Since an import balance occurred 
over the same period of time, this balance implies that 
the country was losing (selling) short-term assets in 
order to cover excess imports.
It has already been pointed out that monetary and 
fiscal policy was applied with little success in Chile. 
External policy appears to have been just as ineffective.
But getting closer to the facts, one would, in the first 
place, question the ability of a nation to enjoy benefits 
from continued depreciation. In the case of Chile, the 
persistent depreciation brought with it significant rises 
in the price level. Table III, page 309, indicates a 57 
per cent rise in prices in 1954 over those in 1953. With 
further depreciation in the following year, the price level 
rose by over 100 per cent of 1954. Again in 1956 the price 
level increased. It reached a height of some 485 per cent 
of the base year, 1953. Of course, some of the responsibility
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for rising prices attaches to internal causes. Yet, the 
external policy must have contributed in no small way to 
this unfortunate experience.
The accumulation of long-term capital constitutes a 
problem of repayment. A nation that is able to create 
export surpluses only at the expense of severe depreci­
ation cannot maintain such a situation indefinitely.
And since it cannot, defaults in capital repayments may 
be expected unless the problem is solved. There seemed 
to be no substantial effort directed toward a state of 
international equilibrium in Chile.
Peru is the only country in this survey which 
recorded an import surplus in its balance of payments in 
every year of the survey. The total amounted to $189 
million. This trend occurred even though the currency 
depreciated. In fact, the inability of the nation to sell 
more abroad was responsible, in part, for the changing 
value of its currency which took the following course: 
15.43 soles per dollar, 1952; 16.85 - 1953; 19.39 - 1954; 
and 19.00 - 1955-1956. It is true, however, that the 
exchange rate was held constant during the last two years 
at a rate slightly lower (appreciated) than that of 1954. 
Nevertheless, the only improvement realized appeared to 
be a larger amount of long-term capital inflow.
To trace the long-term capital movements, one finds
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that capital was inward on balance during the period. The 
total inflow of $156 million was, nevertheless, less than 
the current account deficit. This condition is indicative 
of a fundamental disequilibrium, and serves notice of a 
long run problem with respect to the external sector of 
this country. Furthermore, gold and foreign exchange 
holdings as presented in Table II, page 295, show a change 
of only $1 million.
The result of Peru*s external experience over this 
relatively short period of time may be explained in that 
(1) the nation has been selling short-term assets, and (2) 
some portion of its trade was carried on by clearing 
agreements.
The external problems of the Peruvian economy 
would be expected to cause some repercussions within the 
nation. To better understand the domestic disturbances, 
one may refer back to Table III, page 309. Because of the 
inability to acquire foreign capital in desirable quanti­
ties, the internal money supply was forced to expand. In 
doing so, the rate of money expansion wTas greater than the 
productive facilities could support. Thus, inflation 
occurred. The constant rise in the price level was attri­
buted, in some degree, to the extensive depreciation of 
the exchange rate.
It would seem prudent to state, then, that the rise
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in the real national product of less than one percentage 
point in 1954, the last year in which national product 
information was available, was a partial responsibility 
of external policy.
There is little justification for stating that the 
concept of international equilibrium was visualized, much 
less applied, in connection with the external policy of 
Peru.
With a brief discussion of the external policy of 
Venezuela, this survey of the six nations will be completed. 
Venezuela is the only nation of the group that obtained 
an export surplus over the period considered. The amount 
of this surplus was $68 million.
The long-term capital movement which was inward, on 
balance, for the period, flowed in the wrong direction and 
thus did not enable the country to maintain an equilibrium 
in its balance of payments. In addition, gold and foreign 
exchange accumulated to the extent of $156 million.
The experience of Venezuela is, therefore, different 
than that occasioned by most of the older countries con­
sidered thus far. To use an analogy similar to that 
employed in the discussion of the other countries, it would 
appear that the exchange rate of Venezuela was overvalued. 
But this reflection would be incorrect. The major reason 
why this nation has attained an export surplus is to be
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found in its huge petroleum shipments. All other items 
making up its exports and imports do not reveal the 
tendency toward an appreciated currency. In other words, 
the fact that Venezuela's one major export is oil should 
not lead one to believe that that item determines the rate 
of exchange of the country's currency.
On the other hand, the experience in Venezuela's 
external sector is such that it could have created severe 
internal problems. These problems were mitigated, however, 
by the wise employment of monetary and fiscal policy.
Since earlier discussions have explained the application 
of domestic policy measures, it will suffice at this point 
to call attention to Chapter III which indicates that the 
Federal Government and, in certain respects, the Central 
Bank carried out policies which prevented extreme inflation. 
The results of their action is presented in Table III of 
this chapter. It shows that the increases in the money 
supply were quite effective in bringing forth additional 
production so that the real national product rose steadily. 
And it did so without sharp increases in the price level.
The inflow of foreign capital seemed to be utilized 
to further production rather than merely to add to the 
blaze of inflation. In this period of early growth it 
appears that Venezuela was capable of employing large 
amounts of capital quite successfully.
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There is one certain danger in connection with the 
external sector of the nation*s economy. Should the 
country ever lose its heretofore dependable export market 
for petroleum, its current account wrould be subject to a 
sudden reversal.
The authorities in this nation, perhaps more than 
those of any other included in the survey, seem to have 
worked toward a more balanced economy. In the external 
sector, the exchange rate was maintained at 3.35 boli­
var es per dollar throughout the whole period. The satis­
factory current account balance encouraged the inflow of 
capital. From a long run viewpoint, the nation was able 
to produce an export surplus which is essential to service 
the inflow of this type of capital. All this occurred 
with only moderate changes in prices and a steady rise in 
real income.
To conclude this section, there appears to be no 
clear-cut trend which emphasizes a definite type of 
external policy of the domestic economies of Group I 
nations which is distinctly different from that employed 
by the external economies of Group II countries. For 
example, Argentina and Brazil, two representative nations 
of Group I countries, occasioned nearly as much external 
difficulty as did Chile of the Group II nations. In fact, 
Argentina and Brazil witnessed more serious problems in
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the functioning of their external sectors than was true of 
Venezuela. On the other hand, Mexico of the Group I 
classification was more successful in overcoming external 
difficulties than was Chile or Peru.
Once again there appears to be sound justification 
for stating that each nation is confronted with a set of 
problems which are peculiar to that nation. An attempt 
to set forth recommendations for the purpose of relieving 
difficulties, whether of internal or external origin, 
encompassing several nations or a specific area can be 
expected to meet with only limited success.
The nations involved in this study employed various 
means to achieve a current account balance, none of which 
realized this goal. The specific measures varied from a 
nearly free market determination of the exchange rate— as 
in the case of Mexico— to severe exchange controls as 
applied by Argentina, Brazil, and Chile.
Depreciation was the most popular device used to 
help solve the current account problem of these countries. 
The effect of depreciation differed in the several nations. 
From a short run viewpoint, Mexico appeared to achieve 
some success after depreciation was instigated. On the 
other hand, the depreciation of the Chilean exchange rate 
probably produced more harm than good.
Appreciation as an external device was little used.
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It appeared only in connection with two isolated instances. 
The Chilean peso rate appreciated in 1953. The reali­
zation of an import surplus in the same year led, however, 
to depreciation. Peru was the other nation which revealed 
an appreciated exchange rate. The change occurred in 1954 
and was of small magnitude.
The three measuring devices as developed in this 
section yield valuable information which may he used as 
a partial basis to explain the effectiveness of monetary, 
fiscal, and external policies. An analysis has shown that 
the several nations enjoyed different degrees of success, 
or lack of success, in applying the three policies. In 
fact, these observations indicated some of the factors which 
caused difficulties in the functioning of the economies.
Not only was it possible to describe the general 
effectiveness of internal and external policies, but the 
three measuring devices revealed how one policy measure 
influences the operation of other such measures. In this 
respect, one may determine with the aid of those measuring 
devices the relative importance of monetary, fiscal, and 
external policies as each of them is employed. Finally, 
the measuring devices serve as a basis for judging whether 
or not a nation is directing its policies toward a con­
dition of international equilibrium.
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II. GENERAL CONCLUSIONS
In Chapter I the concept of International equi­
librium was presented. Briefly, it explained that a nation 
could maintain a given national income at a stated exchange 
rate provided that saving equated investment and Imports 
equated exports. Furthermore, the above condition could 
be achieved if the balance between the internal accounts 
of saving and investment were different from those of the 
external accounts of imports and exports, provided that 
the movement of capital was equal to the difference.
It was also proposed that a condition of inter­
national equilibrium is unlikely to be achieved without 
the employment of flexible monetary, fiscal, and external 
policies. To substantiate the above statement, it wras 
shown that underdeveloped countries are not likely to 
acquire or lose capital in amounts sufficient to provide 
a balance between saving and investment and Imports and 
exports* Furthermore, some of the internal difficulties 
experienced by the lesser developed countries are not 
directly related to capital flows. The tremendous desire 
to develop the countries may serve as one example which 
creates internal problems. Then too, external difficulties 
evolve which have little direct relation to capital move­
ments. For example, it appears that some nations attempt 
to control exchange rates and depreciate, or appreciate,
540
their currencies in order to attain current account 
balances. The strict control of exchange rates or the 
intermittent juggling of these rates reflect changes in 
demand and supply of foreign exchange regardless of 
capital movements.
Important factors which relate to the functioning 
of underdeveloped nations may have an impact which is quite 
different from the influence they would expect to have in 
highly industrialized nations. These factors create, 
therefore, additional problems for study.
In connection with the relationship of these factors 
to monetary policy, it was found that in Latin America 
there was a lack of uniform banking systems. One nation 
was found to have a central banking system, a second nation 
relied upon foreign branch banks, and a third country 
emphasized commercial banking with little central direction. 
Although there was a definite trend toward central banking 
in this underdeveloped area, the different types of bank­
ing systems created a problem of monetary control. The 
survey of Mexico and Venezuela revealed that the controls 
employed by the Central Bank of Mexico were different from 
those utilized by the Central Bank of Venezuela. The 
Central Bank of Mexico required that commercial banks keep 
up to a 100 per cent reserve against deposits, but pro­
vided an escape clause which allowed lower reserves if
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loans were channeled into predetermined sectors, or if the 
banks provided a certain portion of short-, intermediate-, 
and long-term loans* This kind of control provided quanti­
tative and qualitative requirements with an issue of one 
decree. On the other hand, the Central Bank of Venezuela 
retained the more orthodox controls such as changes in 
reserves, rediscount privileges, and so on.
It was found that savings banks were quite numerous 
in Mexicoj the number of these banks increased a good deal 
in recent years. Yet, in Venezuela there were no savings 
banks.
Interest rates played a rather unimportant role in 
the countries studied. In general, interest rates were 
high, and were determined by the governments rather than 
by the demand and supply of money. One of the reasons 
offered in explanation of the lack of Influence exerted 
by interest rates in channeling funds was the failure to 
establish organized exchanges, or, at least, the fact that 
such exchanges were just beginning to develop.
In addition, the control over money and the banking 
systems by the governments or autonomous entities tended 
to prevent or restrict the implementation of the more 
orthodox monetary measures.
Fiscal factors pose problems in underdeveloped 
areas that are different from those of the more developed
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nations. Not only are personal savings quite low but, for 
this reason, the tax structure often differs from that 
found in the relatively more developed countries. Although 
progressive individual taxation was in operation in both 
Mexico and Venezuela, the rates were very moderate in the 
former country while taxes derived from petroleum far 
exceeded those levied on personal income in the latter 
nation.
It is certain that capital accumulation is becoming 
more effective in many of the Latin American countries.
Yet, a study of two of the more advanced countries in this 
area revealed that capital accumulation is a slow process. 
The incentive toward capital accumulation via development 
programs was surely not lacking. The rapid rise in money, 
credit, and prices was indicative of the limited ability 
of most of the nations to increase real output.
Either the governments or their representatives, 
the autonomous entities, rather than private enterprise, 
seem to enjoy a major share in the direction of economic 
activity. Nevertheless, there appeared to be definite 
indications as to the desirability of expanding private 
enterprise in Mexico and Venezuela. In the pase of Mexico, 
loans were made In increasing amounts directly to indi­
vidual firms. Also, one of the larger autonomous entities 
offered its assets for sale to private bidders. With
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respect to Venezuela, private groups were spending 
millions of dollars in the various fields of trade and 
commerce.
External policy of the lesser developed nations is 
usually practiced in a manner distinguishable from that of 
the more highly developed countries. For instance, the 
exchange systems of the Latin American nations varied from 
flexible exchange rates, as in the case of Mexico, to 
strict exchange control systems of Argentina, Brazil, or 
Chile. In between these two extreme types of exchange 
systems were those of Venezuela and Peru in which some 
moderate form of exchange control was practiced.
Both internal difficulties and external problems 
seem to explain why some form of exchange restriction is 
utilized. In an earlier section of this chapter it was 
explained that most lesser developed countries rely quite 
heavily on external trade. This reliance is greater, per­
haps, than is indicated by a comparison of the contribution 
of export income to total income. Also, nearly all of the 
countries considered were unable to create an equilibrium 
In their current accounts. Yet, it was also found that 
the majority of the nations were plagued with internal 
problems normally associated with development plans.
The evidence presented revealed that a few of the 
countries employed external controls in order to isolate
344
their domestic economies. Venezuela, for example, appeared 
to do this. On the other hand, Chile showed a severe 
current account problem. This difficulty was largely 
responsible for the implementation of a strict exchange 
control system. The pattern of exchange restrictions in 
other countries indicated that they were created for the 
purpose of mitigating both internal and external diffi­
culties.
This analysis further suggested that at least a few 
of the countries attempted to seek a rate of exchange 
which expressed a closer relation between demand and supply 
conditions. The depreciation of the Mexican exchange rate 
was indicative of this reasoning. Nevertheless, depreci­
ation of currencies by most of the countries seemed to 
create a more serious internal problem than the difficulty 
it was supposed to overcome in the external sector.
Such observations implied that the approach to the 
study of underdeveloped countries must be altered some­
what from that employed in the study of developed nations. 
What may be key factors for studying problems of advanced 
nations may be of minor significance in the study of the 
lesser developed countries.
From a policy standpoint, Mexico was unable to 
successfully cope with the numerous internal and external 
problems until near the end of the five-year period.
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Two outstanding reasons given to explain the lack of 
effective policy results were (l) a failure to co-ordinate 
monetary, fiscal, and external policies and (g) improper 
timing of policy measures. Since all economic activity 
was centered around economic development, policy imple­
mentation was made more difficult. Yet, those in charge 
of policy making appeared to direct policy toward a more 
balanced growth pattern.
Although fiscal and, to some extent, external poli­
cies were more important in Venezuela than was monetary 
policy, the whole period was characterized with exceptional 
stability for an underdeveloped country. Even though 
economic development was an important objective, financial 
stability was not' forced into the background.
The external sector was responsible in large 
measure for the relative economic stability over the five- 
year period. Export income was usually channeled into the 
hands of the government and utilized as a part of fiscal 
policy instead of being directed into the banking system 
and thereby being controlled by monetary policy.
One of the most serious threats to economic sta­
bility in Venezuela is the possible loss of its export 
market. Yet, an analysis of this country indicated that 
this shortcoming was realized and that great effort was 
made to diversify domestic industries.
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Neither Mexico nor Venezuela achieved a condition 
of international equilibrium during the five-year period 
under study. It would seem quite logical, however, that 
the lesser developed countries would not achieve such a 
delicate balance among the several factors required by a 
state of international equilibrium. Nevertheless, these 
two nations came closer to achieving this goal than did 
any of the other four countries considered in the present 
chapter.
A study of the two dissimilar economies of Mexico 
and Venezuela in Chapters II and III, respectively, leads 
one to suggest the necessity of incorporating measuring 
devices for the purpose of revealing the effectiveness of 
monetary, fiscal, and external policies. Although several 
kinds of measuring devices may be useful, those offered in 
this study were (l) the relationship between gold and 
international reserves and the money supply, (2) a compari­
son between the money supply, national product (income), 
and the price level, and (3) changes in current account 
balances and long-term capital movements.
The use of the first measuring device sustained the 
proposition that greater monetary stability is possible in 
the open economies of the lesser developed countries if 
changes in money and credit are proportional to the vari­
ations of gold and foreign exchange holdings. The
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application of this device among six representative 
nations of Latin Merica indicated that little effort was 
expended by the authorities in most of these countries 
toward maintaining a direct relation between changes in 
gold and foreign exchange holdings and the money supply.
The second measuring device showed the relative 
effectiveness of domestic policy, that is, monetary and 
fiscal policy. The result of this measuring device 
revealed that planned saving and investment, besides being 
quite small, produced a situation in which realized invest­
ment was larger than realized saying. Money and credit 
were primarily responsible for this condition. Inflation 
prevailed, therefore, in most of the countries reviewed.
In addition, the evidence indicated that some of the 
nations were in no position to absorb large amounts of 
capital flow. With only a few exceptions, monetary and 
fiscal policy was applied with little success.
The third, and final, measuring device revealed 
the portion of the external problem which was associated 
with capital movements. It also indicated the internal 
influences exerted by capital flowrs. Of the six nations 
under observation, it was found that the majority realized 
an import surplus. In some cases, the capital flow was 
inward; however, the amount required to cover the import 
surplus was not sufficient. It was larger than that
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required to "balance the import surplus in only one instance. 
In addition, one country witnessed an export surplus and 
a capital inflow. In any event, capital movements did not 
offset current account balances in exact proportions.
The flow of capital had much to do with depreciation 
which, in itself, created internal difficulties. The most 
noticeable difficulty was the pressure on the ascending 
price levels of most of the countries.
This last measuring device is also useful in help­
ing to determine the approximate need for capital and the 
ability of a country to absorb it. At present, popular 
criteria for explaining capital needs center around the 
association between changes in capital and available 
goods and services. A consideration of the three measuring 
devices would give a better Indication of the probable 
effects on the functioning of the economy as a whole 
occasioned by a change in capital movements.
There are other beneficial results to be derived 
from the utilization of the three measuring devices 
mentioned in the preceding paragraphs. For example, they 
provide a means for checking the effectiveness of policy 
implementation. By this is meant that these devices indi­
cate whether or not monetary, fiscal, and external policies 
are clearly Implemented toward the purpose of achieving a 
condition of international equilibrium. This objective or
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goal is, of course, subject to change in a dynamic economy; 
yet, the measuring devices act as signals calling for 
changes in policy application for the purpose of producing 
a more balanced growth.
This study has quite conclusively supported the 
view that the intensive desire for economic development is 
so strong that it tends to overshadow the principal 
objective of balanced growth as expressed by the concept 
of international equilibrium. This trend is dangerous 
from the standpoint of both short and long run growth. As 
observed, the short run effect of stimulated development 
often produces high prices and inflation rather than 
increased output. From a long run viewpoint, there is the 
problem of mal-allocation of resources. This difficulty, 
in itself, may turn possible short run gains into long run 
losses, particularly if key factors are inflexible to change.
An analysis of the evidence covered by this study 
reveals that there is but limited benefit to be derived 
from making broad observations which may be said to apply 
to groups or areas of nations. Each country is confronted 
with problems and means of solving them, and these are 
often different from nation to nation.
Although this study has suggested, at various times, 
the influence of long run structural factors,:it has 
covered but a five-year period. It therefore contains
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shortcomings which will become clearer as the short run 
blends into a longer period of time.
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